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Chapter 1 
 
General introduction 
Numerous incidences of organizational scandals have recently emerged. 
Some of them elicited attention in the media worldwide. Examples of organizational 
misconduct include cases such as various accounting scandals (e.g., AIG, Tyco, 
WorldCom, Enron and Ahold), NSA’s mass surveillance of citizens around the 
world, melamine-contaminated milk in China (300,000 victims), violation of 
building regulations which resulted in a building collapse in Bangladesh (1,100 
deaths), GSK’s bribery in China to spark medicine-sale, the European meat 
adulteration scandal, and banking scandals leading up to the worldwide financial 
crisis. All these examples clearly show that unethical business conduct is both 
widespread and invasive, with serious consequences for society and its members. It 
is thus clear that it is important that we understand why so many decision makers 
resort to unethical business practices. 
As a result of this widespread corruption in businesses, research on ethical 
and unethical decision making in organizations has begun to receive the attention it 
deserves. Historically, research on business ethics has taken a normative (i.e., 
prescriptive) approach (Treviño & Weaver, 1994), which origins from philosophy 
and theology and focuses on how individuals and organizations should behave. This 
approach is based on the assumption of autonomy and responsibility and assumes 
that “ethical behavior is not a function of anything other than an individual's free 
choice" (Treviño & Weaver, 1994 p. 118). Interestingly, this approach also assumes 
that humans are rational moral beings. That is, people are aware of the ethical 
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aspects of the situation in which they are involved and they are therefore able to 
consciously decide to “do good” or to “do bad”. 
However, it has become increasingly clear that unethical business conduct 
can rarely be attributed to a few “bad apples” at the top. Instead, unethical behavior 
is widespread and decision makers at various organizational levels have been found 
to behave unethically. It thus seems that a substantial amount of unethical behavior 
in organizations is the result of a temporary lapse in the behavior of good people. 
Indeed, both common practice and research have shown that good people sometimes 
do bad things (Bersoff, 1999). To address this issue, a more empirical (i.e., 
descriptive) approach emerged in management and social sciences literatures that 
focus on how individuals and organizations behave rather than how they should 
behave (Treviño & Weaver, 1994). That is, this approach attempts to describe, 
explain, and/or predict ethical and unethical decision making in organizations by 
looking at how individuals make decisions when faced with ethical dilemmas. The 
present dissertation applies such an approach to improve our understanding of the 
antecedents of ethical and unethical decision making in organizations, and, more 
generally, of moral judgment and behavior by integrating recent work in the fields of 
self-regulation and morality. 
 
A self-regulation approach to ethical and unethical decision making in 
organizations 
 Self-regulation enables people to inhibit, override, and/or refrain from acting 
upon their impulses and desires (Baumeister, Heatherton, & Tice, 1994; Mischel, 
1974; Muraven & Baumeister, 2000; Tangney, Baumeister, & Boone, 2004). The 
human capacity for self-regulation is extremely adaptive and enables people to 
follow society’s norms and rules (Baumeister, Vohs, & Tice, 2007; Mischel, 1974). 
In line with this, research has related successful self-regulation to numerous positive 
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outcomes such as success at work, increased concentration, an improved ability to 
cope with stress and problems, and even lower divorce rates. Conversely, self-
regulation failure has been associated with depression and various behavioral 
problems such as aggression, the inability to manage finances, and theft (Hagger, 
Wood, Stiff, & Chatzisarantis, 2010; Muraven, Tice, & Baumeister, 1998; Tangney 
et al., 2004). It is thus clear that our capacity for self-regulation plays a highly 
important role in a many aspects of our lives. 
 Research on self-regulation failures suggests that self-regulation requires 
mental energy that is limited in its availability (e.g., Baumeister, Bratslavsky, 
Muraven, & Tice, 1998; Muraven et al., 1998) More specifically, all behaviors that 
require self-regulation draw from the same limited resource, which can become 
depleted with repeated use (Muraven & Baumeister, 2000). When self-regulatory 
resources are depleted, performance on subsequent acts that require self-regulation 
may be impaired (Baumeister et al., 1998; Hagger et al., 2010). This state of 
diminished resources following exertion of self-regulation is usually referred to as 
ego depletion (Baumeister et al., 1998). In support of the idea that different acts of 
self-control draw on a limited and shared resource, research shows that various acts 
involving effective self-regulation (e.g., resisting tempting foods, suppressing 
emotions, performing counter-attitudinal behaviors) impair performance on a 
subsequent completely unrelated act that requires self-regulation (for an overview, 
see Hagger et al., 2010). 
 Importantly, the limited resource model of self-regulation may also have 
implications for our understanding of ethical and unethical behavior in 
organizations. Specifically, it has been argued that displaying ethical and avoiding 
unethical behavior requires self-regulation to override selfish impulses (DeWall, 
Baumeister, Gailliot, & Maner, 2008). In line with this idea, laboratory research has 
shown that after an act that required self-regulation, people are less willing to help 
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others (DeWall et al., 2008), are more likely to cheat (Gino, Schweitzer, Mead, & 
Ariely, 2011; Mead, Baumeister, Gino, Schweitzer, & Ariely, 2009), and more likely 
to act aggressively (DeWall, Baumeister, Stillman, & Gailliot, 2007). This finding 
may have important implications in the context of work organizations because 
unethical business behaviors such as revealing confidential company information 
with unauthorized others or theft of company property may pose serious problems 
for organizations. Similarly, ethical business conduct like voluntary helping one’s 
supervisor and coworkers, speaking up to improve the way in which work is 
organized, and attempting to offer the best customer service all contribute to 
organizational effectiveness (N. P. Podsakoff, Whiting, Podsakoff, & Blume, 2009; 
P. M. Podsakoff, MacKenzie, Paine, & Bachrach, 2000). However, a variety of 
forces that are known to hamper and deplete self-regulation are omnipresent in work 
situations, such as the necessity to make many choices and decisions (Vohs et al., 
2008), overly long working hours that lead to sleep deprivation (Barnes, 
Schaubroeck, Huth, & Ghumman, 2011; Christian & Ellis, 2011), and stress 
(Muraven & Baumeister, 2000). In other words, a number of factors that seem 
inherent to organizational life may constrain ethical employee behavior and/or 
promote unethical employee behavior. 
 
Research objectives and overview of the chapters 
In the present dissertation we thus apply a self-regulation perspective to 
ethical and unethical decision making in organizations. In Chapter 2 and 3, we 
focus on the self-regulation of (un)ethical behavior and the role of individual 
differences in this process. In Chapter 4, we take a more moment-to-moment 
perspective on the self-regulation of (un)ethical behavior. Finally, in Chapter 5, we 
investigate the role of leader mistreatment in the regulation of (un)ethical behavior. 
In the latter chapter, rather than looking at the availability of self-regulatory 
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resources, we examine the interplay between people’s personalities. We use multiple 
research methods to test our hypotheses: experiments conducted with students as 
well as multisource field studies in organizations. In the remainder of this 
introduction, we focus on the influence of individual differences, behavioral history, 
and the interplay between personalities on the self-regulation of ethical and unethical 
behavior in the workplace.  
Self-regulation of (un)ethical behavior in the workplace and individual 
differences 
As argued above, self-regulation enables people to bring their behavior in 
line with prevailing norms and rules. Importantly, depending upon individual 
differences, people are likely to feel a multitude of impulses and desires that may or 
may not oppose socially desirable behavior. In other words, instead of doing what 
they want, self-regulation enables people to follow the norms and rules of a society 
or an organization. Successful self-regulation thus suppresses individual differences 
in behavior whereas individual differences will emerge more strongly when people 
are depleted (Baumeister, Gailliot, DeWall, & Oaten, 2006). An individual 
differences variable particularly important for the emergence of ethical and unethical 
behavior is moral identity (Aquino & Reed, 2002). 
Moral identity reflects the degree to which people consider being a moral 
person to be an important part of their self-concept (Aquino & Reed, 2002; Shao, 
Aquino, & Freeman, 2008). Moral identity has been conceptualized as a cognitive 
representation or schema of moral values, goals, traits, and behavioral scripts 
(Aquino, Freeman, Reed, Lim, & Felps, 2009; Shao et al., 2008). For people high in 
moral identity, this moral self-schema is more readily accessible and available for 
use than for people low in moral identity (Narvaez, Lapsley, Hagele, & Lasky, 2006; 
Shao et al., 2008). Moral values and ideals (such as being a good person, being 
helpful) are central to someone’s self-concept for people high in moral identity 
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(Narvaez et al., 2006; Shao et al., 2008). When activated, moral identity should thus 
have a strong influence on one’s cognition and behavior, as individuals have a strong 
tendency to maintain self-consistency (Aquino & Reed, 2002; Blasi, 1980). 
In line with the idea that moral identity is an important source of motivation 
to behave in an ethical manner, previous studies have revealed a positive 
relationship between moral identity and moral behavior as reflected in self-reported 
volunteering (Aquino & Reed, 2002), ethical leader behavior (Mayer, Aquino, 
Greenbaum, & Kuenzi, 2012), an increased likelihood of making a donation (Aquino 
& Reed, 2002; Reed & Aquino, 2003), and charitable giving (Reynolds & Ceranic, 
2007). Additionally, moral identity has been associated with decreased levels of 
immoral conduct, such as less lying in business negotiations (Shao et al., 2008), 
lowered aggression on the football field (Sage, Kavussanu, & Duda, 2006), and less 
antisocial behavior among adolescents (Barriga, Morrison, Liau, & Gibbs, 2001). 
Important for the present purposes, moral identity may also facilitate the 
self-regulation of ethical behavior in situations that constrain the availability of self-
regulatory resources (e.g., depletion). As argued above, people with a high moral 
identity have more readily accessible moral values than people with a low moral 
identity (Aquino et al., 2009). Over time, people with a high moral identity will thus 
more frequently implement ethical behavior, resulting in more internalized and 
automatic enactment of ethical behavior (Seeley & Gardner, 2003). For people high 
in moral identity this internalization of ethical behavior arguably implies that one’s 
ethical behavior is less likely to draw on controlled cognitive processes that share 
resources with other controlled processes, and thus, may suffer less from regulatory 
depletion. In other words, because people high in moral identity are much more 
likely than people low in moral identity to have internalized the display of ethical 
behaviors, acting ethically may proceed in a more automatic manner that uses fewer 
controlled resources (see Bargh, 1994; Schneider & Chein, 2003; Shiffrin & 
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Schneider, 1977; Smith & Lerner, 1986). People with a high moral identity are thus 
likely to have their moral values more readily available, even in situations in which 
their self-regulatory resources are depleted. 
In Chapter 2, we investigate the effect of ego depletion on unethical 
decision making behavior of leaders. In organizations, it is particularly important 
that leaders act in ethical ways, because they serve as role models for their 
employees (cf. Bandura, 1986). At the same time, however, leader have often busy 
and demanding work schedules (e.g., Ganster, 2005; Hambrick, Finkelstein, & 
Mooney, 2005; Mintzberg, 1973) which makes acting ethical not necessarily easy to 
implement. However, as argued above, moral identity may be an important boundary 
condition for this proposed effect of depletion on unethical leader behavior. In 
Chapter 2 we explicitly test this hypothesis by focusing on the role of moral identity 
as a variable that curbs the effects of ego depletion on unethical leader behaviors. 
In Chapter 3, we tried to substantiate the findings of Chapter 2 in the 
context of ethical behavior (vs. unethical behavior in Chapter 2). Chapter 3 thus 
explicitly focuses on the interaction between moral identity and depletion in 
predicting ethical behaviors. Additionally, we argue that selfishness by showing 
antisocial behavior is inherently different from selfishness by refraining from 
prosocial behavior. We expect that people need power to feel that they can refrain 
from helping others. People in a position of power are more inclined to disregard 
others (Keltner, Gruenfeld, & Anderson, 2003; Magee & Smith, 2013) and therefore 
more likely to deviate from prevailing norms (Briñol, Petty, Valle, Rucker, & 
Becerra, 2007). We thus expect that power is likely to be a facilitator of the selfish 
state resulting from the combination of depletion and low moral identity. In Chapter 
3 we explicitly test this hypothesis by investigating the role of power in the 
interaction between moral identity and ego depletion. 
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Self-regulation of (un)ethical behavior in the workplace and behavioral history 
Research on the influence of individual and situational variations in 
predicting ethical and unethical behavior does not shed much light on the 
development of (un)ethical behavior on a moment-to-moment basis. Research on 
moral self-regulation addresses this issue by investigating moment-to-moment 
balancing acts between ethical and unethical behavior in the context of one’s recent 
behavioral history (Monin & Miller, 2001; Zhong & Liljenquist, 2006; Zhong, 
Liljenquist, & Cain, 2009). This research has revealed that self and self-regulation 
processes are important in determining ethical and unethical behavior (Aquino et al., 
2009; Blasi, 1983; Sachdeva, Iliev, & Medin, 2009; Zhong et al., 2009). 
Regretfully, this research has not yet resulted in an integrated model that 
informs us how self-related processes influence (un)ethical behavior. In fact, two 
distinct literatures seem to have developed independently. While both literatures rely 
on similar manipulations and measures of morality, they offer surprisingly opposite 
findings. On the one hand, a series of studies show that people with a salient self-
concept as being a moral person display more prosocial behavior than people for 
whom this self-concept is not salient, or for whom an immoral self-concept is salient 
(e.g., Aquino et al., 2009; Blasi, 1983; Reed, Aquino, & Levy, 2007). Thus, this 
research suggests that when feeling moral (e.g., after helping your colleague in the 
morning), you are more likely to put in some overtime in the afternoon. This effect 
is usually explained in terms of consistency: people who view themselves as moral 
feel that they have to continue acting in a moral manner to avoid violating their 
sense of self and their integrity (Blasi, 1980). 
On the other hand, a growing literature shows that people with a salient self-
concept as an immoral person display more prosocial behavior than people for 
whom this self-concept is not salient, or people who view themselves as moral (e.g., 
Jordan, Mullen, & Murnighan, 2011; Monin & Miller, 2001; Sachdeva et al., 2009). 
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Thus, this research suggests, for instance, that after procrastinating at work in the 
morning, you are more likely to subsequently comply with a request to work 
overtime. Conversely, if you would have spent your morning helping your 
colleague, you might refuse to do overtime. This effect is usually explained in terms 
of compensation and licensing processes (Zhong et al., 2009): People who feel 
immoral attempt to “make up” for this by displaying moral behavior (Sachdeva et 
al., 2009), whereas people who view themselves as moral feel that they have built up 
a “surplus” of morality, allowing them to display less moral behavior without 
damaging their self-concept and self-presentation as a moral person. 
In Chapter 4, we argue that moral consistency and compensation occur in a 
social context and that both processes reflect specific ways to deal with reputational 
concerns. Reputation (i.e., how one is seen by others, “others perceptions”; Carlson, 
Vazire, & Oltmanns, 2011) is one of the most valuable social assets that humans 
have and we go a long way to build and defend a positive reputation (Cheek & 
Briggs, 1982; De Cremer & Tyler, 2005; James, 1890). In Chapter 4 we argue that 
the crucial difference between consistency and compensation is that the first one 
implies a more proactive approach to reputation building and maintenance, whereas 
the latter forms a reactive, “damage control” response in social situations. In Chapter 
4 we explicitly test this hypothesis by manipulating the extent to which people take a 
reactive versus proactive approach. 
Self-regulation of (un)ethical behavior in the workplace and the interplay 
between personalities 
Leader mistreatment may form an important predictor of (un)ethical 
behavior in the workplace (Bennett & Robinson, 2000; Robinson & Greenberg, 
1998). One reason for this may be that leader mistreatment promotes self-regulation 
impairment (Tepper, 2000; Thau, Aquino, & Poortvliet, 2007). As argued above, 
self-regulation impairment hinders ethical behavior (DeWall et al., 2008), and 
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promotes unethical behavior (DeWall et al., 2007; Gino et al., 2011; Mead et al., 
2009). Indeed, research shows that employees who feel abused are more likely to 
show unethical work behaviors because of self-regulation impairment (Thau & 
Mitchell, 2010). Thus, whether or not an employee is able to self-regulate 
(un)ethical behavior is likely to depend on how they are treated by their leader. 
An important predictor of leader mistreatment is leader personality (Padilla, 
Hogan, & Kaiser, 2007; Tepper, 2007). Tepper (2007, p. 281) proposed that 
“supervisors who are high in neuroticism experience greater anger, frustration, and 
impulsiveness compared with their low-neuroticism counterparts (Costa and 
McCrae, 1992), and consequently, neuroticism should be positively related to 
abusive supervision.” This excessive self-focus on aversive emotional states elicits a 
chronic tendency for individuals high in neuroticism to be responsive to social 
threats (e.g., Denissen & Penke, 2008; Matthews, 2004). That is, neuroticism 
involves insecurity about the self, making neurotic individuals scan their 
environment for possible sources of threat to their fragile self (Gray, 1991). Some 
indirect support for this theoretical assertion is provided by Hoobler and Hu (2013) 
showing that state negative affect – regarded as a theoretical proxy of neuroticism – 
is positively associated with leaders’ abusive supervision. In sum, it is likely that 
neurotic leaders may show elevated levels of leader mistreatment, and as such, may 
increase unethical workplace behaviors of their employees.  
 In Chapter 5, we specifically consider the context in which leader 
mistreatment takes place. Trait activation theory (TAT; Tett & Burnett, 2003), 
proposes that activation of traits and their influence on behavior is contingent upon 
the availability of trait-relevant cues in the social context. Put differently, TAT 
argues that a situation may ‘bring out’ particular traits if a thematic connection exists 
between the situation and the individual’s trait (Judge & Zapata, 2015). A most 
relevant aspect of the leader’s social context are his or her employees. Arguably, the 
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process of leadership implies a dynamic relationship between leaders and employees 
(Dansereau, Graen, & Haga, 1975; Dulebohn, Bommer, Liden, Brouer, & Ferris, 
2012; Hollander, 1985). As said before, individuals high in neuroticism are 
especially likely to be responsive to social threats (e.g., Denissen & Penke, 2008; 
Matthews, 2004). This also makes that neurotic individuals can act in ways that are 
socially disturbing by signaling social exclusion (e.g., Morse, Sauerberger, Todd, & 
Funder, 2015). Therefore, in Chapter 5, we hypothesize that employees low in 
neuroticism are likely to communicate social exclusion cues, which (in line with 
TAT) will activate the neuroticism trait of their leaders, as such reinforcing the link 
between leader neuroticism and abusive supervision. In particular, we investigated if 
employee neuroticism interacts with leader neuroticism in predicting abusive 
supervision and the downstream consequences this has for antisocial employee 
behavior. This interactive effect between leader and employee neuroticism provides 
first empirical evidence in favor of a trait matching approach to examine the role of 
personality in leadership (Judge & Long, 2012). Even more importantly, it also 
provides useful insights into the selection of the trait neuroticism to understand the 
phenomenon of unethical behavior in the workplace better. 
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Being ‘in control’ may make you lose 
control: The role of self-regulation in 
unethical leadership behavior 
 
Abstract 
In the present article, we argue that the constant pressure that leaders face may limit 
the willpower required to behave according to ethical norms and standards and may 
therefore lead to unethical behavior. Drawing upon the ego depletion and moral self-
regulation literatures, we examined whether self-regulatory depletion that is 
contingent upon the moral identity of leaders may promote unethical leadership 
behavior. A laboratory experiment and a multisource field study revealed that 
regulatory resource depletion promotes unethical leader behaviors among leaders 
who are low in moral identity. No such effect was found among leaders with a high 
moral identity. This study extends our knowledge on why organizational leaders do 
not always conform to organizational goals. Specifically, we argue that the hectic 
and fragmented workdays of leaders may increase the likelihood that they violate 
ethical norms. This highlights the necessity to carefully schedule tasks that may have 
ethical implications. Similarly, organizations should be aware that overloading their 
managers with work may increase the likelihood of their leaders transgressing 
ethical norms. 
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Introduction 
One critical challenge that organizational leaders face is to remain focused 
on the display of ethical behavior during the course of their fragmented, hectic, and 
disorderly work days. In fact, the many ethical failures within organizations that 
have emerged in the media over the past decade, such as fraud and corruption, 
clearly highlight the need for organizational leaders to act in an ethical manner. 
Indeed, if leaders focus on behaving ethically, then they will serve as an important 
source of ethical guidance for their employees (Brown, Treviño, & Harrison, 2005; 
Walumbwa et al., 2011). Conversely, when leaders act unethically, employees will 
usually follow suit (Mayer, Kuenzi, Greenbaum, Bardes, & Salvador, 2009). Yet, 
acting in ethical ways is not necessarily easy for leaders because they often have 
busy and demanding work schedules. Leaders are responsible for a great variety of 
complex decisions and actions that range from multi-million dollar decisions to 
more trivial ones; thus, they constantly must decide which decisions are worthy of 
their attention and which are not (e.g., Ganster, 2005; Hambrick, Finkelstein, & 
Mooney, 2005; Mintzberg, 1973). 
In the present paper, we argue that the constant pressure that organizational 
leaders face can limit the willpower that is required to act ethically. This lack of 
mental energy can potentially result in negative consequences, such as 
discriminating against employees based on gender or race, discussing confidential 
company information with unauthorized others, and theft of company property. 
Following the ego depletion literature, we argue that when leaders have to make 
multiple decisions and function in demanding situations, they are less likely to 
maintain the mental energy (i.e., cognitive resources) needed for other controlled, 
energy requiring processes (Muraven & Baumeister, 2000; Vohs et al., 2008). 
Furthermore, because ethical behaviors may depend on cognitive resources (Usoof-
Thowfeek, Janoff-Bulman, & Tavernini, 2011), ego depletion (i.e., as resulting from 
32                                                                                                                                               Chapter 2 
 
the hectic leader role) may increase the likelihood of leaders displaying unethical 
behavior.  
We further postulate, however, that this proposed effect of ego depletion on 
unethical leader behavior may have boundary conditions. One important limit may 
be the extent to which people assign value and importance to morality. This variable 
is likely relevant because it may influence the amount of cognitive resources that 
leaders need to behave in an ethical manner. Specifically, moral identity refers to the 
extent to which people consider being a moral person as an important part of their 
self-definition (Aquino & Reed, 2002; Blasi, 1980). For those who define 
themselves in terms of morality, the display of ethical behavior will be more 
frequently implemented and, consequently, more internalized and automatic; as 
such, they will consume fewer cognitive resources and maintain their self-control 
(cf. Aquino, Freeman, Reed, Lim, & Felps, 2009; Aquino & Reed, 2002; Reynolds 
& Ceranic, 2007). One can therefore expect that leaders who are high in moral 
identity are less vulnerable than leaders low in moral identity to the effects of ego 
depletion on their display of ethical behaviors. 
Ego depletion and self-control 
Self-control refers to an individual’s capacity to inhibit, override, or refrain 
from acting upon his/her impulses and desires (Baumeister, Heatherton, & Tice, 
1994; Mischel, 1974; Muraven & Baumeister, 2000; Tangney, Baumeister, & 
Boone, 2004). Successful self-control has been linked to numerous positive 
outcomes such as success at school and at work, increased concentration, an 
improved ability to cope with stress, and even lower divorce rates. Self-control 
failure, on the other hand, has been linked to negative actions such as theft, assault, 
and aggression, and to various negative outcomes such as obesity, depression, and 
obsessive thoughts, (Hagger, Wood, Stiff, & Chatzisarantis, 2010; Muraven, Tice, & 
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Baumeister, 1998; Tangney et al., 2004). It is thus clear that self-control plays a 
highly important role in a many aspects of our lives. 
 Baumeister and colleagues (e.g., Baumeister, Bratslavsky, Muraven, & Tice, 
1998; Baumeister & Heatherton, 1996; Baumeister, Vohs, & Tice, 2007; Muraven & 
Baumeister, 2000; Muraven et al., 1998) proposed a limited-strength model of self-
control to explain self-control failures. The idea behind this model is that self-
control requires mental energy that is limited in its availability (Baumeister et al., 
1998; Muraven et al., 1998). More specifically, all acts of self-control, such as 
repressing habitual responses, draw from the same limited resource, which can 
become depleted with repeated use (Muraven & Baumeister, 2000). Baumeister and 
colleagues compared self-control to a muscle, which requires strength and energy to 
exert force over a period of time (Hagger et al., 2010). Just as muscles get tired from 
exertion, self-control performance also deteriorates after repeated use (Baumeister et 
al., 2007). 
The state of diminished resources following exertion of self-control is 
usually referred to as ego depletion (Baumeister et al., 1998). In support of the idea 
that different acts of self-control draw on a limited and shared resource, research 
shows that various acts of self-control (e.g., resisting tempting foods, suppressing 
emotions, performing counter-attitudinal behaviors) impair performance on a 
subsequent completely unrelated act that requires self-control (for an overview, see 
Hagger et al., 2010). Particularly important for the present purposes, research has 
shown that after an act of self-control, people are less willing to help others 
(DeWall, Baumeister, Gailliot, & Maner, 2008), are more likely to cheat (Gino, 
Schweitzer, Mead, & Ariely, 2011; Mead, Baumeister, Gino, Schweitzer, & Ariely, 
2009), and more likely to act aggressively (DeWall, Baumeister, Stillman, & 
Gailliot, 2007). 
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Research has identified several causes of resource depletion, including lack 
of sleep (Barnes, Schaubroeck, Huth, & Ghumman, 2011), having to resist 
temptation (Baumeister et al., 1998; Vohs & Heatherton, 2000) , and stress 
(Muraven & Baumeister, 2000). Interestingly, one prime determinant of ego 
depletion is having to make multiple choices and decisions (Vohs et al., 2008). As 
noted, most organizational leaders experience heavy workloads, and have to make 
numerous choices and decisions each day. These specific characteristics of the 
leadership role seem to form a source of resource depletion, which might make 
leaders especially prone to self-control failure. 
Awareness of the ethical dimension of many complex business decisions is 
an active and attention-consuming process that requires cognitive resources (Usoof-
Thowfeek et al., 2011). Moreover, resisting the temptation to act in unethical ways is 
also likely to draw on these resources; this temptation may be especially pronounced 
for leaders because of their position of power (see, e.g., Fiske, 1993; Georgesen & 
Harris, 1998; Rusbult & Van Lange, 2003). The assumption that ethical leadership 
draws from the same regulatory resources as the other aspects of the leadership role 
(e.g., decision-making, number of choices, high workload) thus leads us to expect 
that depletion of self-regulatory resources can lead to higher levels of unethical 
leadership behavior. 
However, there may be important boundary conditions for the link between 
ego depletion and unethical leader behavior. Specifically, the extent to which people 
assign value and importance to morality is likely to influence the amount of 
cognitive resources that leaders need to behave in an ethical manner. That is, leaders 
who define themselves in terms of morality will require fewer cognitive resources to 
inhibit impulses and will be able to buffer the effects of ego depletion on their 
ethical behaviors (cf. Aquino et al., 2009; Aquino & Reed, 2002; Reynolds & 
Ceranic, 2007). We explicitly test this argument by focusing on the role of moral 
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identity as a variable that limits the effects of ego depletion on unethical leader 
behaviors. 
Moral identity as a buffer 
Moral identity reflects the importance of morality to one’s self-concept 
(Aquino & Reed, 2002; Shao, Aquino, & Freeman, 2008). Moral identity is usually 
conceptualized as a cognitive representation or schema of moral values, goals, traits, 
and behavioral scripts (Aquino et al., 2009; Lapsley & Narvaez, 2004; Shao et al., 
2008). For people high in moral identity, this moral self-schema is more readily 
accessible and available for use than for people low in moral identity. Moral values 
and ideals (such as being a good person, being helpful) are more central to 
someone’s self-concept for people high in moral identity (Narvaez, Lapsley, Hagele, 
& Lasky, 2006; Shao et al., 2008). When activated, moral identity should influence 
one’s cognition and behavior, as people have a strong tendency to maintain self-
consistency (Aquino & Reed, 2002; Blasi, 1980, 1983). 
In line with the idea that moral identity is an important source of motivation 
to behave in an ethical manner, previous studies have revealed a positive 
relationship between moral identity and moral behavior as reflected in self-reported 
volunteering (Aquino & Reed, 2002), the actual likelihood of making a donation 
(Aquino & Reed, 2002; Reed & Aquino, 2003), and charitable giving (Reynolds & 
Ceranic, 2007). Additionally, moral identity has been associated with decreased 
levels of immoral conduct, such as lying in business negotiations (Shao et al., 2008), 
lowered aggression on the football field (Sage, Kavussanu, & Duda, 2006), and less 
antisocial behavior among adolescents (Barriga, Morrison, Liau, & Gibbs, 2001). 
Interestingly, recent research has suggested that moral identity also functions as an 
antecedent of ethical leader behavior (Mayer, Aquino, Greenbaum, & Kuenzi, 
2012). 
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 We argue that moral identity is also a relevant boundary condition for the 
effects of ego depletion on unethical leader behavior. As noted, moral identity is an 
important motivator of ethical behavior (Aquino & Reed, 2002; Blasi, 1980; Hardy 
& Carlo, 2005), and people with a high moral identity should thus be especially 
likely to expend extra effort to self-regulate their ethical behavior. Over time, people 
with a high moral identity will more frequently regulate their behavior (i.e., inhibit 
selfish impulses), resulting in more internalized and automatic enactment of ethical 
behavior (Seeley & Gardner, 2003). Consequently, for people high in moral identity 
this internalization of ethical behavior arguably implies that one’s ethical behavior is 
less likely to draw on controlled cognitive processes that share resources with other 
controlled processes, and thus, may suffer less from regulatory depletion. In other 
words, because people high in moral identity are much more likely than people low 
in moral identity to have internalized the display of ethical and prosocial behaviors, 
acting ethically may proceed in a more automatic manner that uses fewer controlled 
resources (see Bargh, 1994; Schneider & Chein, 2003; Shiffrin & Schneider, 1977; 
Smith & Lerner, 1986). Hence, in a state of resource depletion, a high moral identity 
will provide leaders with a buffer against the detrimental effects of ego depletion on 
their ethical behaviors. 
Study overview 
In the present research, we collected both experimental and (multisource) 
field data to cross-validate our findings. We did not opt for qualitative research, as 
we were particularly interested in testing specific hypotheses, for which quantitative 
research is most suitable. Furthermore, we chose to use established and validated 
measures. Moral identity was measured using Aquino and Reed’s (2002) instrument 
(for an overview, see Shao et al., 2008). In Study 1 we manipulated depletion using 
a frequently used and effective depletion task (for an overview, see Hagger et al., 
2010); in Study 2 we assessed depletion with a measure that has been successfully 
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used in prior research (Vohs et al., 2008). Unethical leader behavior was measured 
using Bennett and Robinson’s (2000) often-used instrument that measures 
workplace deviance (for an overview, see Berry, Ones, & Sackett, 2007), which has 
shown good psychometric properties (Bennett & Robinson, 2000) and which has 
been adapted and validated for peer report (Stewart, Bing, Davison, Woehr, & 
McIntyre, 2009). 
In our research, we thus investigate unethical behavior by focusing on the 
prevalence of deviant leader behaviors in the workplace. In line with the literature, 
we define workplace deviance as voluntary behavior that violates significant 
organizational norms and, as such, threatens the well-being of the organization 
and/or its members (Bennett & Robinson, 2000; Robinson & Bennett, 1995). 
Deviant behavior represents volitional behavior that occurs because people either 
lack the motivation to conform to organizational norms and standards, or because 
they become motivated to violate these norms and standards (Bennett & Robinson, 
2000). Workplace deviance encompasses a diversity of behaviors varying from 
interpersonal deviance (i.e., acts that inflict harm on individuals) to organizational 
deviance (i.e., acts that are directed at the organization) which can vary in intensity 
and potential consequences (Robinson & Bennett, 1995), and as such, form a 
meaningful operationalization of unethical behavior. Example behaviors include 
humiliating coworkers, procrastinating on work, and falsifying receipts to receive 
more money than was spent on business expenses. 
As argued above, we expect that unethical leadership behaviors may occur 
when leaders face regulatory resource constraints. We expect this because for many 
leaders, behaving ethically may not be an important part of their self-definition, and 
is thus insufficiently internalized. To test this idea, we include the leader’s moral 
identity as a moderator of the effect of self-regulatory depletion on the unethical 
behavior of leaders. Specifically, we expect self-regulatory depletion to result in 
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unethical leadership behaviors particularly among leaders who are low, rather than 
high in moral identity. 
 We tested our hypothesis in two studies. Study 1 used a validated depletion 
task in a controlled laboratory setting which allows us to draw causal conclusions. 
Study 2 was a cross-sectional multisource study, for which we relied on leaders’ 
self-ratings of their depletion and moral identity, while ratings about the leaders’ 
ethical behavior were provided by their colleagues as well as by the leaders 
themselves. The field study permits us to generalize our findings to an 
organizational field setting in which leaders function in meaningful day-to-day 
situations. At the same time, the specific multisource design of this study minimizes 
concerns about the effects of potential common method variance and self-
presentation (Podsakoff, MacKenzie, Lee, & Podsakoff, 2003). 
 
Study 1 
Method 
Participants and design. Seventy-eight undergraduate students (41 males 
and 37 females) with a mean age of 19.00 years (SD = 1.95) from a Dutch university 
participated in the study for partial course credit. Participants were randomly 
assigned to one of two experimental conditions: self-regulatory depletion or no 
depletion.  
Experimental procedure. This study was conducted in two stages. The first 
stage consisted of participants responding via the internet to a bogus “leadership 
ability” questionnaire and to the moral identity measure. The second stage included 
the actual experimental tasks. Upon arrival at the laboratory (one day after they had 
responded to the internet questionnaires), participants were seated in separate 
cubicles that were each equipped with a personal computer. All communication took 
place via this computer. Participants were informed that they would work together 
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with two other participants on several tasks. They were led to believe that a 
computer network was established between them and the other group members via 
which they would collaborate. 
All participants were then assigned to the leadership role. Instructions were 
taken from previous experiments that were designed to study unethical leadership 
behaviors (Maner & Mead, 2010). Participants were informed that the group 
assignment required one person to be the leader and the others to be the 
subordinates. All participants learned that they were assigned the group leader role 
based on their answers on the ‘leadership ability’ questionnaire that they completed 
in the first stage of the study (i.e., the day before the actual experiment). As the 
designated leader, they would thus be responsible for the functioning of their group. 
To check whether the participants understood this role assignment, we asked them 
which role they had to fulfill in the group assignment. 
Participants then completed the regulatory depletion task (taken from 
Baumeister et al., 1998, Study 4). This task consists of two parts and has proven 
successful in the manipulation of ego depletion in a number of studies (Baumeister 
et al., 1998; DeWall, Baumeister, Mead, & Vohs, 2011; Fischer, Greitemeyer, & 
Frey, 2007; Moller, Deci, & Ryan, 2006; Wheeler, Briñol, & Hermann, 2007). The 
regulatory depletion task was presented as part of the group assignment. In the first 
part of the task, participants were instructed to indicate each instance of the letter e 
that they saw in a text (i.e., by clicking each e with the computer mouse). 
Participants received visual feedback whenever they clicked an e (i.e., a highlighted 
circle around the corresponding e) and were given five minutes to complete the task. 
This first phase was relatively easy and was used to establish a strong habitual 
response for scanning and indicating every e. In the second part of the task, 
participants either continued identifying the e’s using the same rule as before (i.e., 
the no depletion condition), or they were given the instruction to respond to each e, 
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except when the e was followed by a vowel or, when a vowel appeared two letters 
before the e (i.e., the high depletion condition). For participants in the high depletion 
condition, overriding the response to scan for and indicate every e would require 
more regulatory resources than for participants in the low depletion condition who 
did not need to override a habitual response. After completing this task, we 
measured the dependent variables and manipulation checks. 
Manipulation checks. The effectiveness of the self-regulatory depletion 
manipulation was measured on a 7-point scale ranging from 1 (totally disagree) to 7 
(totally agree) using two items: “The second task was habit-breaking” (taken from 
DeWall et al., 2008) and “The second task was simple” (reversed item; taken from 
Balliet & Joireman, 2010). 
Measures. In the first phase of the study (i.e., twenty-four hours before the 
experimental condition), we administered an online questionnaire that included 
demographic information questions, a measure of moral identity, and a bogus 
leadership scale that was administered to provide a justification for the role 
assignment. 
We used Aquino and Reed´s (2002) instrument to measure the participants’ 
moral identity, which has been used in several studies and has shown good 
psychometric properties (for an overview, see Shao et al., 2008). In line with our 
ideas, we relied on the internalization dimension of this instrument (i.e., the extent to 
which people find morality an important aspect of who they are) and disregarded the 
symbolization subscale (which measures the extent to which people want to appear 
as a moral person). Consistent with Aquino and Reed’s (2002) procedure, the 
following instructions were given: “Listed below are some characteristics that might 
describe a person: Caring, compassionate, fair, friendly, generous, helpful, 
hardworking, honest, and kind. The person with these characteristics could be you or 
it could be someone else. For a moment, visualize in your mind the kind of person 
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who has these characteristics. Imagine how that person would think, feel, and act. 
When you have a clear image of what this person would be like, answer the 
following questions.” Participants then answered the five internalization items on a 
7-point scale ranging from 1 (totally disagree) to 7 (totally agree). Sample items 
from this scale are: “It would make me feel good to be a person who has these 
characteristics” and “Having these characteristics is not really important to me” 
(reverse scored). The scale proved to be internally consistent (Cronbach’s  = .71; M 
= 5.42, SD = 0.88). 
We assessed leadership deviance as a dependent variable for which we used 
the interpersonal deviance subscale of the organizational deviance measure which 
was developed and validated by Bennett & Robinson (2000). Participants answered 
these 7 items on a 7-point scale ranging from 1 (not at all) to 7 (very much so). We 
asked participants the extent to which they found the following behaviors in the 
current setting acceptable: “Say something hurtful to someone,” “Make an ethnic, 
religious, or racial remark,” “Curse at someone,” “Play a mean prank on someone,” 
“Act rudely toward someone,” and “Publicly embarrass someone” (Cronbach’s  = 
.82; M = 2.10, SD = 0.84). 
Results 
Comprehension and manipulation checks. All participants correctly 
indicated that they were assigned to the leader role. As expected, participants in the 
self-regulatory depletion condition rated the second task as more habit-breaking than 
those in the no depletion condition (Ms = 5.10 vs. 4.42, SDs = 1.27 vs. 1.34, 
respectively, t(76) = -2.30, p < .05). Furthermore, the second task was experienced 
as less simple in the self-regulatory depletion condition than in the no depletion 
condition (Ms = 4.48 vs. 3.47, SDs = 1.37 vs. 1.42, respectively, t(76) = -3.17, p < 
.01).
 
As an additional test of the effectiveness of our manipulation, we regressed the 
manipulation checks on the main and interactive effects of the regulatory depletion 
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manipulation and participants moral identity. These analyses show that both the 
manipulation checks were significantly related to the regulatory depletion 
manipulation, while the main effect of moral identity and the interaction term 
remained insignificant.
 
Deviant leader behavior. To test our hypothesis, we conducted a 
hierarchical regression analysis in which leader deviance was predicted by the main 
effects of the regulatory depletion manipulation and participants’ moral identity at 
Step 1. We added a two-way interaction between regulatory depletion manipulation 
and moral identity at Step 2. Following Aiken and West (1991), the interaction term 
was based on the mean-centered scores of moral identity and the effect-coded scores 
of regulatory depletion. Table 1 shows the regression results. 
 
Table 1 
Results of Hierarchical Regression Analysis for Leader Deviance in Study 1 
Variables B SE B  R
2
 
Step 1    .03* 
Regulatory depletion (RD) 0.01 0.10 0.02*  
Moral identity (MI) -0.16 0.11 -0.17*  
Step 2    .08* 
Regulatory depletion (RD) 0.02 0.09 0.02*  
Moral identity (MI) -0.11 0.11 -0.12*  
RD x MI -0.27 0.11 -0.28*  
Note. Final model: F(3, 74) = 2.94, p < .05. B = unstandardized regression 
coefficient;  = standardized regression coefficient. For the regulatory depletion 
factor, -1 denotes no regulatory depletion manipulation, whereas 1 indicates 
regulatory depletion.  
* p ≤ .05. 
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Table 1 shows that the predicted two-way interaction was significant,  = -
.27, p < .05. We conducted simple slope analyses to further examine this interaction 
(Aiken & West, 1991). Figure 1 shows that, in line with our hypothesis, regulatory 
depletion significantly increased deviant leader behavior among participants who are 
low in moral identity (one SD below the mean),  = .24, p < .05. However, among 
participants who are high in moral identity, regulatory depletion decreased deviant 
leader behavior; however, this effect was not significant,  = -.21, p = .11. 
 
 
Figure 1. Deviant leader behavior as a function of regulatory depletion (RD) 
manipulation and moral identity (MI).  
 
Supplemental analyses. To test the robustness of the OLS regression we 
conducted a Tobit regression (see Tobin, 1958), which was developed for variables 
with a lower (or upper) limit and a concentration of observations at this limiting 
value. Such distributions can result in the violation of OLS assumptions. Deviant 
leader behaviors are typically low-frequency phenomena that show such a cluster of 
observations at and just above the lower limit, thus making them strongly positively 
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skewed. A Tobit regression revealed results similar to the OLS regressions for the 
hypothesized interaction on leader deviance, b = -.27, p < .05. 
Discussion 
Study 1 provides supporting evidence for the hypothesized buffering role of 
moral identity in the effect of resource depletion on unethical leadership behavior. 
Regulatory depletion indeed increased unethical leadership behavior for leaders who 
are low in moral identity. In contrast, there was not such an increase in unethical 
leadership behavior for leaders with a high level of moral identity. These findings 
thus highlight the pivotal role of moral identity in preventing unethical leadership 
behaviors. 
 
Study 2 
 Whereas Study 1 provided causal evidence for our proposed ideas, Study 2 
was designed to generalize our findings to an organizational setting in which 
supervisors and employees function together in meaningful work situations. Instead 
of manipulating regulatory depletion, we measured supervisors’ depletion in Study 
2. 
Method 
Sample and procedure. The study participants included 100 organizational 
supervisors (30 line, 61 middle, and 9 senior/top managers) and their matched 
colleagues from a variety of Dutch organizations. For their participation, they 
received credit points they could trade in for certain gifts (i.e., a ticket for the 
movies). Of the focal supervisors, 70 were male and 30 were female, and their mean 
age was 44.73 years (SD = 9.91). Supervisors worked an average of 11.79 years (SD 
= 9.25) in their current organization and 5.97 years (SD = 5.69) in their current 
function. Twenty percent of the focal supervisors were employed in the public 
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sector, and 80 percent in the private sector. The matched group of colleagues 
included 60 males and 40 females, with a mean age of 41.84 years (SD = 10.52). 
Measures. In Study 2, we used the same five-item internalization subscale 
of moral identity (Aquino & Reed, 2002) as in Study 1. To assess focal supervisors’ 
levels of regulatory depletion, we asked the focal supervisors to indicate on a 5-point 
scale ranging from 1 (totally disagree) to 5 (totally agree) how much they agreed or 
disagreed with the following statements: “I often feel as if I have low energy,” and 
“I often feel as if things are taking a lot of effort” (taken from Vohs et al., 2008, 
Study 5). 
We measured unethical leadership behavior using Bennett and Robinson’s 
(2000) 19-item measure of organizational deviance on a 5-point scale ranging from 1 
(not at all) to 5 (very much so). This measure consists of an interpersonal and an 
organizational subscale, and it has shown good psychometric properties (Bennett & 
Robinson, 2000). The leaders completed the items as self-reports, while the items 
were adapted for peer report for their colleagues who rated how often the focal 
leader performed actions such as “Discussed confidential company information with 
an unauthorized person,” “Falsified a receipt to get more money than spent on 
business expenses,” and “Publicly embarrassed someone at work” (modified and 
validated by Stewart et al., 2009). 
Results 
Descriptive statistics and intercorrelations. Table 2 presents the means, 
standard deviations, internal consistencies, and intercorrelations of the study’s 
variables. 
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Table 2 
Descriptive Statistics and Intercorrelations of Study 2 Measures 
Variable M SD 1 2 3 4 
1. Regulatory depletion 2.54 0.95 (.89)    
2. Moral identity 5.34 0.81 .07** (.62)   
3. Leader deviance (OR) 1.47 0.52 .33** -.22** (.93)  
4. Leader deviance (CR) 1.60 0.81 .19** -.18** .61** (.98) 
Note. N = 100. Internal reliabilities (coefficient alphas) are provided in parentheses 
on the diagonal. OR = own ratings; CR = colleague ratings 
* p ≤ .05. ** p ≤ .01. 
 
Hypothesis test. We conducted a hierarchical regression analysis with self-
reported unethical leader behaviors serving as the dependent variable. The age, 
gender, and tenure of leaders were entered as control variables in the first block of 
the regression. Regulatory depletion and moral identity were entered in the second 
block of the regression. We added a two-way interaction between regulatory 
depletion and moral identity in the third block of the regression. Following Aiken 
and West (1991), the interaction term was based on mean-centered scores of the 
independent variables. Table 3 shows the regression results for self-reported 
unethical leader behavior. For one respondent, self-ratings of deviance were missing, 
and thus, her information was disregarded in this analysis. 
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Table 3 
Results of Hierarchical Regression Analysis for Leader Deviance (Own Ratings) in 
Study 2 
Variables B SE B *** R2 
Step 3    .06** 
Age -0.01 0.01 -0.21***  
Gender 0.10 0.10 0.10***  
Organization tenure 0.01 0.01 0.15***  
Function tenure 0.00 0.01 0.02***  
Regulatory depletion (RD) 0.18 0.05 0.33***  
Moral identity (MI) -0.15 0.06 -0.24***  
RD x MI -0.15 0.06 -0.25***  
Note. Final model: F(7, 91) = 4.95, p < .001. B = unstandardized regression 
coefficient;  = standardized regression coefficient.  
* p ≤ .05. ** p ≤ .01. *** p ≤ .001. 
 
The predicted two-way interaction was significant,  = -.25, p < .01.We 
conducted simple slope analyses to further assess this interaction (Aiken & West, 
1991). Figure 2 shows that among leaders who are low in moral identity (one SD 
below the mean), regulatory depletion and unethical leader behaviors are positively 
related,  = .55, p < .001. However, among leaders who are high in moral identity, 
the relationship between regulatory depletion and unethical leader behaviors was not 
significant,  = .10, p = .40.  
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Figure 2. Unethical leader behavior (self-ratings) as a function of regulatory 
depletion (RD) and moral identity (MI). 
 
The regression analysis was then repeated with the colleague ratings of 
unethical leader behaviors as the dependent variable. As shown in Table 4, the 
predicted two-way interaction was significant,  = -.33, p = .001. We conducted 
simple slope analyses to further analyze this interaction (Aiken & West, 1991). 
Figure 3 shows that among leaders who are low in moral identity (one SD below the 
mean), regulatory depletion and the leaders’ unethical behavior are positively 
related,  = .52, p < .001. Among leaders high in moral identity, however, the 
relationship between regulatory depletion and unethical leader behavior was not 
significant,  = -.09, p = .46. 
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Table 4 
Results of Hierarchical Regression Analysis for Leader Deviance (Colleague 
Indicated) in Study 2 
Variables B SE B *** R2 
Step 3    .10*** 
Age -0.03 0.01 -0.30***  
Gender -0.07 0.16 -0.04***  
Organization tenure 0.01 0.01 0.13***  
Function tenure -0.00 0.02 -0.02***  
Regulatory depletion (RD) 0.19 0.08 0.22***  
Moral identity (MI) -0.13 0.09 -0.13***  
RD x MI -0.32 0.09 -0.33***  
Note. Final model: F(7, 92) = 4.36, p < .001. B = unstandardized regression 
coefficient;  = standardized regression coefficient.  
* p ≤ .05. ** p ≤ .01. *** p ≤ .001. 
 
Figure 3. Unethical leader behavior (colleague ratings) as a function of regulatory 
depletion (RD) and moral identity (MI). 
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Supplemental analyses. We conducted several additional analyses to 
further investigate the validity of our findings. First, as in Study 1, we conducted a 
Tobit regression (see Tobin, 1958). The Tobit regression produced results similar to 
the OLS regressions for the hypothesized interaction on leader deviance, b = -.15 
and -.31, ps < .05, for self and observer ratings, respectively. 
Second, there has been much discussion about the advantages and 
disadvantages of including control variables in organizational research. We thus 
decided to follow Spector and Brannick’s (2011) suggestion by repeating our 
analyses without the control variables as predictors in the equations. These analyses 
led to similar conclusions to those presented previously. Most importantly, we found 
significant interactions with the self-ratings of leader deviance,  = -.26, p < .01, and 
with the colleague indicated ratings of leader deviance,  = -.34, p = .001. 
Discussion 
Consistent with our main hypothesis and with the results obtained in Study 
1, we obtained corroborative evidence for the moderating effect of moral identity in 
the relationship between regulatory depletion and unethical leader behavior. This 
time, however, results were obtained in an actual organizational setting. These 
findings provide further evidence for the prediction that leaders who are high in 
moral identity do not need regulatory resources to refrain from unethical leadership, 
while leaders with a low moral identity do require these resources. 
 
General Discussion 
 The aim of the present research was to investigate the effects of regulatory 
depletion and moral identity on deviant leadership behavior. We obtained 
corroborative evidence for our hypothesis. More specifically, we identified ego 
depletion as a variable that may make leaders act in norm-transgressing ways. 
Moreover, to further enhance our understanding of this relationship, we also focused 
Leadership and self-regulation                                                                                                                             51 
 
on moral identity as a possible boundary condition. Our results indicate that leaders 
with a low moral identity need self-regulatory resources to refrain from engaging in 
deviant leader behaviors, while for leaders who are high in moral identity behaving 
ethically is less reliant on these resources, and thus, not influenced by regulatory 
resource depletion. This interactive effect was shown across a laboratory experiment 
(Study 1) and a multisource field study (Study 2). 
Theoretical Implications 
 Our results are the first to show that ego depletion can induce leaders to 
display a wide range of norm-transgressing behaviors that are as varied as 
embezzling company property, deferring work in order to be paid overtime, and 
humiliating one’s coworker in public. Such behaviors contrast sharply with how 
organizations prefer to view the leadership role. Specifically, leaders often face 
hectic and fragmented workdays, but they are at the same time expected to 
cooperate, to serve the interests of the organization, and to direct followers towards 
organizational interests (e.g., Hollander, 1980; Maner & Mead, 2010; Tjosvold, 
1984; Van Vugt, Hogan, & Kaiser, 2008; Yukl & Van Fleet, 1992). In fact, 
leadership is often defined as influencing followers to contribute to the collective 
and as coordinating collective interests (e.g., Hollander & Offermann, 1990; Van 
Vugt et al., 2008).  
 Research has documented a number of cases in which leaders do not 
conform to the ideal leadership role of cooperatively working towards the 
organization’s goals but instead act in self-serving and norm-transgressing ways. 
This has been attributed to variables such as the instability of the leadership position 
(Maner & Mead, 2010) and to leaders’ feelings of incompetence (Fast & Chen, 
2009). Some scholars have even claimed that norm-transgressing behaviors are 
intrinsic to the leadership role (De Cremer, 2003; Van Dijk & De Cremer, 2006) 
because leaders feel entitled to obtain more outcomes than followers (De Cremer & 
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Van Dijk, 2005; Stouten, De Cremer, & Van Dijk, 2005). The present research 
identifies ego depletion as a variable that may make leaders act in norm-
transgressing ways. Importantly, the nature of ego depletion sheds new light on 
(un)ethical leader behavior, because leaders need to be able to control their 
automatic drives towards self-servingness. 
These findings are particularly important because leaders, by means of their 
behavior, serve as social models for their employees that influence follower 
cooperation and displays of ethical behavior. This process is usually understood in 
terms of social learning theory (Bandura, 1977, 1986), which holds that people learn 
behavior by observing and imitating others. According to Bandura (1986), people 
with high status who have the ability to control rewards may function as effective 
role models. Therefore, leaders are the most likely source of vicarious learning in an 
organizational setting. This makes leaders’ conformity to ethical rules a particularly 
important aspect of the leadership role. In support of this idea, norm-transgressing 
leaders are known to decrease positive affect, trust, cooperation, and performance 
among their followers (De Cremer, 2006a, 2006b; Van Knippenberg & Van 
Knippenberg, 2005). In sum, the hectic and fragmented workdays that leaders 
typically face may increase the likelihood that they cross essential boundaries of 
their leadership role by displaying unethical behaviors, which consequently makes 
them less effective in motivating employees to act productively and cooperatively. 
A second theoretical implication derives from the fact that Study 2 revealed 
that self-reports and colleague ratings of leader deviance show a highly similar 
pattern. Specifically, ego depleted leaders reported more deviant behaviors and they 
were rated more deviant by their coworkers (at least leaders who are low in moral 
identity). It thus seems that leaders are well aware of the specific and sometimes 
norm-transgressing actions they perform, even when they are depleted of cognitive 
resources. This, however, does not necessarily imply that leaders are also aware of 
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the ethical dimension of their actions. Leaders may, for instance, frame a specific 
action not in ethical terms but rather in purely economic terms (e.g., striving for a 
financial reward even if it comes at the expense of others; Tenbrunsel & Messick, 
1999). In fact, it has been argued that the salience of the economic aspects of a 
situation may make the ethical dimension of the decision “fade” into the 
background; thus, leaders do not recognize their actions as unethical (Tenbrunsel & 
Messick, 2004). This idea suggests that ego depletion can lead to deviant leader 
actions ranging from discrimination to forgery because it hinders the identification 
of the ethical dimension of a decision, which is a necessary first step in conducting 
ethical behavior (Rest, 1986). 
 Our research also contributes to the literature on moral identity. To date, 
most research has focused on the antecedents and consequences of moral identity 
(for an overview, see Shao et al., 2008). Research that investigates precisely when 
moral identity may influence behavior remains relatively sparse. Thus far, scholars 
have looked at the interaction between moral identity and formalism (Reynolds & 
Ceranic, 2007), at the interaction between moral identity and ethical organization 
culture (Skarlicki, van Jaarsveld, & Walker, 2008), and at the interaction between 
internal and symbolic moral identity (Caldwell & Moberg, 2007). We add to this 
existing literature and illuminate how moral identity operates. In this context, it is 
interesting to note that while ego depletion hinders behavior that requires cognitive 
processing, it does not influence automatic processes (DeWall et al., 2008; 
Schmeichel, Vohs, & Baumeister, 2003). Our results thus suggest that moral identity 
influences moral behavior in a fairly automatic way, and it is not thwarted by other 
processes that require controlled processing. 
Practical Implications 
 A first important practical implication of the present findings is that they 
suggest that characteristics of leaders’ day-to-day activities can undermine their 
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ability to behave ethically and may actually make leaders more likely to act in norm 
transgressing ways. This is an important finding for managers to acknowledge 
because much of a leader’s influence derives from being a role model, rather than 
from explicit attempts to influence followers (Brown et al., 2005; Walumbwa et al., 
2011). Organizations should thus be aware that overloading their managers with 
decisions to take may come with the cost of an increased likelihood of leaders 
transgressing ethical norms. Nevertheless, managers should be similarly aware that 
whenever they are facing tasks that can have important (i.e., ethical) implications, 
their cognitive state can affect their behavior; thus, it is necessary to carefully 
schedule these tasks. Tasks that may have ethical implications should preferably be 
made after a period of rest because rest can replenish managers cognitive resources 
(Baumeister, Muraven, & Tice, 2000). 
 Our findings also convey a more optimistic message by indicating that not 
all leaders are prone to displaying norm-transgressing behaviors due to the effects of 
ego depletion. Specifically, leaders who are high in moral identity proved to be 
immune to the effects of ego depletion in promoting norm-transgressing behaviors. 
This finding is relevant from a practical perspective because although moral identity 
represents a rather stable individual characteristic, it might also be impacted by the 
situation. Research (Aquino et al., 2009; Reed, Aquino, & Levy, 2007) shows that it 
is possible to situationally increase the accessibility of moral identity. Combined 
with the present results, these prior findings have two promising implications for 
organizations. First, making moral identity accessible through situational 
interventions such as stimulating a clear ethical climate and ensuring that the 
organization’s top management behaves in ethical ways (Martin & Cullen, 2006; 
Mayer et al., 2009; Mayer, Kuenzi, & Greenbaum, 2010) makes it more likely that 
leaders behave ethically. More importantly, this effect should also buffer the effects 
of ego depletion on leaders’ norm transgressing behaviors. Second, and equally 
Leadership and self-regulation                                                                                                                             55 
 
important, situational interventions that make moral identity salient are likely to 
result in leaders being “trained” to act ethically. Such training may make ethical 
behaviors more automatic, thus rendering leaders immune to the effects of ego 
depletion on norm-transgressing behaviors. 
Strengths and Limitations 
 A major strength of this article lies in the use of diverse methods to test our 
hypothesis. While the laboratory experiment conducted in Study 1 permits us to 
make causal inferences, Study 2 was a field study that allowed us to investigate 
whether the hypothesized effects emerged in an organizational setting. 
We recognize, of course, that we did not include a situational manipulation 
of morality in the experiment. However, our reliance on a dispositional 
operationalization of moral identity is clearly in line with our ideas that moral 
identity as a dispositional variable is likely to lead to internalized moral behavior 
(i.e., these leaders are better trained to act ethically). Obviously, this is not the case 
with situational manipulations of morality in relatively short-lived experimental 
contexts. Yet, various studies show that a moral prime can stimulate morality and 
thus can induce individuals to behave more morally (Aquino et al., 2009; Mazar, 
Amir, & Ariely, 2008; Reed et al., 2007). At the same time, it should be recognized 
that other research shows that situational manipulations of morality can lead to 
compensatory, rather than consistent, moral behavior. In other words, priming 
morality can also reduce the display of moral behaviors (Jordan, Mullen, & 
Murnighan, 2011; Sachdeva, Iliev, & Medin, 2009; Smeesters, Warlop, Van 
Avermaet, Corneille, & Yzerbyt, 2003; Zhong, Liljenquist, & Cain, 2009). Rather 
than trying to resolve this inconsistency in the literature, we relied on a dispositional 
measure of moral identity, which has proven to be a consistent predictor of moral 
behavior (for an overview, see Shao et al., 2008). Moreover, a dispositional measure 
of moral identity is more likely to tap into internalized moral values and, more 
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importantly, should be a stronger predictor of the prevalence of (internalized) moral 
actions.  
 Research on deviance has typically relied on self-reported behavioral 
measures (Berry et al., 2007). In line with this, we also relied on self-reported 
deviance in Study 1. However, we found the same consistent pattern in the multi-
source field sample using observer measures of leaders’ actual behaviors, which 
cross-validates the use of self-report in the experimental study. Additionally, the 
observer ratings of deviance in Study 2 yielded a pattern of results that was 
analogous to the self-reported ratings, which corroborates results of a recent meta-
analysis on organizational deviance (Berry et al., 2007) showing high convergence 
between observer- and self-reported organizational deviance. 
An additional limitation of this research that should be mentioned is the 
skewed gender distribution in Study 2. The majority of our respondents were male, 
reflecting the preponderance of males in an executive function. This skewed gender 
distribution may pose potential problems to the validity of our results. We addressed 
this issue by including gender as a control variable in Study 2, and found no effect of 
gender. Furthermore, excluding gender as a control variable did not alter our results 
in any way. It is in this respect relevant to note that a meta-analysis on workplace 
deviance showed that gender had only a very weak correlation with deviant behavior 
(Berry et al., 2007). 
Directions for Future Research 
 One highly relevant avenue for future research might be to investigate our 
research questions in another cultural setting. For instance, the present research was 
conducted in the Netherlands, which is considered an individualistic culture 
(Schimmack, Oishi, & Diener, 2005). It might be interesting to conduct a similar 
study in a collectivistic culture. Many aspects of moral behavior are interpersonal in 
nature (Aquino et al., 2009; Kant, 1785/2005; Singer, 1981), and differences in 
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cultural orientation might therefore influence deviant leader behavior. In Japan, for 
example, expressing anger publicly is considered unseemly, while this is considered 
necessary (to avoid “boiling over” or “blowing up” at a later point) in the United 
States (Markus & Kitayama, 1991). Even more directly relevant to the present 
research question, collectivist cultures place greater importance on acting in line 
with norms and expectations (Husted & Allen, 2008). Therefore, like our 
respondents high in moral identity, collectivist cultures should be more experienced 
in inhibiting their selfish impulses than individualists (Seeley & Gardner, 2003). As 
a result, leaders in collectivistic cultures might be less influenced by ego depletion 
and may refrain from deviant behavior when they are depleted. 
A second avenue for future research lies in the specific type of norm 
transgressing behavior that is focused on as the outcome variable. In our research, 
we focused on unethical leader behaviors that harm the organization and/or its 
members. It could be interesting, however, to focus on different types of unethical 
leader behavior. For instance, prosocial rule breaking (Morrison, 2006; Umphress, 
Bingham, & Mitchell, 2010) represents norm-transgressing behavior that is intended 
to benefit the organization and/or its members. An example of this is violating 
organizational policies or procedures to solve a problem (Galperin, 2012). Arguably, 
this creates a tension between doing the morally right thing from a rule based (i.e., 
deontological) perspective and from an outcome based (i.e., utilistic) perspective. 
Concluding Remarks 
The hectic, fragmented nature of a typical day for organizational leaders 
makes them especially prone to resource depletion. Regretfully, depletion makes it 
more likely that organizational leaders display norm transgressing behaviors that 
conflict with their desired leadership role, which should focus on benefitting the 
organization and stimulating employees to strive towards these goals as well. We 
showed that leaders who are high in moral identity are less vulnerable to resource 
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depletion effects in their display of unethical behaviors, indicating that they need 
less controlled resources to act ethically. Leaders who are low in moral identity, 
however, need these cognitive resources to display ethical leader behaviors. This 
indicates that the nature of the leadership role can lead to unethical leader behaviors, 
as such highlighting the importance of internalizing the motivation to act in ethical 
ways in organizational settings. 
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Out of control!? How loss of self-control 
influences prosocial behavior: The role of 
power and moral values 
 
Abstract 
Lack of self-control has been suggested to facilitate norm-transgressing behaviors 
because of the operation of automatic selfish impulses. Previous research, however, 
has shown that people having a high moral identity may not show such selfish 
impulses when their self-control resources are depleted. In the present research, we 
extended this effect to prosocial behavior. Moreover, we investigated the role of 
power in the interaction between moral identity and self-control depletion. More 
specifically, we expected that power facilitates the externalization of internal states, 
which implies that for people who feel powerful, rather than powerless, depletion 
decreases prosocial behavior especially for those low in moral identity. A laboratory 
experiment and a multisource field study supported our predictions. The present 
finding that the interaction between self-control depletion and moral identity is 
contingent upon people’s level of power suggests that power may enable people to 
refrain from helping behavior. Moreover, the findings suggest that if organizations 
want to improve prosocial behaviors, it may be effective to situationally induce 
moral values in their employees. 
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This chapter is based on Joosten, A., van Dijke, M., Van Hiel, A., & De Cremer, D. (2015). 
Out of control!? How loss of self-control influences prosocial behavior: The role of power 
and moral values. PLoS ONE, 10(5), online.  
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Introduction 
Research suggests that in order to display prosocial and cooperative 
behaviors, people require active self-control to override their automatic selfish 
impulses (DeWall, Baumeister, Gailliot, & Maner, 2008). This suggestion may have 
important implications in the context of work organizations because prosocial 
employee behaviors like voluntary helping one’s supervisor and coworkers, 
speaking up to improve the way in which work is organized, and attempting to offer 
the best customer service possible all play a significant role in effective 
organizational functioning (N. P. Podsakoff, Whiting, Podsakoff, & Blume, 2009; P. 
M. Podsakoff, MacKenzie, Paine, & Bachrach, 2000). However, a variety of forces 
that are known to hamper and deplete self-control are omnipresent in work 
situations, such as the necessity to make many choices and decisions (Vohs et al., 
2008), overly long working hours that lead to sleep deprivation (Barnes, 
Schaubroeck, Huth, & Ghumman, 2011; Christian & Ellis, 2011), and stress 
(Muraven & Baumeister, 2000). In other words, a number of factors that seem 
inherent to organizational life may constrain prosocial employee behavior, and 
therefore organizational effectiveness. 
Yet, not everybody requires active self-control to display prosocial behavior. 
More specifically, people who have internalized moral values - as indexed by a high 
moral identity - may act in prosocial ways regardless of their level of self-control. 
This is an important theoretical idea because it presents a different perspective on 
the workings of automatic processes than most other studies, which usually assume 
that selfishness is automatically activated (e.g., Baumeister & Exline, 1999; Mead, 
Baumeister, Gino, Schweitzer, & Ariely, 2009; Shalvi, Eldar, & Bereby-Meyer, 
2012). However, internalized moral values have been argued to facilitate the self-
regulation of moral behavior (Muraven & Slessareva, 2003; Seeley & Gardner, 
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2003), which should explain why they can override automatic self-oriented 
processes. 
Unfortunately, there is as yet little empirical evidence to substantiate these 
arguments in the context of prosocial behavior. The present research therefore 
focuses on the interaction between internalized moral values and self-control 
depletion in predicting voluntary prosocial behaviors. Research on negative and 
antisocial behaviors has shown that the combination of depletion and low moral 
identity increases antisocial behavior (Gino, Schweitzer, Mead, & Ariely, 2011; 
Joosten, Van Dijke, Van Hiel, & De Cremer, 2014). However, in the present paper 
we argue that selfishness by showing antisocial behavior is inherently different from 
selfishness by refraining from prosocial behavior. We argue that people need power 
to feel that they can refrain from helping others. People who feel powerful are more 
inclined to disregard others (Keltner, Gruenfeld, & Anderson, 2003; Magee & 
Smith, 2013) and therefore more likely to deviate from prevailing norms (Briñol, 
Petty, Valle, Rucker, & Becerra, 2007). We thus expect that power is likely to be a 
facilitator of the selfish state resulting from the combination of depletion and low 
moral identity.  
In the following sections, we will first develop our argument regarding the 
relevance of self-control for the display of voluntary prosocial behaviors and the role 
of internalized moral values in this process. We develop our reasoning using the 
influential strength model of self-control (see Hagger, Wood, Stiff, & Chatzisarantis, 
2010 for an overview). Internalized moral values are analyzed in terms of theorizing 
on moral identity (Aquino & Reed, 2002; Hardy & Carlo, 2005; Shao, Aquino, & 
Freeman, 2008). Then, we will develop our argument regarding the critical 
moderating role of power in this process. This will result in a hypothesis regarding a 
three-way interaction effect of self-control, moral identity and employee power on 
voluntary prosocial behavior. 
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Theoretical Background 
Self-Control, Depletion, and Prosocial Behavior 
Self-control refers to an individual’s ability to inhibit, override, or refrain 
from acting upon his/her impulses and desires (Baumeister, Heatherton, & Dianne, 
1994; Mischel, 1974; Tangney, Baumeister, & Boone, 2004). The human capacity 
for self-control is extremely adaptive and enables people to follow society’s norms 
and rules (Baumeister, Vohs, & Tice, 2007; Mischel, 1974). In line with this, 
research has shown that self-control failures may lead to various behavioral 
problems that can be harmful to people and to social collectives, such as depression, 
aggression, the inability to manage finances, and theft. Conversely, successful self-
control has been linked to numerous positive outcomes such as success at work, 
increased concentration, and an improved ability to cope with stress and problems 
(see Hagger et al., 2010 for an overview).  
Research on self-control failures suggests that the capacity for self-control is 
a limited resource, which, with repeated use, can become depleted (Baumeister, 
Bratslavsky, Muraven, & Tice, 1998). When self-control resources are depleted, 
performance on subsequent acts that require self-control may be impaired 
(Baumeister et al., 1998; Hagger et al., 2010). Self-control failures are thus more 
likely to emerge when an individual performs multiple acts that require self-control 
without rest or replenishment (Baumeister et al., 1998; Muraven, Tice, & 
Baumeister, 1998). 
Importantly, the limited resource model of self-control may also have 
implications for our understanding of prosocial behavior. Specifically, it has been 
argued that displaying prosocial behavior and avoiding antisocial behavior requires 
self-control to override selfish impulses (DeWall et al., 2008). Indirect support for 
this idea is found in laboratory research that focuses on antisocial behavior showing 
that after an initial act that required self-control, people were more likely to cheat 
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(Gino et al., 2011; Mead et al., 2009) and to act aggressively (DeWall, Baumeister, 
Stillman, & Gailliot, 2007). Research focusing on prosocial behavior, however, is 
scarce, if non-existent. We know of only one paper that addressed this issue but 
mostly in terms of prosocial intentions: DeWall and colleagues (2008) showed that 
depletion reduced participants’ intention to help, but helping behavior was not 
included in the design. These findings suggest that people need self-control 
resources for prosocial behaviors to emerge. Interestingly, research suggests that 
having moral values (i.e., moral identity) facilitates the self-control of prosocial 
behavior (Aquino, Freeman, Reed, Lim, & Felps, 2009). That is, people with a high 
moral identity are more likely to have moral values readily accessible, even in 
situations that impair self-control. Below, we explicitly argue how moral identity 
may influence the self-regulation of prosocial behavior.  
Moral Identity 
Moral identity reflects the degree to which people consider being a moral 
person an important part of their self-concept (Aquino & Reed, 2002; Shao et al., 
2008). Moral identity has been conceptualized as a cognitive representation or 
schema of moral values, goals, traits, and behavioral scripts (Aquino et al., 2009; 
Shao et al., 2008). For people high in moral identity, this moral self-schema is more 
readily accessible and available for use than for people low in moral identity 
(Narvaez, Lapsley, Hagele, & Lasky, 2006; Shao et al., 2008). When activated, 
moral identity should have a strong influence on one’s cognition and behavior, as 
individuals have a strong tendency for self-consistency (Aquino & Reed, 2002; 
Blasi, 1980). 
Consequently, moral identity is an important predictor of prosocial behavior 
(Hardy & Carlo, 2005) and has been associated with increased levels of self-reported 
volunteering (Aquino & Reed, 2002), ethical leader behavior (Mayer, Aquino, 
Greenbaum, & Kuenzi, 2012), an increased likelihood of making a donation (Aquino 
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& Reed, 2002; Reed & Aquino, 2003), and charitable giving (Reynolds & Ceranic, 
2007). Additionally, moral identity has been linked to decreased levels of selfish 
behavior, such as less lying in business negotiations (Shao et al., 2008), lowered 
aggression on the football field (Sage, Kavussanu, & Duda, 2006), and less 
antisocial behavior among adolescents (Barriga, Morrison, Liau, & Gibbs, 2001). 
Important for the present purposes, moral identity may also facilitate the 
self-regulation of prosocial behavior in situations that constrain the availability of 
self-regulatory resources (e.g., self-control depletion). As argued above, people with 
a high moral identity have more readily accessible moral values than people with a 
low moral identity (Aquino et al., 2009). Consequently, people with a high moral 
identity should be especially likely to expend extra effort to self-regulate their 
prosocial behaviors. Over time, people with a high moral identity will thus more 
frequently implement prosocial behavior, resulting in more internalized and 
automatic enactment of prosocial behavior (Seeley & Gardner, 2003). People with a 
high moral identity are thus likely to have their moral values more readily available, 
even in situations in which their self-control resources are depleted. We know of 
only two studies that offer some indirect support for this argument, but this support 
is offered in the realm of negative behavior. This research shows that depletion 
makes people low in moral identity more likely to show antisocial behavior, whereas 
this negative effect of depletion was absent among people high in moral identity 
(Gino et al., 2011; Joosten et al., 2014). In other words, the combination of depletion 
and a low level of moral identity represents a negative cocktail as evinced by the 
heightened levels of antisocial behavior. 
However, findings obtained with negative behaviors cannot be 
straightforwardly extrapolated to (the non-display) of positive behavior. In 
philosophy, an important distinction is made between positive (i.e., do good for 
another) and negative duties (i.e., refraining from doing something morally bad; 
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Rawls, 1971). Importantly, Kant (1785/2005) argued that negative duties are more 
stringent than positive duties. In other words, refraining from negative behavior is 
considered more pressing than positive behavior, and therefore, negative behaviors 
are often regulated by state legislation (Nozick, 1974). Likewise, in organizations, 
refraining from antisocial and selfish behavior is regulated by formal sanction 
systems, whereas displaying prosocial behavior is often informal and more easy to 
implement because of its’ social desirability. Admittedly, the display of prosocial 
behavior might sometimes be restrained by, for example, formal organizational rules 
and regulations (Morrison, 2006) or by the demands that are inherent in employees’ 
primary tasks (Bell & Menguc, 2002). However, helping others is often considered 
to be rewarding and these behaviors ‘feel good’ (Rilling et al., 2002; Smith, Keating, 
& Stotland, 1989). These behaviors are already stimulated at a young age (Grusec, 
1991). Moreover, such behaviors are ‘the right thing to do’ and as such affirm one’s 
morality (see Batson, Kobrynowicz, Dinnerstein, Kampf, & Wilson, 1997). Thus, 
these behaviors are mostly regulated by informal norms rather than by explicit 
sanctioning systems.  
Variations in the display of antisocial and prosocial behavior can thus not be 
expected to be symmetrical. As such, selfishness by showing antisocial behavior is 
inherently different from selfishness by refraining from prosocial behavior. One can 
thus not straightforwardly extrapolate the effects of factors that influence the display 
of negative and antisocial behaviors toward the non-display of positive and prosocial 
behaviors. Hence, it remains to be seen whether the interaction effect between moral 
identity and depletion on antisocial behavior generalizes to the display of prosocial 
behavior. As we argue below, it is likely that power is a facilitator of the selfish state 
resulting from the combination of low moral identity and depletion. In other words, 
it may be that people actually need power to feel that they can refrain from prosocial 
behavior. 
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Power as an Inhibitor of Prosocial Behavior 
Power is typically defined as one’s ability to administer and deny valuable 
resources or punishment to other people (e.g., Fiske, 1993; French & Raven, 1959; 
Keltner et al., 2003). Power is a central aspect of organizational contexts (DeCelles, 
DeRue, Margolis, & Ceranic, 2012; Magee & Galinsky, 2008), and as such, can 
have a substantial impact on the emergence of selfish behaviors. Specifically, power 
has often been viewed as a corruptive force, influencing people to behave in self-
interested ways (Anderson & Galinsky, 2006; Galinsky, Gruenfeld, & Magee, 2003; 
Keltner et al., 2003; Kipnis, 1972). A number of empirical studies have indeed 
suggested that people who experience power tend to focus on selfish impulses and 
subordinate the needs of others to their own desires (for overviews, see Keltner et 
al., 2003; Magee & Smith, 2013). Moreover, the experience of power makes people 
less likely to empathize with someone else (Galinsky, Magee, Inesi, & Gruenfeld, 
2006; Van Kleef et al., 2008). People who experience power are also less influenced 
by others and less likely to conform to prevailing norms (Briñol et al., 2007). In 
sum, it seems that people who feel powerful are inclined to disregard others in their 
behavior.  
More recent research, however, suggests that the relation between power and 
self-interested behavior may be more complex (Keltner et al., 2003). Rather than 
directly influencing behavior, power may instead amplify the behavioral expression 
of individual predispositions (Chen, Lee-Chai, & Bargh, 2001; DeCelles et al., 2012; 
Galinsky et al., 2003; Hoogervorst, De Cremer, Van Dijke, & Mayer, 2012). Wisse 
& Rus (2012), for example, found that people who experienced power displayed 
more antisocial behavior when they focused on their personal self than when they 
focused on their social self.  
The finding that power magnifies inherent impulses is interesting in the 
context of moral identity and self-control depletion. Because the combination of a 
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low moral identity and self-control depletion has been reported to increase antisocial 
behavior and, as such, can be considered to represent a cocktail of selfishness, power 
should be expected to be a magnifying factor. As we argued before, it is not possible 
to simply translate results found in the realm of negative behavior to positive 
behavior, and it therefore remains to be shown whether the combination of low 
moral identity and depletion leads to lower levels of prosocial behavior, or if power 
is a necessary facilitator of this effect. We expect the latter to be true for two 
reasons. First, prosocial behavior is usually displayed in high quality relationships 
such as workplace relationships. Power, however, may actually undermine this 
prevalence of prosocial behavior in high quality relationships. More specifically, 
power leads to an objectification of others, which transforms workplace 
relationships in exchange relationships, as such undermining prosocial behavior 
(Chen et al., 2001). Second, while the display of positive behavior is enhanced by 
societal norms and education, high power undermines conformity (Briñol et al., 
2007), and therefore less helping behavior can be expected. In other words, people 
high in power may feel that they are in a position where they can get away with less 
helping behavior. 
For people high in moral identity, on the other hand, depletion does not 
influence their level of selfishness as research suggests that high moral identifiers 
have their moral values more readily accessible even in situations of self-control 
depletion (Gino et al., 2011; Joosten et al., 2014). Because prosocial behavior is easy 
to implement and generally sustained by societal and organizational norms, we 
expect that people high in moral identity act in line with these societal norms 
irrespective of their level of depletion. In the same vein, one could also reason that 
power, as a facilitator of individual predispositions, may increase the prosocial 
behavior of people high in moral identity. Indeed, there is some research that 
indicates that people high in power who focus on moral or prosocial values show 
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less antisocial behavior than those low in power (DeCelles et al., 2012; Wisse & 
Rus, 2012). Prosocial behavior is -unlike antisocial behavior- relatively easy to 
implement and sustained by societal and organizational norms. We expect that 
because of this high social acceptance of most prosocial behaviors, power will not 
lead to more prosocial behavior for high moral identifiers. That is, we expect that 
prosocial behavior is already part of the daily routine for people high in moral 
identity, and power is not likely to increase their helping behavior beyond this level.  
Overview of Predictions and Studies 
There is reason to believe that self-control depletion undermines the 
emergence of prosocial behaviors. However, internalized moral values in terms of a 
high moral identity facilitate the self-regulation of prosocial behavior, even in 
situations that impair self-regulation. In other words, depletion is likely to make 
people low in moral identity less prosocial, whereas depletion should have no effect 
on people high in moral identity. In the present research we expect that - contrary to 
the negative effects of depletion and low moral identity on antisocial behavior - 
power is a facilitator of the negative combination of depletion and low moral 
identity on prosocial behavior. It is likely that people may need power to feel that 
they can get away with refraining from prosocial behavior. Hence, we expected that 
power facilitates the interaction effect of depletion and moral identity on prosocial 
behavior. This leads to our Hypothesis, which implies a three-way interaction 
between depletion, moral identity and power. In particular, when power levels are 
high, a combination of depletion and low moral identity lead people to refrain from 
prosocial behavior, whereas no such an effect is expected when power levels are 
low. The present study’s Hypothesis therefore states that: 
The negative effect of depletion on prosocial behavior among people low in 
moral identity is restricted to people high, rather than low in power. 
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We tested this Hypothesis in two studies. Study 1 was a controlled 
laboratory experiment in which participants’ power and level of depletion were 
manipulated. We measured the participant’s level of moral identity independent 
from the experimental situation. The dependent variable in this study was the extent 
to which the participants helped another person who was in need.  
The controlled setting in Study 1 makes it possible to draw causal 
conclusions, but it does not tell us much about the relevance of the processes that we 
set out to study in actual organizational contexts. Therefore, Study 2 was conducted 
in an organizational setting, using a multisource design. We asked employees of 
various organizations to indicate their level of depletion, their moral identity, and 
their power in the organization using well-established measures. To avoid potential 
common method and self-presentation biases (P. M. Podsakoff, MacKenzie, Lee, & 
Podsakoff, 2003) we asked a colleague to indicate the focal employee’s level of 
prosocial behavior. We operationalized prosocial behavior as organizational 
citizenship behavior (OCB). OCB is an important and commonly used index of 
prosocial employee behavior because it describes various types of discretionary, 
extra-role behaviors that contribute to effective organizational functioning but that 
are not explicitly required (Organ, 1988). 
 
Study 1 
Method 
Ethics statement. Ethics approval for Study 1 was formally waived by the 
ethical committee of the Faculty of Psychological and Educational Sciences 
(FPPW), Ghent University, as this research was performed in adherence with the 
ethical protocol of the university. All participants gave their formal, written consent, 
and were fully debriefed after the experiment. Participants participated voluntary 
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and they could quit the experiment at any time without negative consequences. All 
data was analyzed and stored anonymously. 
Participants and design. Eighty-four undergraduate students
1
 from a 
medium-sized Belgian university participated in this study. The average age of 
participants was 18.95 years (SD = 2.11), and 89.3 percent were women. The 
participants were recruited through an online sign-up system and received partial 
course credit for their participation. Participants were randomly assigned to one 
condition of a 2 (depletion versus no depletion) x 2 (high versus low power) between 
subjects design. Participants’ moral identity was assessed prior to the experimental 
manipulations, creating an additional continuous between subjects variable. 
Moral identity measure. Participants responded to an online questionnaire 
including demographic information and a measure of moral identity 24 hours before 
the actual experiment. We used Aquino and Reed´s (2002) instrument to measure 
participants’ moral identity. Following Aquino and Reed (2002), and in line with our 
theoretical ideas, we relied on the Internalization dimension of this instrument (i.e., 
the extent to which people find morality an important aspect of who they are) and 
disregarded the Symbolization subscale (which measures the extent to which people 
want to appear as a moral person). The Internalization subscale has been proven to 
be the most stable and robust predictor of moral behavior (Aquino et al., 2009; 
Reynolds & Ceranic, 2007). In line with Aquino and Reed’s (2002) procedure, the 
following instructions were given: “Listed below are some characteristics that might 
describe a person: Caring, Compassionate, Fair, Friendly, Generous, Helpful, 
                                                 
1
 Three respondents were not included in the analyses because they did not follow the 
instructions of the power manipulation. Inclusion of these three respondents in our analyses 
did not change any of the results. Most importantly, the predicted three-way interaction 
remained significant,  = .29, p = .01. 
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Hardworking, Honest, and Kind. The person with these characteristics could be you 
or it could be someone else. For a moment, visualize in your mind the kind of person 
who has these characteristics. Imagine how that person would think, feel, and act. 
When you have a clear image of what this person would be like, answer the 
following questions.” Participants then responded to the five Internalization items on 
a 7-point scale. Sample items from this scale are: “It would make me feel good to be 
a person who has these characteristics” and “Having these characteristics is an 
important part of my sense of self” (1 = totally disagree; 7 = totally agree; 
Cronbach’s = .72; M = 6.18, SD = 0.60).  
Experimental procedure. Upon arrival at the laboratory, participants were 
seated in separate cubicles, each equipped with a personal computer. All 
communication took place via this computer.  
First, participants were introduced to the power manipulation, taken from 
Galinsky and colleagues (2003) that served to prime high versus low power. 
Participants were asked to recall a particular situation in their lives. Participants in 
the high power condition wrote about “a particular situation in which you had power 
over another individual or individuals”. Participants in the low power condition 
wrote about “a particular situation in which someone else had power over you.”  
Following the power manipulation, participants responded to the 
manipulation checks using two items (adapted from Guinote, Weick, & Cai, 2012): 
“How powerful did you feel in the situation you recalled” and “How much power 
did someone else have over you in the situation you recalled” (reversed; 1 = not at 
all; 7 = very much so). 
Participants then completed the depletion task (taken from Baumeister et al., 
1998). This task has proven to be successful as a manipulation of self-control 
depletion in a number of studies (e.g., Baumeister et al., 1998; Fischer, Greitemeyer, 
& Frey, 2007; Wheeler, Briñol, & Hermann, 2007). In the first part, participants 
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were instructed to indicate each instance of the letter e in a text (i.e., by clicking 
each e with the computer mouse). Participants received visual feedback whenever 
they clicked an e (i.e., a highlighted circle around the corresponding e), and were 
given five minutes to complete the task. This first phase is relatively easy and is used 
to establish a strong habitual response for scanning and indicating every e. In the 
second part of the task, participants either continued indicating e’s using the same 
rule as before (no depletion condition), or they were given the instruction to indicate 
each e, except for the ones followed by a vowel, or those with a vowel preceding the 
e by two letters (high depletion condition). For participants in the high depletion 
condition, overriding the response of scanning for and indicating every e is known to 
require more regulatory resources than for participants in the low depletion 
condition (who did not need to override a habitual response).  
The effectiveness of the self-control depletion manipulation was assessed 
using two items: “The second task was hard” (taken from Balliet & Joireman, 2010), 
and “The second task was habit-breaking” (1 = not at all; 7 = very much so; taken 
from DeWall et al., 2008).  
Helping measure. After the experimental tasks, participants were told that 
there were several PhD students in need of participants for their experiments that 
lasted usually somewhere between 5 and 60 minutes. Participants were asked 
whether they would be willing to participate. We emphasized to the participants that 
it was not possible to reward them for their participation in these additional studies, 
and that they would be contacted by an experimenter to set a date and time that 
would suit them best. Then, participants indicated how much time they would help 
(i.e., number of donated minutes) or by indicating that they would not help (coded as 
0 donated minutes; see e.g., Van Dijke, De Cremer, Brebels, & Van Quaquebeke, in 
press; Zhong & Liljenquist, 2006 for similar ways to measure prosocial behavior). 
Subsequently, participants were fully debriefed.  
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Results 
Manipulation checks. A 2 (depletion versus no depletion) x 2 (high power 
versus low power) Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) showed that participants in the 
high power condition considered themselves more powerful in the recalled situation 
than participants in the low power condition (M = 4.81, SD = 1.40 vs. M = 2.14, SD 
= 1.00, respectively), F(1, 80) = 99.24, p < .001, 2 = .55. These participants also 
disagreed more with the statement that someone else had power over them than 
participants in the low power condition (M = 4.55, SD = 1.23 vs. M = 5.29, SD = 
1.15, respectively), F(1, 80) = 8.17, p = .01, 2 = .09. No other main or interaction 
effects were significant. 
Additionally, two independent judges rated how powerful the participants 
were in the recalled situations on a 7-point scale (1 = not at all powerful; 7 = very 
powerful). The inter-rater reliability was high (Intraclass correlation coefficient 
[ICC] = .90) and ratings were averaged to assess the effectiveness of the power 
manipulation. A 2 (depletion versus no depletion) x 2 (high versus low power) 
ANOVA showed that participants in the high power condition were rated more 
powerful in the described situation than participants in the low power condition (M = 
4.85, SD = 0.58 vs. M = 3.20, SD = 0.90, respectively), F(1, 80) = 99.34, p < .001 , 
2 = .55. No other main or interaction effects were significant. 
A 2 (depletion versus no depletion) x 2 (high versus low power) ANOVA 
indicated that depleted participants rated the depletion task as harder than non-
depleted participants (M = 4.88, SD = 1.33 vs. M = 3.60, SD = 1.50, respectively), 
F(1, 80) = 17.62, p < .001, 2 = .18. These participants also found the task more 
habit-breaking than non-depleted participants (M = 5.05, SD = 1.38 vs. M = 3.95, SD 
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= 1.46, respectively), F(1, 80) = 12.40, p = .001, 2 = .13. No other main or 
interaction effects were significant.
2
 
Helping behavior. Our measure of helping behavior (i.e., asking 
participants to donate their time for participation in additional studies) was 
positively skewed (M = 21.31, SD = 16.79). This resulted because a significant 
number of cases (N = 16) clustered at the lower limit (i.e., helping out for 0 minutes, 
to indicate that they did not want to display prosocial behavior). Skewed 
distributions can result in the violation of OLS assumptions. We therefore conducted 
a Tobit regression (see Tobin, 1958), which was specifically developed for variables 
with a lower (or upper) limit and a concentration of observations at this limiting 
value.  
To test our hypothesis, we thus conducted a Tobit regression analysis
3
 in 
which helping behavior was predicted by the depletion manipulation, moral identity, 
the power manipulation, all the two-way interactions among these three variables, 
and finally, the three-way interaction. Following Aiken and West (1991), the 
                                                 
2
 We also conducted regression analyses in which the manipulation checks were predicted by 
the depletion manipulation, power manipulation, participants’ moral identity, and the 
corresponding interaction terms. These analyses produced similar results to those presented 
in the main text. Specifically, power increased how powerful participants felt,  = .75, p < 
.001, and decreased reported feelings of powerlessness,  = -.30, p = .01. Furthermore, 
participants in the high power condition were rated significantly more powerful than 
participants in the low power condition,  = .83, p < .001. Finally, depletion increased ratings 
of how hard,  = .43, p < .001, and habit-breaking the task was,  = .35, p = .001. In none of 
the analyses, other main or interaction effects were significant. 
3
 We also conducted OLS regression analyses. These analyses produced similar results as the 
Tobit regression analyses. Most importantly, the predicted three-way interaction was 
significant,  = .28, p = .02. 
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interaction terms were based on the mean-centered scores of moral identity and 
effect coded scores of depletion and power. 
Table 1 shows the results of the Tobit regression analysis. Of most 
importance, the predicted three-way interaction was significant,  = .34, p = .004. To 
analyze this interaction in more detail, we used simple slope analyses (Aiken & 
West, 1991). Figure 1a shows that, consistent with our predictions, among 
participants who were primed with high power, depletion significantly decreased 
helping behavior for those low in moral identity (one SD below the mean),  = -.55, 
p = .02, but not for those high in moral identity (one SD above the mean),  = .21, p 
= .33.  
Yet, for participants who received the low power prime (see Figure 1b), 
depletion did not significantly influence helping behavior for those low in moral 
identity (one SD below the mean),  = .35, p = .09, or for those high in moral 
identity (one SD above the mean),  = -.26, p = .24. 
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Table 1 
Results of Hierarchical Regression Analysis for Helping in Study 1 
Variables B SE B 
Self-control depletion (SD) -1.26 2.11 -.06 
Moral identity (MI) 5.24 3.90 .15 
Power (P) -0.34 2.11 -.02 
SD x MI 1.24 3.90 .04 
SD x P -2.14 2.11 -.11 
MI x P 3.66 3.90 .11 
SD x MI x P 11.55 3.92 .34** 
Note. Final model: -2 log likelihood = -311.39, 2 (7) = 11.29, p = .13. B = 
unstandardized regression coefficient;  = standardized regression coefficient. For 
the self-control depletion manipulation, -1 denotes no self-control depletion; 1 
denotes self-control depletion. For the power manipulation, -1 denotes low power; 1 
denotes high power. 
* p < .05. ** p < .01. 
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Figure 1a. Helping as a function of self-control depletion and moral identity for 
participants in the high power condition. 
 
 
 
Figure 1b. Helping as a function of self-control depletion and moral identity for 
participants in the low power condition. 
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Summary and Conclusion 
The results of Study 1 show that, in line with theoretical predictions (Seeley 
& Gardner, 2003) and our Hypothesis, among participants who felt high in power, 
depletion reduced prosocial behaviors for those low (as opposed to high) in moral 
identity, whereas this interaction effect between depletion and moral identity did not 
occur for those who felt low in power. 
 
Study 2 
Study 1 provided causal evidence for our proposed ideas, but the setup 
limited us to the use of students as participants in a laboratory setting. Study 2 was 
designed to test our predictions in an organizational setting. Rather than priming 
power and manipulating depletion, we measured employees’ sense of power in the 
organization and their level of depletion in addition to their moral identity. To avoid 
potential common method and self-presentation biases we asked colleagues of the 
respondents to rate the respondent’s prosocial behavior (P. M. Podsakoff et al., 
2003). 
Method 
Ethics statement. Ethics approval for Study 2 was formally waived by the 
ethical committee of the FPPW, Ghent University, as this research was performed in 
adherence with the ethical protocol of the university. We used a research agency to 
recruit our respondents, who gave their consent upon enrolling this research panel to 
use their data for research purposes. Moreover, a “double active opt-in” method was 
used, meaning that all respondents gave their consent by actively and voluntarily 
agreeing to take part in our research. Before starting the questionnaire, all 
respondents were provided with information on the purpose and the content of the 
research. Respondents were informed that all data would be analyzed and stored 
anonymously and that they could quit the questionnaire at any moment. 
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Sample and procedure. We recruited respondents via a Dutch research 
panel. We asked potential respondents to respond to our survey and also to invite a 
coworker to respond to some items. A total of 893 panel members agreed to fill out 
the questionnaire as focal employee and 94 of these focal employees also found a 
colleague willing to fill out the questionnaire. The focal employees (i.e., panel 
members) received credit points that would allow them to receive certain gifts (e.g., 
tickets for the movies). Colleagues participated in a lottery in which they could win 
an Ipad or one of five €20 gift certificates. Because we relied on colleague ratings of 
the focal employee’s behavior, the number of respondents included in our analyses 
consisted of 94 employees and 94 matched colleagues.
4
 
Of the focal employees, 55 were male and 39 were female. The mean age 
was 44.13 years (SD = 11.37). One percent had only lower education (primary 
school), 17% had high school only, 26% had followed up on this with vocational 
education, 36% had a bachelor’s degree, and 20% had a master’s degree. The focal 
                                                 
4
 Focal employees who could be included in the analyses (i.e., because they had a coworker 
who was also willing to participate) did not differ from focal employees who could not be 
included in the analyses with regard to their mean level on the demographic variables and 
focal predictors. There was one exception: focal employees who could be included worked 
longer in their current organization than focal employees who were not included. This is 
most likely because longer tenure increases the likelihood of developing social connections 
with colleagues. This should make it easier to find a coworker willing to participate.  
In addition, we also tested whether the correlations between the study variables were 
significantly different between included and not included employees. The correlations 
between the study’s variables (Bonferroni corrected) did not differ between the two groups of 
focal employees. These analyses give us little reason to think that selection biases impacted 
our results and conclusions. 
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employees worked on average for 12.83 years (SD = 10.80) in their current 
organization.  
The matched group of colleagues included 47 males and 47 females. The 
mean age was 42.96 years (SD = 10.98). One percent had only lower education 
(primary school), 19% had high school only, 30% had followed up on this with 
vocational education, 43% had a bachelor’s degree, and 7% had a master’s degree. 
The colleagues worked on average for 10.72 years (SD = 9.27) in their current 
organization. 
Measures. We measured moral identity using the same internalization 
subscale of the moral identity measure (Aquino & Reed, 2002) as in Study 1 (1 = not 
at all; 5 = very much so; Cronbach’s = .77; M = 4.02, SD = 0.70).  
 To assess focal employees’ levels of depletion, we used the 2-item measure 
from Muraven and colleagues (1998). Focal employees indicated how much they 
agreed or disagreed with: “I often feel as if I have low energy,” and “I often feel as if 
things are taking a lot of effort” (1 = strongly disagree; 5 = strongly agree; 
Cronbach’s = .72; M = 2.29, SD = 0.93).  
Power of the focal employee was measured using the 8-item instrument 
developed by Anderson and Galinsky (2006; see Anderson, John, & Keltner, 2012, 
for extensive validation evidence). Focal employees responded to items such as 
“Even if I voice them, my views have little sway in the organization” (reverse 
scored), and “If I want to, I get to make the decisions in the organization” (1 = 
strongly disagree; 5 = strongly agree; Cronbach’s = .77; M = 3.51, SD = 0.89). 
We operationalized prosocial behavior of the focal employee using the 19-
item OCB measure of Moorman and Blakely (1995). To assess OCB, colleagues of 
the focal employees were asked to rate the focal employees on actions such as 
“voluntarily helps new employees settle into the job,” “often motivates others to 
express their ideas and opinions”, “performs his/her job duties with extra-special 
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care,” and “actively promotes the organization’s products and services to potential 
users” (1 = strongly disagree; 5 = strongly agree; Cronbach’s = .91; M = 3.87, SD 
= 0.52). 
Results 
Descriptive statistics and intercorrelations. Table 2 presents the means, 
standard deviations, and correlations between the Study 2 variables.  
Hypothesis test. To test our hypothesis, we conducted a hierarchical 
regression analysis with colleague ratings of OCB serving as the dependent variable. 
Age, gender, tenure, and education level of the focal employees, and, age, gender, 
and education level of the colleagues were entered as control variables in the first 
step of the regression. Depletion, moral identity, and power were entered in the 
second step of the regression. The two-way interactions between depletion, moral 
identity, and power were entered in the third step of the regression. The three-way 
interaction was entered in the fourth step. Interaction terms were based on mean-
centered scores of the independent variables (Aiken & West, 1991). 
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Table 3 shows the results of the hierarchical regression analysis. Of most 
importance and in line with our Hypothesis, the predicted three-way interaction was 
significant,  = .24, p = .02. We used simple slope analyses (Aiken & West, 1991) to 
analyze this interaction further. Figure 2a shows that, among high power employees, 
depletion significantly decreased OCB for those low in moral identity (one SD 
below the mean),  = -.95, p < .001. However, for those high in moral identity (one 
SD above the mean) depletion did not decrease OCB,  = .17, p = .35.  
 
 
Figure 2a. OCB rated by a coworker as a function of self-control depletion and 
moral identity for employees with high power. 
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Table 3 
Results of Hierarchical Regression Analysis for OCB in Study 2 
Variables Step 1 Step 2 Step 3 Step 4 
Age of focal employee -.03 -.05 -.09 -.08 
Gender of focal employee .10 .09 .07 .07 
Tenure of focal employee .08 .12 .16 .15 
Education level of focal 
employee 
.06 .06 .07 .06 
Age of colleague -.14 -.16 -.12 -.10 
Gender of colleague .17 .07 .08 .11 
Education level of colleague .00 -.13 -.06 -.07 
Self-control depletion (SD)  -.10 -.04 -.09 
Moral identity (MI)  .26 .22*  .23* 
Power  .19 .16 .15 
SD x MI   .33** .41*** 
SD x Power   -.29** -.31** 
MI x Power   -.03 .05 
SD x MI x Power    .25* 
R
2
 .10 .23 .34 .38 
R
2
adj .03 .13 .23 .27 
R
2
change .10 .13** .11** .04* 
F 1.35 2.42* 3.14** 3.45*** 
Note. Table presents Beta coefficients. For gender, -1 denotes males, 1 denotes 
females.  
* p < .05. ** p < .01. *** p < .001. 
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Figure 2b shows that, for low power employees, depletion had no effect on 
OCB for those low in moral identity (one SD below the mean),  = .02, p = .89. 
Unexpectedly, depletion increased OCB for those high in moral identity (one SD 
above the mean),  = .41, p = .050. However, given the fact that the interaction 
between moral identity and self-control depletion was not significant among 
employees low in power, and given that we did not obtain this result in Study 1, the 
results of this analysis should be interpreted with caution. 
 
 
Figure 2b. OCB rated by a coworker as a function of self-control depletion and 
moral identity for employees with low power. 
 
Supplemental analyses. We followed Spector and Brannick’s (2011) 
suggestion and repeated our analyses without the control variables as predictors in 
the equations. This analysis led to similar conclusions to those presented previously. 
Most importantly, the predicted three-way interaction was significant,  = .24, p = 
.02.  
 
Power, self-control, and moral identity                                                                                                            99
 
Summary and Conclusion 
The results of Study 2 supported our prediction. We found the hypothesized 
interaction between moral identity and depletion for employees high in power, but 
not for employees low in power. More specifically, depletion reduces prosocial 
behaviors among employees low in moral identity if those employees feel high in 
power, but not if they feel low in power. The prosocial behavior of employees high 
in moral identity, on the other hand, was not influenced by depletion, whether they 
felt high in power or not. It thus seems that employees with a high moral identity 
have their moral values more readily accessible, even when their self-control 
resources are depleted and irrespective of their power level. 
 
General Discussion 
A laboratory experiment and a multisource field study consistently showed 
an interaction between depletion and moral identity for people high in power, but not 
for people low in power. In the following sections we discuss the implications and 
limitations of these findings. 
Theoretical Implications 
The obtained three way interaction between self-control depletion, moral 
identity and power has theoretical implications for each of the constituting factors of 
this third order effect. It enhances, first of all, our understanding of the role of self-
regulation in the display of prosocial behavior. In fact, most previous studies focused 
on effects of depletion on subsequent task persistence or negative and antisocial 
behavior (DeWall et al., 2007; Gino et al., 2011; Stucke & Baumeister, 2006). To 
date, indirect evidence for the effect of depletion on prosocial behavior is offered 
only by DeWall and colleagues (2008) who showed that depletion decreases 
prosocial intentions. Hence, our research is (at least to our knowledge) the first to 
show that regulatory depletion has an effect on prosocial behavior. These findings 
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are important because our results indicate that especially people who feel powerful 
and are low in moral identity are likely to show less prosocial behavior as a result of 
regulatory depletion. At the same time, however, people high in power are likely to 
serve as a source of ethical guidance by means of social learning (Bandura, 1977, 
1986). That is, if someone in power does not act in ethical ways, employees are 
likely to follow his or her lead (Mayer, Kuenzi, Greenbaum, Bardes, & Salvador, 
2009).  
Most importantly, the present findings offer corroborative evidence for the 
idea that the effect of situations that constrain cognitive capacity (e.g., self-control 
depletion) on prosocial behavior depends not only on one’s level of moral identity, 
but also on one’s sense of power. That is, self-control depletion leads to a decrease 
in prosocial behavior among people low in moral identity, but only when they feel 
powerful. Our reasoning for this is that prosocial behavior is fairly easy to 
implement because of its social desirability and it thus seems that people need power 
to feel that they can refrain from prosocial behavior. Research in the realm of 
antisocial behavior, however, has shown that the effect of self-control depletion on 
antisocial behavior depends solely on one’s level of moral identity (Gino et al., 
2011; Joosten et al., 2014). That is, depletion increases antisocial behavior among 
people low in moral identity, irrespective of their power level. The self-regulation of 
prosocial behavior, on the other hand, is dependent upon people’s level of power. In 
other words, depletion reduces prosocial behavior among people low in moral 
identity, only if they experience power. Taking all these results together, it is clear 
that the display of prosocial intentions relies on processes that are qualitatively 
different from suppressing antisocial and selfish impulses (e.g., Lee & Allen, 2002).  
The results of the present study also have implications for our understanding 
of what power tells us about the differences between not helping someone and 
hurting someone. In the introduction we argued that refraining from antisocial 
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behavior is considered as more pressing than prosocial behavior (Kant, 1785/2005). 
That is, antisocial behavior is usually regulated by formal sanctioning systems, 
which are known to make people focus on the exchange characteristics of a situation 
(Mulder, Van Dijk, De Cremer, & Wilke, 2006; TenBrunsel & Messick, 1999). 
Similarly, power is also likely to make people focus on the exchange characteristics 
of a situation, because people who experience power tend to objectify others (Chen 
et al., 2001). It thus seems that similar processes that underlie the emergence of 
antisocial behavior, also play a role in the behavior of people high in power. 
Prosocial behavior, on the other hand, is regulated more informally because of its 
social desirability. Prosocial behavior is generally sustained by social and 
organizational norms, and adherence to these norms is fairly easy. The present study 
thus indicates that power is needed to obtain the same results for prosocial behavior 
as for antisocial behavior (i.e., the negative effect of self-control depletion for people 
low in moral identity; see (Gino et al., 2011; Joosten et al., 2014). 
 Our findings are also informative for the study of moral identity. Among 
people high in moral identity, self-control depletion and power do not necessarily 
hamper the self-regulation of prosocial behavior. This finding suggests that, in line 
with Gino and colleagues (2011) and Joosten and colleagues (2014), people high in 
moral identity have their moral values accessible irrespective of their level of 
depletion.  
Our research has also some implications that are relevant for the power 
literature. Past research has, on the one hand, often shown that power can make 
people more selfish (for overviews see Keltner et al., 2003; Magee & Smith, 2013). 
However, on the other hand, some studies suggest that this undermining effect on 
selfishness does not necessary result from having high power in itself (Galinsky et 
al., 2003; Keltner et al., 2003). As a solution to these diverging findings, it has been 
proposed that power in itself does not make people selfish but that it acts as a 
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catalyst in facilitating the behavioral expression of internal states (Galinsky, Magee, 
Gruenfeld, Whitson, & Liljenquist, 2008; Guinote et al., 2012). This indicates that 
power is not inherently corruptive, but rather a facilitator of the behavioral 
expression of internal states (in our case: the toxic cocktail of depletion and low 
moral identity). The present research adds to this literature, showing that the 
facilitating effect of power on internal states (i.e., low moral identity) is contingent 
upon third variables as well (i.e., self-control depletion).  
Practical Implications 
The present research also offers some practical implications for 
organizations. It seems to be the case that particularly employees who feel powerful 
are vulnerable to the effects of self-control depletion on prosocial behaviors. At the 
same time, it is especially important for employees high in power to behave in 
prosocial ways as they form an important source of vicarious learning (Bandura, 
1986). For these employees, the negative effects of self-control depletion on 
prosocial behavior seem to apply particularly among those low in moral identity. 
Fortunately, research indicates that it is possible to situationally increase the 
accessibility of moral identity (Aquino et al., 2009; Reed, Aquino, & Levy, 2007). 
Combined with the present results, this entails a promising implication for 
organizations. Situational interventions aimed at stimulating moral identity are thus 
likely to make employees who feel high in power behave in prosocial ways. Such 
interventions can consist of the stimulation of a clear ethical climate. Moreover, 
social learning is enforced by ensuring that employees high in power act in moral 
ways, by which interventions aimed at increasing morality have positive 
implications for people low in power (Martin & Cullen, 2006; Mayer et al., 2009; 
Mayer, Kuenzi, & Greenbaum, 2010). 
Another practical implication of the present findings is that on the one hand, 
high power makes employees particularly vulnerable to the effects of self-control 
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depletion on prosocial behaviors, while, on the other hand, power also comes with 
heavy workloads, and numerous choices and decisions each day. Importantly, high 
stress levels (Muraven & Baumeister, 2000), overly long working hours that may 
lead to sleep deprivation (Barnes et al., 2011; Christian & Ellis, 2011), and the 
necessity to make many choices and decisions (Vohs et al., 2008), all constitute 
factors that are known to lead to self-control depletion. Organizations should thus be 
aware that overloading their employees in this respect could also reduce the 
prevalence of prosocial behaviors, at least among employees with a low moral 
identity and a high sense of power. Similarly, employees who feel high in power 
should also be aware that their cognitive state could affect their own behavior. 
One could assume from our results that employees who feel low in power 
are not vulnerable to the effects of self-control depletion on selfish behaviors. It is, 
however, important that organizations and employees realize that this only holds for 
the emergence of prosocial behaviors. That is, our findings indicate that for 
employees low in power, depletion does not reduce prosocial behaviors for those 
low in moral identity. There are, however, studies in the realm of negative behavior 
that show that self-control depletion makes people low in moral identity more likely 
to show antisocial behavior (Gino et al., 2011; Joosten et al., 2014). Even though 
these studies did not compare high and low power, the results from these studies 
should nevertheless be taken into consideration.  
Strengths, Limitations and Suggestions for Future Research 
A major strength of this article lies in the use of diverse methods to test our 
hypothesis. The laboratory experiment (Study 1) permits us to draw causal 
inferences with regard to the interactive effects of power, self-control depletion and 
moral identity on prosocial behavior. The subsequent multisource field study (Study 
2) allowed us to investigate whether the hypothesized effects are also relevant in 
organizational settings. Furthermore, the multisource setting made it possible to 
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control for common method and self-presentation biases (P. M. Podsakoff et al., 
2003).  
A potential limitation is that the sample sizes in both Study 1 and Study 2 
are relatively small and that this could potentially harm the validity of our results. 
We did, however, replicate the findings in an experimental setting (Study 1) and in a 
multisource field setting (Study 2), which reinforces the reliability and validity of 
our results. However, even though we believe that our results are valid and reliable, 
replications are necessary to further prove the validity of our findings. 
In Study 2, we relied on colleague ratings of OCB. Our reliance on a single 
source to measure OCB may pose a threat to the validity of our findings, because of 
the discretionary nature of OCB (Allen, Barnard, Rush, & Russell, 2000). That is, 
OCB consists of many different behaviors, and it is not unlikely that the colleagues 
witnessed only part of these behaviors. It may thus be that our reliance on a single 
source measure does not fully capture the unique variance present in citizenship 
behaviors. Future research could address this possible shortcoming by measuring 
OCB via various sources (e.g., comparing self and other ratings, or by combining 
various other ratings). 
Another strength of the present article is that self-control depletion was 
manipulated in Study 1, whereas it was measured in Study 2. Although it can be 
argued that the manipulation of self-control depletion represents a more dynamic 
representation of self-control depletion than the more trait oriented measure, similar 
results were obtained. This apparent consistency strengthens our beliefs that it is 
possible to capture self-control depletion with a trait oriented measure in the field. 
These results also corroborate previous research that combined self-control depletion 
manipulations and measures, which shows clear consistency between these two 
operationalizations of self-control depletion (Vohs et al., 2008; Joosten et al., 2014) 
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Readers could wonder whether there are situations in which power may 
increase the prosocial behavior of people high in moral identity. In our research we 
focused on informal, effortless helping behavior. As noted in the introduction, 
prosocial behavior might sometimes be restrained by organizational rules and 
regulations or by demands inherent in employees’ primary tasks (Bell & Menguc, 
2002; Morrison, 2006). In these cases, prosocial behavior is thus likely to be more 
effortful and less socially desirable, and may have as a result that high moral 
identifiers need power to act in line with their moral values.  
Concluding Remarks 
Research focusing on the social effects of depletion presents us with a rather 
cynical view of human nature. Lack of self-control results in selfishness (Baumeister 
& Exline, 1999; Mead et al., 2009; Shalvi et al., 2012), and is also likely to 
undermine the emergence of prosocial behaviors. Yet, other studies show that 
depletion makes only people low in moral identity more selfish, while no such an 
effect of depletion was obtained among high moral identifiers. We argued that one 
cannot simply extrapolate the effects of factors that influence the display of 
antisocial behavior to the non-display of prosocial behavior, and that one may need 
power to refrain from prosocial behavior. In line with this, we showed that the 
moderating role of moral identity on the effects of depletion is present among people 
high in power, and not among people low in power. 
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Feel good, do-good!? On consistency and 
compensation in moral self-regulation 
 
Abstract 
Studies in the behavioral ethics and moral psychology traditions have begun to 
reveal the important roles of self-related processes that underlie moral behavior. 
Unfortunately, this research has resulted in two distinct and opposing streams of 
findings that are usually referred to as moral consistency and moral compensation. 
Moral consistency research shows that a salient self-concept as a moral person 
promotes moral behavior. Conversely, moral compensation research reveals that a 
salient self-concept as an immoral person promotes moral behavior. The present 
study’s aim was to integrate these two literatures. We argued that compensation 
forms a reactive, “damage control” response in social situations, whereas 
consistency derives from a more proactive approach to reputation building and 
maintenance. Two experiments supported this prediction in showing that cognitive 
depletion (i.e., resulting in a reactive approach) results in moral compensation 
whereas consistency results when cognitive resources are available (i.e., resulting in 
a proactive approach). Experiment 2 revealed that these processes originate from 
reputational (rather than moral) considerations by showing that they emerge only 
under conditions of accountability. It can thus be concluded that reputational 
concerns are important for both moral compensation and moral consistency 
processes, and that which of these two prevails depends on the perspective that 
people take: a reactive or a proactive approach. 
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This chapter is based on Joosten, A., van Dijke, M., Van Hiel, A., & De Cremer, D. (in 
press). Feel good, do-good!? On consistency and compensation in moral self-regulation. 
Journal of Business Ethics, 123(1), 71-84. 
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Introduction 
Every day we encounter numerous work situations in which we have to 
decide between right and wrong. In the morning, when choosing a new supplier, a 
warehouse manager may decide to choose for the more expensive one that is 
guaranteed sweatshop free or she may go for the cheapest offer. In the afternoon, she 
may decide (somewhat more trivially) to put in some overtime to finish an important 
deadline or to enjoy a drink on a sunny terrace. Recently, researchers who are 
interested in behavioral ethics and moral psychology have started to study these 
moment-to-moment balancing acts between prosocial and self-interested behavior
1
. 
This research has revealed important roles for the self and self-regulation processes 
in shaping our moral behaviors (Aquino, Freeman, Reed, Lim, & Felps, 2009; Blasi, 
1983; Sachdeva, Iliev, & Medin, 2009; Zhong, Liljenquist, & Cain, 2009). 
Regretfully, this research has not yet resulted in an integrated model that 
informs us how self-related processes influence moral behavior. In fact, two distinct 
literatures seem to have developed independently. While both literatures rely on 
similar manipulations and measures of morality, they offer surprisingly opposite 
findings. On the one hand, a series of studies show that people with a salient self-
concept as being a moral person display more prosocial behavior than people for 
whom this self-concept is not salient, or for whom an immoral self-concept is salient 
(e.g., Aquino et al., 2009; Blasi, 1983; Reed, Aquino, & Levy, 2007). Thus, this  
research suggests that when feeling moral (e.g., after helping your colleague in the 
morning), you are more likely to put in some overtime in the afternoon. This effect 
                                                 
1
 Morality requires people to forgo self-interested impulses and focus on the needs of others 
(Kant, 2005/1785; Aquino et al., 2009). In this paper we adopted a focus on prosocial 
behavior, which are actions intended to help other people. Helping behavior is considered an 
important exemplar of moral behavior (Haidt & Graham, 2007; Wilhelm & Bekkers, 2010). 
More specifically, more helping behavior implies less self-interest in our studies. 
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is usually explained in terms of consistency: people who view themselves as moral 
feel that they have to continue acting in a moral manner to avoid violating their 
sense of self and their integrity (Blasi, 1980).  
On the other hand, a growing literature shows that people with a salient self-
concept as an immoral person display more prosocial behavior than people for whom 
this self-concept is not salient or people who view themselves as moral (e.g., Jordan, 
Mullen, & Murnighan, 2011; Monin & Miller, 2001; Sachdeva et al., 2009). Thus, 
this research suggests, for instance, that after procrastinating at work in the morning, 
you are more likely to subsequently comply with a request to work overtime. 
Conversely, if you would have spent your morning helping your colleague, you 
might refuse to do overtime. This effect is usually explained in terms of 
compensation and licensing processes (Zhong et al., 2009): People who feel immoral 
attempt to “make up” for this by displaying moral behavior (Sachdeva et al., 2009) 
whereas people who view themselves as moral feel that they have built up a 
“surplus” of morality, allowing them to display less moral behavior without 
damaging their self-concept and self-presentation as a moral person. 
We know of only one study that has addressed the intriguing inconsistency 
between these two sets of findings. Conway and Peetz (2012) showed that recalling 
a temporally distant action (e.g., behavior performed over 1 year ago) led to moral 
consistency, whereas recalling a recent action (e.g., behavior performed within the 
past week) led to moral compensation effects on prosocial intentions. They argued 
that this effect occurs because distant actions are conceptualized abstractly, in 
general terms as a schematic representation, whereas recent actions are 
conceptualized concretely, in specific terms as they occurred. When people think 
about (im)moral actions in abstract terms they will focus on the abstract moral 
values associated with these actions and act in line with them. Thinking about 
(im)moral actions in concrete terms might remind people about the moral 
Moral self-regulation, consistency, and compensation                                                                                 121
 
obligations that they already fulfilled, which causes people to feel licensed to act less 
moral (i.e., when thinking about moral behavior) or induces people to compensate 
through more moral behavior (i.e., when thinking about immoral behavior). Yet, 
when testing this proposition explicitly with prosocial behavior as the outcome 
variable, Conway and Peetz (2012) found evidence for moral compensation, but not 
for moral consistency. 
Integrating Moral Consistency and Moral Compensation 
In the present paper, we argue that moral consistency and compensation do 
not reflect mere abstract moral considerations. Instead, they occur in a social context 
and both processes reflect specific ways to deal with reputational concerns. 
Reputation (i.e., how one is seen by others, “others perceptions”; Carlson, Vazire, & 
Oltmanns, 2011) is one of the most valuable social assets that humans have and they 
go a long way to build and defend a positive reputation (Cheek & Briggs, 1982; De 
Cremer & Tyler, 2005; James, 1890). We argue that the crucial difference between 
consistency and compensation is that the former implies a proactive focus on 
maintaining and building a reputation, whereas the latter implies a reactive focus on 
reputation management. Proactivity refers to self-initiated and future oriented 
behavior whereas a reactive focus entails an orientation aimed at responding in the 
moment (Crant, 2000; Parker, Williams, & Turner, 2006). 
It has been argued that acting consistent with one’s self-concept and past 
behavior results from an active, long-term outlook on reputation building (Blasi, 
1980, 1983; Reed et al., 2007). This argument is supported by research showing that 
consistency may form an important long-term reputational cue (Gabarro, 1978; 
Whitener, Brodt, Korsgaard, & Werner, 1998) that supports the continuous 
functioning and development of social relationships (Kramer, 1999). Proactivity 
induces people to focus on the long-term consequences of their behavior (Frese, 
Kring, Soose, & Zempel, 1996; Parker et al., 2006). Moreover, it enables people to 
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see the big picture and focus on higher order goals (Ainslie, 1975; Hofmann, Friese, 
& Strack, 2009; Parker, Bindl, & Strauss, 2010). A proactive focus will thus induce 
people to infer their moral personality from their moral self-concept, which 
promotes behavior in line with this inferred moral personality (Albarracín & Wyer, 
2000; Blasi, 1983; Fishbach & Dhar, 2005). Summarizing, we argue that for moral 
consistency to occur, people who have a salient self-concept as a moral person 
assume from this self-concept that they are a moral person, and act accordingly to 
confirm and build their reputation as a moral person.  
Research on moral compensation and licensing, on the other hand, reveals 
that compensation and licensing result from short-term fluctuations in moral self-
worth (Khan & Dhar, 2007; Monin & Miller, 2001; Sachdeva et al., 2009). This 
suggest that moral compensatory behaviors are likely to be driven by reactive 
reputational considerations (Schnall, Haidt, Clore, & Jordan, 2008; Zhong et al., 
2009), rather than proactive considerations with a long term outlook aimed at 
building and maintaining one’s reputation. For moral compensation to occur, people 
have to feel that they need to be prosocial in order to defend their threatened 
reputation. This is likely to occur if people just did something bad (which gives them 
the feeling that they have to make up for their selfish behavior), or whenever 
behavior that is negative for their reputation is salient. Conversely, for moral 
licensing to occur, people should have the impression that the situation allows them 
to be selfish. This is very likely to occur if people just did something good (which 
provides them a free pass to be selfish), or whenever behavior positive for their 
reputation is salient. Arguably, reacting on one’s moral self-concept by “damage 
control” (i.e., compensation) or by “slacking off” (i.e., licensing) is a rather short-
term, reactive form of reputation management. 
In sum, we expect that moral consistency and moral compensation both 
depend on reputational considerations. However, moral consistency arguably implies 
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a more proactive approach to reputation building and maintenance, whereas moral 
compensation forms a reactive, “damage control” response in social situations. 
As an explicit test of our assumption that moral compensation and consistency both 
depend on reputational considerations, we investigated the role of accountability as a 
facilitator of both moral consistency and moral compensation processes. 
Accountability can be defined as people’s expectations that they will be publicly 
held responsible for their actions (De Cremer & Van Dijk, 2009; Lerner & Tetlock, 
1999). Accountability is known to increase self-critical awareness of one’s judgment 
processes, out of concerns of the possible reputational consequences of one’s 
behavior (Beu & Buckley, 2001; Lerner & Tetlock, 1999). Hence, if our argument 
holds that moral consistency and compensatory behavior are shaped by reputational 
concerns (i.e., concerns about how one is seen by others), we expect that both types 
of patterns should be found particularly when people are held accountable for their 
actions (i.e., when they have to explain their actions to others). If people are not held 
accountable for their actions, we expect no moral consistency (i.e., because 
proactive, long-term reputational concerns are less salient), and no moral 
compensation (i.e., because a reactive, short-term focus on “damage control” in 
reputation management is unnecessary). 
The Present Studies 
 To test our predictions regarding the subtle processes that flow from 
people’s dealings with reputational concerns, we conducted two laboratory 
experiments. In both studies, we manipulated whether participants had a salient self 
as a moral versus an immoral person relying on an established priming procedure 
that asks participants to describe and recall a situation in which they acted in a moral 
(versus immoral) manner (see e.g., Aquino et al., 2009; Sachdeva et al., 2009). This 
allowed us to capture moral consistency (i.e., high levels of prosocial behavior when 
a self-definition as moral is salient) as well as moral compensation (i.e., or high 
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levels of prosocial behavior when a self-definition as immoral is salient or low levels 
of prosocial behavior when a self-definition as moral is salient). Participants were 
led to believe that they worked together with others in a team on several tasks 
because this has been shown to induce reputational concerns (De Cremer & Bakker, 
2003; Van Vugt & Hardy, 2010). 
Scholars have identified a number of factors that make people take a 
reactive versus a proactive approach in their dealing with various challenges. Most 
importantly, reactive responses are more likely in situations that constrain cognitive 
capacity (Parker et al., 2006; Rusbult & Van Lange, 2003). Cognitive capacity refers 
to one’s ability to “override or change one’s inner responses, as well as to interrupt 
undesired behavioral tendencies (such as impulses) and refrain from acting on them” 
(Tangney, Baumeister, & Boone, 2004, p. 274). In the two experiments presented in 
this paper, we manipulated the extent to which people take a reactive versus 
proactive approach by relying on a common way to impair cognitive capacity, that 
is, by depleting cognitive resources (Baumeister, Bratslavsky, Muraven, & Tice, 
1998). People need cognitive resources to override short-term, reactive impulses in 
order to proactively pursue high standards and desirable long-term goals 
(Baumeister, 2002; Fishbach, Friedman, & Kruglanski, 2003; Hofmann et al., 2009; 
Muraven & Baumeister, 2000; Mischel, 1974). When people lack these resources, 
impulsive behavior that serves immediate, short-term impulses would predominate, 
and long-term considerations and goal-directed behavior would become impossible 
(Baumeister, 2005; Hagger, Wood, Stiff, & Chatzisarantis, 2010; Loewenstein, 
1996).  
Research indicates that people’s cognitive capacity is a limited resource that 
can be impaired by depleting cognitive resources (Baumeister et al., 1998; 
Baumeister & Haetherton, 1996; Mischel, Shoda, Rodriguez, 1989; Fishbach et al., 
2003). A state of cognitive depletion refers to “a temporary reduction in the self’s 
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capacity or willingness to engage in volitional action (including controlling the 
environment, controlling the self, making choices, and initiating action) caused by 
prior exercise of volition” (Baumeister et al., 1998, p. 1253). Thus, cognitive 
depletion hinders the ability to take a proactive approach and strive for long-term 
goals and causes people to engage in behaviors that are driven by reactive, short-
term considerations (DeWall, Baumeister, Gailliot, & Maner, 2008; Gino, 
Schweitzer, Mead, & Ariely, 2011). Conversely, non-depleted people should be 
relatively effective at taking a proactive approach (Morrison & Phelps, 1999; Parker 
et al., 2006). The principal aim of Experiment 1 was to test whether cognitive 
depletion (i.e., making people act in more reactive ways) results in moral 
compensation whereas sufficient cognitive resources (i.e., not being depleted, 
making people act in more proactive ways) result in moral consistency. 
This focus on a proactive versus a reactive approach to deal with challenges 
by means of manipulating depletion is important as a test of our argument. However, 
in itself, it does not prove conclusively that it is particularly a proactive versus 
reactive approach towards reputation management. Therefore, in Experiment 2, we 
also wanted to provide an explicit and formal test of the idea that moral 
compensation and consistency result from reputational concerns (i.e., concerns about 
how one is seen by others). In order to do this, we included accountability as a factor 
in our design. Accountability refers to the degree to which one can be publicly held 
responsible for one’s actions (Lerner & Tetlock, 1999) and it is known to induce 
people to act upon reputational concerns (Beu & Buckley, 2001; De Cremer & Van 
Dijk, 2009; Sedikes, Herbst, Hardin, & Dardis, 2002). Hence, reputational concerns 
should be particularly viable in situations where one is accountable for one’s actions. 
Thus, if moral compensation and consistency indeed drive from reputational 
concerns, then moral compensation and consistency effects should be particularly 
pronounced in situations of high accountability. In situations of low accountability, 
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however, little evidence for compensation or consistency effects was expected, 
because reputational concerns should be less salient in these situations. 
 
Experiment 1 
Method 
Participants and design. Seventy-two undergraduate students (62 females, 
1 unreported; Mage = 18.62; SD = .87) participated in this experiment for course 
credit. They were randomly assigned to one condition of a 2 (salient self-concept: 
moral vs. immoral) x 2 (depletion: low vs. high) between-subjects design. 
Procedure. We used a procedure designed by Maner and Mead (2010) to 
measure participants’ moral behavior. Upon arrival at the laboratory, participants 
were seated in separate cubicles that were each equipped with a personal computer. 
This computer was used to collect the participants’ responses and to present the 
information and stimulus materials to the participants. Participants were informed 
that they would work together with two other participants on several tasks. They 
were led to believe that a computer network was established between them and the 
other team members via which they would collaborate. This type of procedure is 
regularly used in social psychological (e.g., Cornelis, Van Hiel, & De Cremer, 2006) 
and organizational research (e.g., Maner & Mead, 2010; Overbeck & Park, 2006) to 
give participants the feeling that they cooperate in a team setting. Next, participants 
were informed that the team assignment required one person to be the leader and the 
others to be subordinates. In reality, all participants were assigned the team leader 
position, ostensibly based on their answers on a ‘leadership ability’ questionnaire 
they completed before the start of the experiment (see e.g., also Hoogervorst, De 
Cremer, Van Dijke, & Mayer, 2012; Maner & Mead, 2010; Overbeck & Park, 2006 
for this leader assignment procedure). They were told that it was their task as a team 
leader to help the team perform optimally. 
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Then, to manipulate the moral self-concept, participants were randomly 
assigned to either the moral or the immoral condition. Participants in the moral 
condition read: “Please recall a time when you did something moral in the past.” 
Participants in the immoral condition read: “Please recall a time when you did 
something immoral in the past.” In the moral condition, participants described, for 
instance, situations in which they honestly gave money back that they found or when 
they opposed a racist group. In the immoral conditions, participants described, for 
instance, situations in which they were unfaithful to their partner, or when they stole 
something. Similar methods have been used in both moral compensation (Jordan et 
al., 2011; Mazar & Zhong, 2010; Sachdeva et al., 2009), and moral consistency 
studies (Aquino et al., 2009; Reed et al., 2007). 
Subsequently, participants completed the cognitive depletion task (taken 
from Baumeister et al., 1998, Study 4). As noted, depleting participants’ cognitive 
resources is a common way to impair cognitive capacity, which hinders the ability to 
focus on and strive for long-term goals and causes people to engage in behaviors that 
are driven by short-term considerations (DeWall et al., 2008; Gino et al., 2011). The 
cognitive depletion task consists of two parts. The first part is designed to form a 
strong habitual response by the participants. The second part taxes the cognitive 
resources of participants by overriding this habitual response (in the cognitive 
depletion condition) or by continuing the same habitual response (in the no depletion 
condition). Research on self-control indicates that people need cognitive resources 
(which could otherwise be used to take a proactive approach towards one’s goals) to 
break a habitual response (Baumeister et al., 1998; Hagger et al., 2010). Thus, for 
participants in the depletion condition, overriding this habitual response is likely to 
require more cognitive resources than for participants in the no depletion condition 
who do not need to override this habitual response. This task has proven successful 
in manipulating cognitive depletion in a number of studies (see Hagger et al., 2010 
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for an overview). In the first part of the task, participants were instructed to indicate 
each instance of the letter e that they saw in a piece of text (i.e., by clicking each e 
with the computer mouse). Participants received visual feedback whenever they 
clicked an e (i.e., a highlighted circle around the corresponding e) and were given 
five minutes to complete the task. This first phase was relatively easy and was used 
to establish a strong habitual response for scanning and indicating every e. In the 
second part of the task, participants either continued identifying the e’s using the 
same rule as before (i.e., the no depletion condition), or they were given the 
instruction to respond to each e, except when the e was followed by a vowel or, 
when a vowel appeared two letters before the e (i.e., the high depletion condition). 
After the depletion task, participants were asked to shortly recall the moral or 
immoral behavior they described earlier. 
Then the group task started. This task was used to measure moral behavior 
(adapted from Maner & Mead, 2010). Participants learned that their team should 
provide as many correct solutions to a word puzzle as possible. The total number of 
correct responses would be summed and every correct solution would earn the team 
points. Participants were told to imagine that every point was worth €1, and that the 
final number of points would be divided equally among the team members. 
However, participants were told that there was also an individual bonus for the team 
member who earned the most points. Next, participants were told that they (as the 
leader) had the possibility to distribute clues among their team members that would 
facilitate solving the puzzle. Clues ranged in quality from 1 (not very helpful) to 7 
(very helpful). Participants were given the following example: “We are looking for 
the word: memory. A level 1 clue would then be: “Ends with a Y.” A level 7 clue 
would then be: “The ability to remember.” Next, participants were asked to enter a 
single clue level (from 1 to 7) for their team members. This task thus allowed us to 
pit self-interest against prosocial behavior. On the one hand, it was the participant’s 
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responsibility as a leader to maximize team performance, and giving the best clue 
possible to their team members would optimize team performance. However, giving 
a low quality clue would increase their own chances of winning the individual 
bonus. Participants thus faced a trade-off between doing the “right thing” for the 
team and focusing on their self-interest. After choosing a clue level, participants 
were debriefed and thanked for their participation. 
Manipulation checks. We checked the effectiveness of the cognitive 
depletion manipulation with “The task was habit-breaking” (taken from DeWall et 
al., 2008) and “The task was simple” (reversed; taken from Balliet & Joireman, 
2010) on a 7-point scale (1 = totally disagree; 7 = totally agree). 
Two independent judges rated the morality of the recalled behaviors on a 7-point 
scale (1 = immoral; 7 = moral). The interrater reliability was high (Intraclass 
correlation coefficient [ICC] = .85) and ratings were averaged to assess the 
effectiveness of the moral self-concept manipulation. 
 Helping. The dependent variable was the clue level that the leader offered to 
the team (1 = not very helpful; 7 = very helpful). 
Results 
 Manipulation checks. We tested the effectiveness of our manipulations 
using a 2 (salient self-concept: moral vs. immoral) x 2 (depletion: low vs. high) 
Analysis of Variance (ANOVA). The results show that, as expected, depleted 
participants found the depletion task more habit-breaking than non-depleted 
participants (M = 4.64, SD = 1.70 vs. M = 3.48, SD = 1.34, respectively; F(1, 68) = 
9.09, p = .004, 2 = .12), and considered the task as less simple than non-depleted 
participants (M = 5.39, SD = .96 vs. M = 3.68, SD = 1.51, respectively; F(1, 68) = 
27.68, p < .001, 2 = .29). No other main or interaction effects were significant. 
 Furthermore, participants in the moral recall condition described more moral 
behavior than participants in the immoral recall condition (M = 5.35, SD = 1.01 vs. 
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M = 2.55, SD = 1.12, respectively; F(1, 68) = 111.47, p < .001, 2 = .58). No other 
main or interaction effects were significant. 
 These analyses indicate that our manipulations of cognitive depletion 
(depleted versus not depleted) and salient self-concept (i.e., moral versus immoral) 
were effectively and orthogonally induced, allowing us to test our hypotheses 
regarding the effects of a moral versus an immoral self-concept upon helping 
behavior as a function of the level of cognitive depletion. 
Helping. Means and standard deviations are presented in Table 1. A 2 
(salient self-concept: moral vs. immoral) x 2 (depletion: low vs. high) ANOVA on 
participants’ helping behavior showed no significant main effect of moral self-
concept or cognitive depletion. However, the analysis did reveal a significant 
interaction between cognitive depletion and moral self-concept (F(1, 68) = 8.80, p = 
.004, 2 = .11; see Figure 1). We conducted simple effects tests to further analyze 
this interaction. The results show that among non-depleted participants, a salient 
self-concept as a moral person resulted in more helping than an immoral self-
concept. However, we found this difference to be only marginal significant (F(1, 68) 
= 2.81, p = .098, 2 = .04). In contrast, among depleted participants, a salient self-
concept as an immoral person led to more helping than a moral self-concept (F(1, 
68) = 6.03, p = .017, 2 = .09). 
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Table 1 
Helping Behavior of Participants as a Function of Cognitive Depletion and Moral 
Recall Condition in Study 1 
  Moral recall condition 
 Moral  Immoral 
Cognitive depletion condition M SD  M SD 
Depletion 3.59a 1.46  5.00b 1.27 
No depletion 4.61a 1.23  3.86b 1.82 
Note. Means with different subscripts within each row differ significantly from each 
other at p < .05, with the exception of the moral versus immoral comparison for the 
no depletion condition, where p = .098.  
 
 
Figure 1. Helping as a function of cognitive depletion and moral recall condition in 
Study 1 
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 The results above suggest that we found moral consistency and 
compensation, but they do not inform us about the valence of this behavior. To 
tentatively assess whether our conditions made participants more prosocial or more 
selfish than the neutral baseline, we ran some additional analyses (i.e., One-Sample 
t-Tests) in which we tested if our participants significantly deviated from the 
midpoint of our helping measure. These analyses reveal that non-depleted 
participants with a salient self-concept as a moral person helped significantly more 
than the neutral midpoint of our scale (t(22) = 2.37, p = .027), suggesting more 
prosocial behavior than the baseline. In contrast, non-depleted participants with a 
salient self-concept as an immoral person did not differ from this neutral midpoint 
(t(20) = -0.36, p = .72), indicating no decreases in prosocial behavior relative to the 
baseline. Furthermore, depleted participants with a salient self-concept as a moral 
person did not differ from the neutral midpoint of our scale (t(16) = -1.16, p = .26), 
indicating no decreases in prosocial behavior relative to the baseline. In contrast, 
depleted participants with a salient self-concept as an immoral person helped 
significantly more than the neutral midpoint of our scale (t(10) = 2.62, p = .026), 
indicating more prosocial behavior than the baseline. 
Summary 
 Our findings support our predictions. Participants who were not depleted 
(i.e., allowing for a proactive, long-term focus on reputation building) showed moral 
consistency: those recalling moral behavior showed more helping behavior than 
those recalling immoral behavior. Conversely, participants who were depleted (i.e., 
making them act more reactively upon reputational concerns) showed moral 
compensation: those recalling immoral behavior showed more helping behavior than 
those recalling moral behavior.  
The conclusions above do tell us when recalling moral behavior results in 
more helping than recalling immoral behavior and vice versa. They do not, however, 
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give us any information about whether we are looking at prosocial or at selfish 
behavior. Additional analyses show us that participants who were not depleted 
helped more when recalling moral behavior, but did not help less when recalling 
immoral behavior relative to the neutral baseline. Furthermore, participants who 
were depleted helped more when recalling immoral behavior, but did not help less 
when recalling moral behavior relative to this neutral baseline. This indicates that 
both a proactive (i.e., no depletion) and a reactive (i.e., depletion) focus are able to 
increase prosocial behavior for participants recalling moral and immoral behavior, 
respectively, but that they do not cause an increase in selfish behavior. 
 
Experiment 2 
Experiment 2 was conducted for two reasons. A first aim was to replicate 
the findings of Experiment 1. Our sample size in Experiment 1 was relatively small 
and could thus potentially have too much inherent variability, which may harm the 
validity of our findings. Experiment 1 showed that people are more likely to act 
consistent with their moral self-concept when sufficient cognitive capacity is 
available, whereas moral compensation prevails when cognitive capacity is limited. 
These findings support our line of reasoning that people can deal with reputation 
management in proactive but also in more reactive ways. Ego depletion is a well-
established manipulation that makes people act in a more reactive (versus proactive) 
manner. Yet, showing that a reactive versus proactive approach explains 
compensation versus consistency does not provide prove that moral consistency and 
compensation are driven by reputational concerns. In Experiment 2, we wanted to 
provide an explicit test of the relevance of reputational considerations for the process 
that we set out to study. Therefore, in Experiment 2, we included accountability as a 
boundary condition. We expected that if moral consistency and compensatory 
behavior are indeed shaped by reputational concerns, the effect of cognitive 
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depletion (i.e., moral compensation) versus sufficiently available cognitive resources 
(i.e., moral consistency) should be found particularly when people are held 
accountable for their actions. When people are not accountable, reputational 
concerns do not matter much, leading us to expect little evidence for compensation 
and consistency in these conditions. 
Including accountability as an additional moderator in our design also 
introduces a useful set of control conditions. We expect that unaccountable 
participants are not influenced by reputational concerns. That is, their anonymity 
will make it more likely that they will not worry about the potential consequences of 
their behavior for their reputation. As such, unaccountable participants provide us 
with a baseline of helping behavior (i.e., that is not influenced by any reputational 
concerns). This baseline then allows us to test whether consistency is driven 
particularly by people who want to act consistent with their salient moral self, or 
(also) by people who want to act consistent with their salient immoral self. For 
compensation processes, these baseline conditions allow us to test whether reactive 
people are likely to compensate for a lack of morality, and / or whether they are also 
likely to feel licensed to act in less moral ways whey they feel moral. 
Because of our explicit focus on the role of accountability in Study 2, we 
changed one aspect of the procedure. As part of the procedure taken from Maner and 
Mead (2010), we assigned all our participants in Experiment 1 as team leaders who 
were responsible for the optimal performance of the team they were leading. 
Regretfully, research is unclear about how the leadership role relates to 
accountability. On the one hand, leaders are expected to focus on the collective 
interests and goals (Van Vugt, Hogan, & Kaiser, 2008), and research shows that they 
do so more than regular team members (Overbeck & Park, 2001, 2006), thus 
suggesting that accountability can be intrinsic to the leadership role. On the other 
hand, other research indicates that at least high power leaders need to be held 
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accountable in order to refrain from acting in self-serving ways (Rus, Van 
Knippenberg, & Wisse, 2012). Because of this unclear state of affairs regarding the 
relationship between leadership and accountability, we assigned all our participants 
in Experiment 2 to the role of regular team member without any reference to the 
team requiring a leader. This focus on regular team members also makes it possible 
to generalize our findings beyond the leadership role to people who function as part 
of social collectives in general. 
Method 
Participants and design. One-hundred and forty-nine undergraduate 
students (101 females; Mage = 19.72; SD = 2.52) participated in this study for course 
credit. They were randomly assigned to one condition of a 2 (salient self-concept: 
moral vs. immoral) x 2 (depletion: low vs. high) x 2 (accountability: low vs. high) 
between-subjects design. 
Procedure. We slightly adapted the procedure used in Experiment 1, such 
that no reference was made to team leaders and all participants were in the role of 
regular team members. After completing the moral self-concept and depletion 
manipulations, participants learned that they were chosen to distribute a clue to their 
team, which would facilitate solving the puzzle. To manipulate accountability, we 
relied on a common accountability manipulation (De Cremer & Van Dijk, 2009; De 
Kwaadsteniet, Van Dijk, Wit, De Cremer, & De Rooij, 2007; Tetlock, Skitka, & 
Boettger, 1989). Participants learned that “the clue assignments are visible to both 
the experimenter and the other team members”, or that “the clue assignments are 
anonymous, both the experimenter and your team members will not know which 
clue assignments you chose”. 
Manipulation checks. We checked the cognitive depletion manipulation 
with “The task was habit-breaking” (taken from DeWall et al., 2008) and “The task 
was difficult” (taken from Balliet & Joireman, 2010) on a 7-point scale (1 = totally 
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disagree; 7 = totally agree). To check the moral self-concept manipulation, two 
independent coders rated the recalled behaviors on a 7-point scale (1 = immoral; 7 = 
moral). Interrater reliability was high (ICC = .92) and ratings were averaged to form 
a measure of morality. Additionally, we asked participants how they considered the 
behavior they described on a 7-point scale ranging from 1 (bad) to 7 (good). 
 Helping. We again used the clue level that participants offered to the team 
as an index of helping behavior (1 = not very helpful; 7 = very helpful). 
Results 
 Manipulation checks. We tested the effectiveness of our manipulations 
using a 2 (salient self-concept: moral vs. immoral) x 2 (depletion: low vs. high) x 2 
(accountability: low vs. high) ANOVA. The results show that depleted participants 
judged the depletion task as more habit-breaking than participants in the no 
depletion condition (M = 4.94, SD = 1.48 vs. M = 3.95, SD = 1.64, respectively), 
F(1, 141) = 12.67, p = .001, 2 = .08. Furthermore, depleted participants experienced 
greater difficulty than non-depleted participants (M = 4.74, SD = 1.71 vs. M = 3.70, 
SD = 1.51, respectively), F(1, 141) = 13.54, p < .001, 2 = .09. No other main or 
interaction effects were significant. 
Participants described more moral behaviors in the moral recall condition 
than in the immoral recall condition (M = 5.60, SD = 0.46 vs. M = 2.55, SD = 0.67, 
respectively), F(1, 141) = 1027.01, p < .001, 2 = .85. Additionally, participants in 
the moral recall condition rated their own behavior as more ‘good’ than participants 
in the immoral recall condition (M = 6.18, SD = .75 vs. M = 2.53, SD = 1.11, 
respectively), F(1, 141) = 528.54, p < .001, 2 = .77. No other main or interaction 
effects were significant. 
Helping. Means and standard deviations for each condition are presented in 
Table 2. A 2 (salient self-concept: moral vs. immoral) x 2 (depletion: low vs. high) x 
2 (accountability: low vs. high) ANOVA on participants’ helping behavior revealed 
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a significant main effect of accountability (F(1, 141) = 5.64, p = .019, 2 = .04). Not 
surprisingly, accountable participants helped more than non-accountable participants 
(M = 4.50, SD = 1.81 vs. M = 3.75, SD = 2.04, respectively). More importantly, and 
analogous to Experiment 1, a significant interaction emerged between depletion and 
moral self-concept (F(1, 141) = 5.20, p = .024, 2 = .03). This interaction was 
qualified by the predicted three-way interaction (F(1, 141) = 4.02, p = .047, 2 = 
.03). 
 
Table 2 
Helping Behavior of Accountable and Non-Accountable Participants as a Function 
of Cognitive Depletion and Moral Recall Condition in Study 2 
   Moral recall 
condition 
  Moral  Immoral 
 Cognitive depletion 
condition 
M SD  M SD 
Accountable condition Depletion 3.63a 1.82  5.36b 1.69 
 No depletion 5.00a 1.97  4.00b 1.16 
       
Non-accountable 
condition 
Depletion 3.56a 2.23  3.71a 2.26 
No depletion 3.85a 2.01  3.83a 1.81 
Note. Means with different subscripts within each row differ significantly from each 
other at p < .05, with the exception of the moral versus immoral comparison for the 
no depletion condition, where p = .086. 
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For non-accountable participants, the interaction between depletion and 
moral self-concept was non-significant (F(1, 79) = 0.04, p = .85, 2 = .00; see Figure 
2). Simple effects tests showed that non-accountable participants with a moral self-
concept did not help more or less than non-accountable participants with an immoral 
self-concept, whether they were depleted (F(1, 79) = 0.06, p = .81, 2 = .00), or not 
(F(1, 79) = 0.00, p = .98, 2 = .00). Moreover, One-Sample t-Tests showed that 
unaccountable participants did not show more or less prosocial behavior than the 
neutral midpoint of our helping scale. Neither for depleted participants, regardless of 
whether they had a moral or an immoral self-concept (t(17) = -0.85, p = .41 vs. t(20) 
= -0.58, p = .57, respectively), nor for non-depleted participants, regardless of 
whether they had a moral or an immoral self-concept (t(19) = -0.33, p = .74 vs. t(23) 
= -0.45, p = .66, respectively). This thus suggests that the midpoint of our scale 
forms a useful baseline for helping behavior. 
 
 
Figure 2. Helping as a function of cognitive depletion and moral recall condition for 
accountable and non-accountable participants in Study 2 
 
Moral self-regulation, consistency, and compensation                                                                                 139
 
For accountable participants, the interaction between cognitive depletion 
and moral self-concept was significant (F(1, 62) = 10.38, p = .002, 2 = .14; see 
Figure 2). Simple effect tests showed that for accountable participants who were not 
depleted, a moral self-concept led to more helping than an immoral self-concept. 
However, we found this difference to be only marginally significant (F(1, 62) = 
3.05, p = .086, 2 = .05). Moreover, One-sample t-Tests showed that accountable, 
non-depleted participants with a salient self-concept as a moral person helped 
significantly more than the neutral midpoint of our scale (t(19) = 2.27, p = .035), 
indicating more prosocial behavior than the baseline. In contrast, accountable, non-
depleted participants with a salient self-concept as an immoral person did not differ 
from this neutral midpoint (t(15) = 0.00, p = 1.00), indicating no increase or decrease 
in prosocial behavior relative to the baseline. 
In contrast, for accountable participants who were depleted, simple effects 
tests showed that an immoral self-concept led to more helping than a moral self-
concept (F(1, 62) = 7.68, p = .007, 2 = .12). Additional One-Sample t-Tests showed 
that accountable, depleted participants with a salient self-concept as a moral person 
did not differ from the neutral midpoint of our scale (t(15) = -0.82, p = .42), 
indicating no increase or decrease in prosocial behavior relative to the baseline. In 
contrast, accountable, depleted participants with a salient self-concept as an immoral 
person helped significantly more than the neutral midpoint of our scale (t(13) = 3.00, 
p = .010), indicating more prosocial behavior than the baseline. 
 These results indicate that our effects in the accountable condition are 
mainly driven by the moral condition for participants who are not depleted, and by 
the immoral condition for participants who are depleted. That is, for accountable 
participants who are not depleted, recalling moral behavior increases prosocial 
behavior relative to the baseline, but recalling immoral behavior does not decrease 
prosocial behavior. In contrast, for accountable participants who are depleted, 
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recalling moral behavior does not decrease prosocial behavior relative to the 
baseline, but recalling immoral behavior does increase prosocial behavior. 
Summary 
Our findings support our predictions. Like in Study 1, participants who were 
not depleted (i.e., taking a proactive approach) showed moral consistency: those 
recalling moral behavior showed more helping behavior than those recalling 
immoral behavior. Yet, this effect was only found among accountable participants. 
Non-depleted participants who were not accountable showed no moral consistency, 
indicating that the proactive approach that these participants displayed reflects 
reputational concerns. Depleted participants (i.e., taking a reactive approach) 
showed moral compensation: those recalling immoral behavior showed more 
helping behavior than those recalling moral behavior. Yet, again, this compensation 
effect was also restricted to accountable participants. This indicates that moral 
compensation also derives from reputational concerns, but this time of a reactive 
kind. 
As expected, participants who were not accountable did not show moral 
consistency or compensation effects at all. In fact, their responses never significantly 
differed from the neutral scale midpoint. Accountable participants, on the other 
hand, showed more helping behavior than this neutral baseline in two conditions: 
when focusing on proactive, long-term reputational considerations (i.e., no 
depletion) and feeling moral (i.e., moral consistency), and when focusing on 
reactive, short-term reputational considerations (i.e., depletion) and feeling immoral 
(i.e., moral compensation). In the other two conditions, helping behavior did not 
differ from this baseline. Our results suggest that helping behavior does not decrease 
in any of our accountable conditions, which indicates that our participants do not get 
less prosocial (vs. the baseline in the unaccountable conditions). Thus we do not find 
any evidence for immoral consistency or moral licensing. 
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General Discussion 
This research integrates two lines of research on moral self-regulation that 
have generated opposing findings, while relying on similar manipulations and 
measures of morality. On the one hand, people with a salient self-definition as a 
moral person have been shown to display more moral behavior than people for 
whom this self-concept is not salient or who view themselves as immoral (i.e., 
revealing consistency between the self-concept and behavior). On the other hand, 
research shows that people with a salient self-definition as an immoral person show 
more moral behavior than people for whom this self-concept is not salient or who 
view themselves as moral (i.e., revealing moral compensation and licensing). We 
tried to join these two literatures by focusing on which perspective people take: a 
proactive approach (i.e., in this case because they have sufficient cognitive resources 
at their disposal) or a more reactive approach (i.e., in this case because they were 
cognitively depleted). Furthermore, our results indicate that moral consistency and 
moral compensation processes only emerge under conditions of accountability. In 
the following sections, we discuss the implications and limitations of this research. 
Theoretical and Practical Implications 
Our results strongly suggest that whether consistency or compensation 
prevails is a function of the perspective that participants take: whether they take a 
reactive approach to reputation management or a more proactive approach. That is, 
we argued that moral compensation forms a reactive, “damage control” response in 
social situations, whereas moral consistency implies a more proactive approach to 
reputation building and maintenance. Furthermore, by including accountability as a 
boundary condition to this effect we provided support for an important assumption 
of our argument. To understand when moral compensation or, conversely, 
consistency will occur, it is important to realize that these effects are at least partly 
driven by reputational concerns, and not only by de-contextualized moral 
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considerations. Obviously, this finding is very different from earlier research that 
tried to integrate moral consistency and compensation by using construal level 
theory (Conway & Peetz, 2012). Construal level theory explains how the 
psychological distance of events can influence abstract and concrete thinking (Trope 
& Liberman, 2010). Distant events are conceptualized in an abstract way, whereas 
recent events are conceptualized concretely. We extent and improve this approach 
by showing that moral consistency and compensation do not reflect mere abstract 
moral considerations, but that they occur in a social context. 
The claim that compensation and consistency should be considered as 
occurring in a social context is further strengthened by our results for the role of 
accountability that indicate that reputational considerations clearly play a role in 
both consistency and compensation processes. Importantly, both literatures have 
suggested that reputational concerns are relevant to the display of moral behavior 
(Miller & Effron, 2010; Reed et al., 2007). However, no earlier research has 
integrated moral consistency and moral compensation processes by focusing on 
differences in reputation management. Our results strongly suggest that moral 
compensation forms a reactive, “damage control” response in social situations, 
whereas moral consistency implies a more proactive approach to reputation building 
and maintenance. Moreover, our research suggests that people can deal with 
reputation management in proactive but also in more reactive ways.  
Our research also provides a fresh perspective on how (lack of) self-control 
resources relates to selfishness. Prior work has often claimed that a lack of resources 
straightforwardly leads to selfishness (Baumeister & Exline, 1999; Mead, 
Baumeister, Gino, Schweitzer, & Ariely, 2009; Shalvi, Eldar, & Bereby-Meyer, 
2012). Research supporting this idea shows that depletion can result in less moral 
behavior (DeWall et al, 2008) and more immoral behavior (DeWall, Baumeister, 
Stillman, & Gailliot, 2007; Gino et al, 2011; Mead et al, 2009). Yet, there is also 
Moral self-regulation, consistency, and compensation                                                                                 143
 
research showing that morality is not by definition effortful, but some types of 
morality are in fact driven by automatic processes (Greene, Morelli, Lowenberg, 
Nystrom, & Cohen, 2008). Hence, a lack of cognitive resources does not necessarily 
lead to immoral behavior. It has been shown, for instance, that depletion does not 
cause selfishness for people with internalized moral values (Gino et al., 2011), for 
people with a clear dispositional prosocial orientation (Balliet & Joireman, 2010), or 
for people who consumed a glucose drink (Gailliot et al., 2007). In fact, research by 
Zhong (2011) shows that deliberative decision making (comparable to a situation 
where people are not depleted) can lead to more unethical behavior than intuitive 
decision making (i.e., comparable to a situation where people lack resources). We 
argue that a lack of resources hinders the ability to take a proactive approach and 
thus to focus on and strive for long-term goals, causing people to engage in 
behaviors that are driven more by reactive strategies (DeWall et al., 2008; Gino et 
al., 2011). This reactive, short-term outlook may induce selfish behavior, because it 
implies a failure to see the long-term benefits of moral behavior. Yet, at the same 
time, our findings show that a short-term focus may also make people more moral, if 
they are focused on damage control (i.e., a direct response to a salient self-concept 
as an immoral person). Earlier research studying the effects of self-control on moral 
behavior often focused on variables that were not particularly relevant for damage 
control and reputation management (e.g., presumed undetectable cheating).  
We used the term moral compensation to refer to the process by which 
people with a salient self-concept as an immoral person display more pro-social 
behavior than people with a salient self-concept as a moral person. However, this 
does not tell us whether our results are caused by moral compensation (i.e., people 
who feel immoral compensate by showing more moral behavior), by moral licensing 
(i.e., people who feel moral feel licensed to act less moral), or that perhaps both 
processes are involved. Most prior research remains silent about whether their 
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effects reflect compensation or licensing (see Sachdeva et al., 2009, for a noteworthy 
exception). Importantly, the accountability manipulation in Study 2, besides 
enabling us to test our idea that moral behavior rests on reputational concerns, 
provides us with a baseline condition of helping behavior. Our results indicate that 
accountable participants who feel moral and are not depleted, and those who feel 
immoral and are depleted are both more helpful than the baseline set by participants 
in the unaccountable conditions. Importantly, however, accountable participants who 
feel immoral and are not depleted, and those who feel moral and are depleted do not 
show less prosocial behavior (i.e., more selfish behavior) than this baseline. A 
possible reason for this is that consistently behaving selfish may be damaging to 
one’s self-concept and reputation. Therefore, they level to some optimal, baseline 
level of moral behavior. Likewise, moral compensation is arguably sending a much 
more disturbing signal to one’s reputational concerns (i.e., “I am such a bad person, I 
should make up”) than moral licensing (i.e., “I am such a good person, maybe I can 
slack off now”). 
From a practical perspective, it is important to note that organizations often 
install procedures that make employees (and managers) more accountable in order to 
decrease immoral, selfish, or deviant behaviors (Beu & Buckley, 2001; Petrick & 
Quinn, 2001). Our findings of Study 2 connect well with this idea in showing a main 
effect of accountability on helping behavior. Moreover, in line with some prior 
work, our research also shows that accountability not simply makes people act in 
more desirable ways (i.e., leading to a main effect of accountability on moral 
behavior, such as the one that we also obtained), but also leads to a stronger focus on 
their own behavior and psychological processes (i.e., leading to the three-way 
interaction that we were primarily interested in in the present study). However, our 
results suggest that accountability only increases prosocial behavior dependent on 
the context. Moreover, in some cases, accountable people may be similarly helpful 
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as unaccountable people. Thus it is important that organizations realize that, in some 
situations, making employees more accountable may not be an effective strategy in 
reducing selfish behavior. 
For organizations, it is important to note that strategies aimed at stimulating 
prosocial employee behavior (e.g., stimulating a clear ethical climate or ensuring 
that managers behave in ethical ways; Martin & Cullen, 2006; Mayer, Kuenzi, 
Greenbaum, Bardes, & Salvador, 2009; Mayer, Kuenzi, & Greenbaum, 2010) will 
not necessarily lead to more prosocial behavior. The present results suggest that 
when employees take a reactive approach to reputational concerns (e.g., while 
cognitively depleted), feeling moral may not be effective in promoting prosocial 
behavior. Importantly, various causes of cognitive depletion are omnipresent in 
organizations, such as decision-making (Vohs et al., 2008) and lack of sleep (Barnes, 
Schaubroeck, Huth, & Ghumman, 2011). It is thus important to make employees 
aware of this potential subversion. Furthermore, as research has shown that rest can 
replenish cognitive resources (Baumeister, Muraven, & Tice, 2000), strategies aimed 
at stimulating morality should preferably be implemented after a period of rest.  
Strengths, Limitations and Suggestions for Future Research 
We realize that the external validity of our findings need to be further 
established, because we tested our predictions in a single laboratory context and 
relied on priming procedures and cognitive depletion tasks to manipulate the 
salience of people’s self-views and their proactive versus reactive approach in 
dealing with reputational concerns. Our primary aim was to make a first attempt to 
arrive at a theoretical integration of two streams of behavioral ethics research, which 
should improve our understanding of the processes that shape ethical behavior. 
However, different methods (e.g., field research) have to be employed to assess the 
robustness and broader implications of our findings (Ellemers, 2013). Consequently, 
a possible avenue for future research lies in combining different research methods 
146                                                                                                                                                               Chapter 4 
 
and employing different ways to manipulate (or measure) a proactive versus reactive 
approach to reputational concerns. It is interesting to note that studies have shown 
that cognitive depletion in a work context can result in more deviant behaviors 
among employees (e.g., Barnes et al., 2011). Furthermore, research also clearly 
indicates that people’s salient self-concept regarding their morality influences their 
behavior in organizational contexts (see Shao, Aquino, & Freeman, 2008 for an 
overview).  
In this respect it is also important to note that the sample sizes in both 
Experiment 1 and Experiment 2 are relatively small and that this could potentially 
harm the validity of our results. We did however replicate the findings of 
Experiment 1 in Experiment 2, which reinforces the reliability and validity of our 
results. However, even though we believe that our results are valid and reliable, 
replications in different settings are necessary to further prove the validity of our 
findings. 
We relied on a well-established regulatory depletion manipulation as a way 
to stimulate people to take a reactive versus proactive approach to reputation 
management. Our reliance on this manipulation should not be taken as a suggestion 
that in prior research that revealed moral compensation or licensing effects 
participants were always ego depleted. Regulatory depletion is just one way to make 
participants take a reactive approach and it is likely that other elements of the 
procedure of a study can induce such a focus. Furthermore, there are also stable 
individual differences between people in the extent to which they are able to take a 
more proactive approach to reputation management (Rusbult & Van Lange, 2003). 
Future research should test explicitly for the relevance of various individual and 
situational factors that induce a proactive versus reactive approach in understanding 
consistency and compensation effects in moral decision making and action. 
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Future research may also focus on potential mediating variables that explain 
in greater detail the emergence of moral consistency and moral compensation. In this 
research, we decided to take a moderator approach because we were particularly 
interested in testing the idea that reputational concerns explain why people 
compensate or are consistent with their moral values. A moderator approach (i.e., 
focusing on theoretically relevant boundary conditions to an effect) is just as valid as 
a mediator approach (i.e., focusing on theoretically relevant intervening variables of 
an effect) to study processes underlying an effect (see e.g., Spencer, Zanna, & Fong, 
2005). A promising avenue for future research would be to focus on the type of 
reputational concerns (i.e., proactive, long-term versus reactive) as a possible 
underlying process that plays a role in the emergence of both moral consistency and 
moral compensation. 
One limitation of this research that should be mentioned is the skewed 
gender distribution in our samples. The majority of our participants were female, 
which may pose potential problems to the validity of our results. Common belief is 
that women are less selfish than men (Balliet, Macfarlan, & Van Vugt, 2011; Eckel 
& Grossman, 1998). Since our task was designed to foster helping behavior among 
team members, it could be that the specific characteristics in our task favored female 
helping. However, we expect that a general tendency for women to help does not 
affect the validity of our conclusions. That is, we expect no gender differences in 
moral consistency or moral compensation. Thus, a general tendency to help does not 
explain variations in helping behavior among people with a salient self-concept as a 
moral or immoral person. It is in this respect noteworthy that (to our knowledge) 
previous studies investigating moral consistency or moral compensation with more 
balanced samples in terms of gender did not report gender effects. 
A final relevant issue to be discussed here is that the results of both Study 1 
and Study 2 suggest that compensation effects are more robust and easier to detect 
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than consistency effects. One reason for this may be found in our procedure. The 
teams in our study were newly formed which might curb long-term reputation 
management concerns. Yet, this focus does not limit generalizations that can be 
inferred from the present research, because many encounters in economic and 
business settings are with people with whom we have weak, rather than strong 
relationships (Granovetter, 1995; Kim, Dirks, Cooper, & Ferrin, 2006) In fact, in 
line with our findings, it has been noted that a proactive, long-term focus to 
reputation management may be present in newly formed relationships (Kim et al., 
2006; Meyerson, Weick, & Kramer, 1996). However, future research should address 
whether consistency effects are stronger and easier to detect in longer functioning 
groups and teams. 
Concluding Remarks 
The present research integrates two seemingly opposing literatures. 
Research on moral compensation shows that people with a salient self-concept as an 
immoral person show more prosocial behavior than people with a salient self-
concept as a moral person. Conversely, research on moral consistency indicates that 
people with a salient self-concept as a moral person show more prosocial behavior 
than people with a salient self-concept as an immoral person. We integrate these two 
literatures by focusing on differences in reputation management. Our results strongly 
suggest that moral compensation forms a reactive, “damage control” response in 
social situations, whereas moral consistency implies a more proactive approach to 
reputation building and maintenance. It thus seems that reputational concerns are 
important for both moral compensation and moral consistency processes, and that 
which of these two prevails depends on the perspective that people take: a reactive 
or a proactive approach.  
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Insecurity breeds negativity: Synergetic 
effects of employee and leader neuroticism 
on abusive supervision and antisocial work 
behavior 
 
Abstract 
Relying on trait activation theory (Tett & Burnett, 2003) we investigated whether 
particularly higher (vs. lower) neurotic leaders respond with abusive supervision to 
social exclusion cues communicated by higher (vs. lower) neurotic employees. As a 
consequence, we also expected leader neuroticism and employee neuroticism to 
interactively predict elevated levels of antisocial employee behavior, via the 
mediating mechanism of abusive supervision. Our predictions were supported across 
two studies. In an experiment (Study 1) we first showed that higher (vs. lower) 
neurotic employees signal more social exclusion cues to their leader. In a multi-
source field study (Study 2), we then revealed support for our full model including 
the effects on abusive supervision and antisocial employee behavior. Our research 
provides the first theoretically grounded and empirically verified introduction of 
neuroticism in the abusive supervision literature.  
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This chapter is based on Joosten, A., van Dijke, M., De Cremer, D., Bostyn, D. H., & Van 
Hiel, A. Insecurity breeds negativity: Synergetic effects of employee and leader neuroticism 
on abusive supervision and antisocial work behavior. Manuscript submitted for publication. 
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Introduction 
Some of the most aversive experiences of organization members emerge 
when their leader ignores, humiliates, or intimidates them (e.g., Bies & Tripp, 1998). 
Abusive supervision is defined as “subordinates’ perceptions of the extent to which 
supervisors engage in the sustained display of hostile verbal and nonverbal 
behaviors, excluding physical contact” (Tepper, 2000, p. 178). Its emergence 
presents a potent challenge to organizations. No less than 13.6 percent of U.S. 
employees are confronted with an abusive leader (Schat, Frone, & Kelloway, 2006), 
and abusive supervision is associated with decreased employee well-being and 
performance, and increased antisocial behaviors (see Martinko, Harvey, Brees, & 
Mackey, 2013; Tepper, 2007, for overviews). 
To date, most research has examined consequences of abusive supervision. 
However, more recent studies have also started to zoom in on its antecedents 
(Martinko et al., 2013). The latter studies operationalized these antecedents as 
characteristics of the social context, including the mistreatment that leaders 
themselves experience from their own superiors (Aryee, Chen, Sun, & Debrah, 
2007; Hoobler & Hu, 2013), and the influence of underperforming or deviant 
subordinates (Liang et al., in press; Tepper, Moss, & Duffy, 2011). Importantly, this 
research trend as such signals that leader characteristics as antecedents of abusive 
leadership have been largely ignored so far. Leadership constitutes a dynamic 
interaction between characteristics of the leader and his/her social context (i.e., 
employees; van Knippenberg & Hogg, 2003). Therefore, the next step to take to 
increase our understanding of why (and thus also when) leaders display abusive 
supervision, is to study characteristics of the leader in interaction with employee 
characteristics. 
In line with suggestions of Judge and Long (2012), we apply a characteristic 
matching approach in which we examine the situation where a specific trait of the 
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leader coincides with a relevant trait of the employee. Specifically, we address the 
question how neuroticism of both the leader and of the employee interactively shape 
abusive supervision. And, we test if this interactive effect has more distal 
downstream consequences for antisocial employee behavior. To study these 
questions we rely on trait activation theory (TAT; Tett & Burnett, 2003). 
Neuroticism is associated with social insecurity and ego-fragility, encompassing an 
excessive self-focus on aversive emotional states like anxiety (e.g., Judge, Erez, 
Bono, & Thoresen, 2003). This elicits a chronic tendency for individuals higher (vs. 
lower) in neuroticism to be responsive to social threats (e.g., Denissen & Penke, 
2008; Matthews, 2004). Also, it makes that neurotic individuals can act in ways that 
are socially disturbing by signaling social exclusion (e.g., Morse, Sauerberger, Todd, 
& Funder, 2015). Therefore, we predict that higher (vs. lower) neurotic employees 
communicate social exclusion cues, and that higher (vs. lower) neurotic leaders are 
particularly likely to respond by displaying abusive supervision. This should, in turn, 
have downstream consequences for antisocial employee behavior (see Figure 1 for a 
visual representation of our model).  
 
 
Figure 1. Proposed model of the relationship between leader neuroticism, abusive 
supervision, and antisocial employee behavior. LR indicates that the variable was 
reported by leaders; ER indicates that the variable was reported by employees. 
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Our research makes three contributions. First, of the fundamental 
dimensions of the influential Five-Factor Model of personality (Costa & McCrae, 
1992), theoretical accounts have suggested that neuroticism may be an important 
antecedent of abusive supervision (Tepper, 2007). Despite this interesting assertion, 
to date only one paper – that we are aware of – has looked at the role of leader 
neuroticism in relationship to abusive leadership (Courtright, Gardner, Smith, 
McCormick, & Colbert, in press). This study included leader neuroticism as control 
variable and revealed inconclusive evidence regarding the relationship between 
leader neuroticism and abusive supervision. For this reason, we test in a more direct 
and theoretically meaningful way – by adopting a trait activation lens – whether and 
in what way neuroticism relates to abusive supervision. Second, we decided to have 
the leader’s trait match the trait of the employee to arrive at a better understanding of 
how abusive supervision emerges and results in antisocial employee behavior. As far 
as we know, no study to date has included neuroticism of one party as a moderator 
variable for the effects of neuroticism of another party. This trait matching approach 
is also helpful to investigate more accurately the processes underlying the leader-
employee interaction. Indeed, our research contributes to the abusive supervision 
literature by showing that employees higher in neuroticism radiate social exclusion 
cues, which activates leaders higher (vs. lower) in neuroticism to display abusive 
leadership. By showing that neurotic employees are socially excluding others and 
that neurotic leaders are more concerned and responsive to such social approval cues 
we provide first evidence that social exclusion and neuroticism in leadership 
situations are related in two unique ways. A third contribution of our research is that 
it integrates the earlier research approach on abusive supervision which focuses on 
the consequences of abusive supervision with the more recent approach focusing on 
the antecedents of this leadership type. Our research is thus the first – at least to our 
knowledge – to provide a more complete picture of how abusive supervision 
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emerges and in turn affects the antisocial work behavior of the employee. 
Leader Neuroticism and Abusive Supervision 
Tepper (2007, p. 281) proposed that “supervisors who are high in 
neuroticism experience greater anger, frustration, and impulsiveness compared with 
their low-neuroticism counterparts (Costa and McCrae, 1992), and consequently, 
neuroticism should be positively related to abusive supervision.” Some indirect 
support for this theoretical assertion is provided by Hoobler and Hu (2013) showing 
that state negative affect – regarded as a theoretical proxy of neuroticism – is 
positively associated with leaders’ abusive supervision. One important reason to 
expect a positive relationship between leader neuroticism and abusive supervision is 
that individuals scoring higher on neuroticism show an increased sensitivity to social 
threats (Matthews, 2004). Neuroticism involves insecurity about the self, making 
higher (vs. lower) neurotic individuals scan their environment for possible sources of 
threat to their fragile self (Gray, 1991). 
Important to our line of reasoning is that the self of leaders is very much 
defined in social ways (in relationship to their employees; van Knippenberg & 
Hogg, 2003) and therefore neurotic leaders should be especially sensitive to the 
experience of negative emotions when not being socially valued (Denissen & Penke, 
2008; Leary & Springer, 2001). Neurotic leaders can thus be expected to be sensitive 
to exclusion cues in their relationship with employees. All of this should translate in 
the display of abusive supervision. Indeed, for humans, violations of their social 
standing lead to reciprocity in kind, as demonstrated by research that social 
exclusion cues have a strong and direct effect on displays of aggressive behavior 
(Buckley, Winkel, & Leary, 2004; Leary & Springer, 2001; Twenge, Baumeister, 
Tice, & Stucke, 2001); an act that has been linked to the emergence of abusive 
leadership (Liang et al, in press). 
In line with the above, we therefore need to examine carefully how the 
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context of the leader activates concerns about social exclusion, which subsequently 
may facilitate the emergence of abusive supervision. An important context-specific 
variable is the trait of the employee the leader interacts with. This approach is 
consistent with TAT tenets (Tett & Brunett, 2003), highlighting the role of 
situational cues (in our case employee neuroticism) in activating the impact of leader 
traits (in our case leader neuroticism) on abusive supervision. 
Trait Activation, Employee Neuroticism, and Abusive Supervision 
According to TAT (Tett & Burnett, 2003), activation of traits and their 
influence on behavior is contingent upon the availability of trait-relevant cues in the 
social context. Put differently, TAT proposes that a situation may ‘bring out’ 
particular traits if a thematic connection exists between the situation and the 
individual’s trait (Judge & Zapata, 2015). Interesting to the present research is that 
Tett and Burnett (2003, p. 502) noted that “a situation is relevant to a trait if it is 
thematically connected by the provision of cues … which … indicate a person’s 
standing on the trait.” As mentioned earlier, neurotic leaders are responsive and 
vigilant to information relevant to their social standing and acceptance and a 
meaningful context that communicates such social cues concerns their employees 
(van Knippenberg & Hogg, 2003). We thus argue that employees and their 
corresponding traits can be considered diagnostic cues to assess signals of social 
exclusion. Why? 
Because of their experienced insecurity, higher (versus lower) scoring 
neurotics will scan their environment for ego threats, but this process reflects a 
rather superficial interest in others as it primarily aims to bolster and protect the 
insecure self. Employees higher (versus lower) in neuroticism will therefore be too 
self-centered to show genuine interest in other people. Some research provides 
indirect evidence for this argument. Higher (vs. lower) neuroticism has, for example, 
been related to a number of poor social outcomes, like relationship dissatisfaction 
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(Finn, Mitte, & Neyer, 2013), a lack of closeness (Berry & Hansen, 1996), and less 
concern with others (Van Hiel, Mervielde, & De Fruyt, 2006), and particularly 
relevant to the present purposes, the display of less positive behavior in social 
interactions (Morse et al., 2015) and interpersonal withdrawal (Ormel et al., 2013). 
This argument leads to the following hypothesis: 
 
Higher (vs. lower) neurotic employees communicate cues of social exclusion 
(H1). 
 
Further developing this argument, we postulate that a higher (vs. lower) 
neurotic employee represents a situation that is thematically connected in light of 
social exclusion cues to leader neuroticism, which, in line with TAT’s tenets, will 
activate the neuroticism trait of leaders. For this reason, we suggest that leader’s 
level of neuroticism will predict the display of abusive supervision when employees 
are higher (vs lower) in neuroticism: 
 
Leader and employee neuroticism interact to predict abusive supervision such 
that the positive relationship between leader neuroticism and abusive 
supervision is stronger when employee neuroticism is higher (vs. lower) (H2). 
 
Furthermore, we argue that the social exclusion cues communicated by 
higher (vs. lower) neurotic employees underlie the interactive effect predicted in H2 
as those cues are particularly likely to trigger the sensitive threat-monitoring system 
of neurotic leaders (Denissen & Penke, 2008). Higher (vs. lower) neurotic 
individuals are particularly sensitive to exclusion (Downey & Feldman, 1996; 
Downey, Feldman, & Ayduk, 2000), and those with higher levels of neuroticism are 
more likely to feel anxious when they become concerned about social acceptance 
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(Leary & Kowalski, 1993). Interestingly, Denissen and Penke (2008) provided direct 
evidence for the argument that neuroticism refers to “differences in … activation … 
when faced with cues of social exclusion” (p. 1285). In line with these insights, we 
hypothesize the following: 
 
Employees’ social exclusion cues explain the moderating role of employee 
neuroticism in the relationship between leader neuroticism and abusive 
supervision. As such, leader neuroticism and social exclusion cues will 
interact to predict abusive supervision such that the positive relationship 
between leader neuroticism and abusive supervision is stronger when social 
exclusion cues are higher (vs. lower) (H3). 
 
As we noted earlier, we aim to show not only how abusive supervision 
emerges but also how, in turn, it reveals negative consequences. Prior research has 
indicated that the display of abusive supervision leads to negative employee 
behaviors, most notably deviant and antisocial actions (Martinko et al., 2013; Tepper 
et al., 2009; Tepper, Henle, Lambert, Giacalone, & Duffy, 2008). Antisocial work 
behavior encompasses a diversity of behaviors that violate organizational norms and 
can harm an organization and/or its members (Robinson & O’Leary-Kelly, 1998). 
This relationship between abusive supervision and antisocial employee behavior 
suggests, in line with our prior hypotheses, that the leader neuroticism interaction 
with employee’s cues of social exclusion should indirectly predict antisocial work 
behavior via the mechanism of abusive supervision. 
 
Higher (vs. lower) leader neuroticism is positively related to antisocial 
employee behavior via the mediating mechanism of abusive supervision. However, 
this effect will be a function of employee’s cues of social exclusion because stronger 
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cues of employee’s social exclusion will strengthen the path from leader neuroticism 
to abusive supervision (H4).  
 
Study 1 
 Our argument about the role of employee neuroticism strengthening the 
effect of leader neuroticism on abusive supervision assumes that neurotic employees 
represent cues of social exclusion (H1). We designed Study 1 as a direct test of this 
core assumption. 
Method 
Sample. We recruited 102 U.S. participants via Amazon Mechanical Turk 
and paid them $0.50. We introduced the study as being about ‘‘work and behavior’. 
Inclusion criteria stated that participants be employed in an organization (i.e., not 
self-employed) and have a supervisory role. Based on criteria explained below (see: 
Attention checks), we excluded 19 participants from the analyses. Including these 
participants in the analyses did not alter the direction or significance of any of the 
results reported below. Of the 83 remaining participants, 51 were male and 32 were 
female. The mean age was 37.5 years (SD = 12.6). Participants worked on average 
for 8.0 years (SD = 6.1) in their current organization and for 5.7 years (SD = 5.7) in 
their current job. 
Design and procedure. We assigned participants on a random basis to one 
of two levels of the employee neuroticism factor (high vs. low). We asked 
participants to carefully read a personality profile, taking one of their employees in 
mind who fitted best this description. We based these personality profiles upon the 
items of the Neuroticism scale of the NEO Five Factor Inventory. Our descriptions 
thus represent core elements of neuroticism (Costa & McCrae, 1992). Participants in 
the high (low) neurotic employee condition read the following description: “He or 
she is (not) easily stressed out and (not) easily discouraged. You can tell that he or 
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she does not (does) feel good about him/herself and that he/she sees the future in 
dark (bright) colors. Furthermore, he/she cannot (can) tolerate a lot and does (not) 
often react overly sensitively.” Next, we assessed manipulation and attention checks, 
and social exclusion cues. 
Attention checks. To check for random responding we included two items, 
taken from Jones and Paulhus (2014). We excluded participants who did not agree 
with “I breathe oxygen each day” or who did not disagree with “I was born in Pago-
Pago” (N = 19) from our analyses. 
 Manipulation check. Responses for all our measures were indicated on a 
5-point scale (1 = strongly disagree; 5 = strongly agree). We assessed whether 
leaders considered their employee neurotic with the 4-item Neuroticism scale of the 
Mini-IPIP (a brief version of the International Personality Item Pool), developed and 
validated by Donnellan et al. (2006). The IPIP has been used successfully for other-
ratings in past research (e.g., Kluemper, McLarty, & Bing, 2015). Leaders indicated, 
for instance, if their employee “has frequent mood swings” and “is relaxed most of 
the time” (reverse-coded) (α = .90). 
Social exclusion cues. We measured the employee’s cues of social 
exclusion using Leary et al.’s (1995) 3-item exclusion scale, which we adapted to 
leader-employee relationships; “this employee avoids or rejects me”, “I cannot turn 
to this employee in times of need”, and “this employee does not accept me” (α = 
.78). 
Results and Conclusion  
An independent samples t-test indicated that leaders in the low neurotic 
employee condition perceived their employee as less neurotic, M = 2.11, SD = 0.80, 
than leaders in the high neurotic employee condition, M = 3.81, SD = 0.72, t(81) = -
10.08, p < .001.  
In support of our H1, an independent samples t-test showed that a lower 
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neurotic employee signaled less social exclusion cues, M = 1.86, SD = 0.75, than a 
higher neurotic employee, M = 2.68, SD = 0.75, t(81) = -5.03, p < .001. 
 
Study 2 
The aim of Study 2 was to test the full model depicted in Figure 1 in a multi-
source field study. As in Study 1, we tested if higher (vs. lower) neurotic employees 
signal stronger cues of social exclusion (H1). Furthermore, we tested if higher (vs. 
lower) leader neuroticism predicts heightened abusive supervision particularly when 
the employee is also higher in neuroticism (H2), and whether the moderating role of 
employee neuroticism is explained by employee’s cues of social exclusion (H3). 
Finally, we tested if leader neuroticism, via the mechanism of abusive supervision, 
predicts antisocial employee behavior as a function of social exclusion cues (H4). 
Method 
Sample and procedure. We recruited participants using a professional Dutch 
research agency: Flycatcher, established by Maastricht University. The Flycatcher 
panel has the ISO-26362 certification for access panels (i.e., it meets the qualitative 
ISO requirements for social scientific research, market research, or opinion polls) 
and consists of approximately 16,000 Dutch citizens. We recruited members who 
had a supervisory position. Using panel data has been shown to be a reliable way to 
collect data in other organizational research (e.g., Tepper et al., 2009). For their 
participation, panel members received credit points that would allow them to receive 
certain gifts (e.g., tickets for the movies). Before starting the questionnaire, 
participants were asked to invite one of their direct subordinates to participate in this 
research. Subordinates could win one of ten gift certificates (worth €20). 
We took various steps to ensure that the correct sources completed the 
surveys. When introducing the study, we emphasized the importance of truthfulness 
in the scientific process. We told respondents that it was essential for the supervisor 
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and the subordinate to fill out the correct surveys. Further, the research agency 
compared the email addresses of the supervisors and subordinates to ensure that the 
questionnaires were completed by the correct sources. We found no irregularities in 
the responses. This resulted in a total of 151 leader-employee dyads. To ensure 
anonymity, email addresses were never matched to the answers of respondents.  
Of the leaders, 108 were male and 43 were female. The mean age was 42.6 
years (SD = 11.3). Leaders worked on average for 12.3 years (SD = 10.0) in their 
current organization and for 7.8 years (SD = 6.7) in their current job. 
The matched group of employees included 92 males and 59 females. The 
mean age was 36.9 years (SD = 10.6). Employees worked on average for 7.9 years 
(SD = 7.5) in their current organization and for 5.9 years (SD = 6.1) in their current 
job. 
Measures. We assessed leader neuroticism and employee neuroticism with 
the authorized Dutch translation (Hoekstra, Ormel, & De Fruyt, 1996) of the 12-item 
Neuroticism scale of the NEO Five Factor Inventory (NEO-FFI), developed and 
validated by Costa and McCrae (1992; 1 = strongly disagree; 5 = strongly agree). 
We measured social exclusion cues with the same 3-item exclusion scale as 
in Study 1, including “I avoid or reject my supervisor”, “My supervisor cannot turn 
to me in times of need” and “I do not accept my supervisor” (1 = strongly disagree; 
5 = strongly agree). 
We measured abusive supervision using Tepper’s (2000) 15-item abusive 
supervision scale. Employees indicated how often their leader engaged in behaviors 
such as “ridicules me” and “doesn’t give me credit for jobs requiring a lot of effort” 
(1 = never; 5 = very often). 
We measured antisocial employee behavior using Robinson and O’Leary-
Kelly’s (1998) 9-item antisocial work behavior measure. To avoid problems 
associated with self-reports, such as common method variance and social desirability 
174                                                                                                                                                               Chapter 5 
 
bias, scholars have called for the use of other-reported antisocial behavior (see 
Berry, Carpenter, & Barratt, 2012). Therefore, we adapted items for peer report. 
Leaders rated how often the employee performed actions such as “griped with 
coworkers” and “deliberately bent or broke (a) rule(s)” (1 = never; 5 = very often). 
Results 
Table 1 presents means, standard deviations, intercorrelations, and 
reliabilities for the study variables. 
 
Table 1 
Descriptive Statistics and Intercorrelations for Study 2 
Variable M SD 1 2 3 4 5 
1. Leader neuroticism (LR) 2.11 0.69 (.87)     
2. Employee neuroticism (ER) 2.31 0.66 .70** (.87)    
3. Social exclusion cues (ER) 1.92 0.85 .53** .54** (.78)   
4. Abusive supervision (ER) 1.58 0.74 .63** .59** .64** (.97)  
5. Antisocial employee behavior 
    (LR) 
1.90 0.77 .64** .57** .57** .69** (.92) 
Note. N = 151. Internal reliabilities (Cronbach α) are provided in parentheses on the 
diagonal. LR = leader rated, ER = employee rated. ** p < .01. 
 
Measurement model. Before testing our hypotheses, we conducted 
confirmatory factor analyses (CFA) to test our measurement model. We estimated a 
model with five latent factors (leader neuroticism, employee neuroticism, social 
exclusion cues of the employee, abusive supervision, and employees’ antisocial 
work behavior) using LISREL (Jöreskog & Sörbom, 2004). The five-factor model 
showed a good fit to the data: 2 (1214) = 2471.90, p < .001; CFI = .97; RMSEA = 
.07; SRMR = .06. A single factor model showed a clearly inferior fit to the data: 2 
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(1224) = 3443.63, p < .001; CFI = .95; RMSEA = .13; SRMR = .09. In sum, the 
CFAs support the validity of our specified measurement model. 
Hypotheses testing. We tested our model depicted in Figure 1with 
maximum likelihood estimation using R (R Core Team, 2015). This approach allows 
for a formal test of the full model, rather than testing each hypothesis individually. 
We mean centered all predictor variables prior to analyses (Aiken & West, 1991). 
Standard errors for the indirect effect (H4) were obtained through a bias-corrected 
and accelerated bootstrap procedure using 1,000 bootstrap samples. Table 2 presents 
the results.
1
 
First, as in Study 1 and in support of H1, employee neuroticism significantly 
predicted social exclusion cues (Table 2, first column). Second, in support of H2, we 
found a significant Leader Neuroticism × Employee Neuroticism interaction (see 
Table 2, second column, and also Figure 2). In support of H2, simple slope analyses 
(Aiken & West, 1991) revealed that leader neuroticism was positively associated 
with abusive supervision among employees higher in neuroticism (one SD above the 
mean; b = .45, p < .001), but not among employees lower in neuroticism (one SD 
below the mean; b = .06, p = .42). 
Third, to understand the process that explains why leader neuroticism 
predicts abusive supervision particularly when employees are higher (vs. lower) in 
neuroticism (H2), and building on the finding that employee neuroticism 
significantly predicts social exclusion cues (H1), we tested H3. In support of H3, the 
                                                 
1
 The low means of abusive supervision and antisocial employee behavior in our Study 2 are 
consistent with those found in previous research (cf. Tepper, 2000; Tepper et al., 2008). To 
check if potential violations of normality would pose a problem for our conclusions, we 
tested our model using maximum likelihood estimation along with a bias corrected and 
accelerated bootstrap procedure (1,000 bootstrap samples) to obtain the standard errors for 
each of the effects. This approach not only allowed for a formal test of the full model, but has 
the additional benefit that all reported statistical tests do not rely on a distributional 
assumption and are thus robust against potential violations of normality. The results of this 
more conservative approach mirrored those presented in the main text. 
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Leader Neuroticism × Social Exclusion Cues interaction was significant (b = .28, p < 
.001; Table 2, third column) when controlling for the Leader Neuroticism × 
Employee Neuroticism interaction. Simple slopes analyses revealed that leader 
neuroticism was positively associated with abusive supervision when employees 
signaled more social exclusion cues (one SD above the mean; b = .36, p < .001), but 
not when employees signaled less social exclusion cues (one SD below the mean; b 
= .04, p = .54). When we included the moderating effect of social exclusion cues, the 
Leader Neuroticism × Employee Neuroticism interaction was reduced to non-
significance (Table 2, second and third column), suggesting that the moderating 
effect of employee neuroticism is explained by the social exclusion cues that higher 
(vs. lower) neurotic employees signal. As an additional explicit test of H3 we 
estimated another model in which we constrained the size of the moderating effect 
of employee neuroticism to be zero. A model comparison test of this constrained 
model versus one in which we freely estimate the strength of this moderating effect 
revealed that the constrained model did not lead to a significantly worse fit (
2
 (1) = 
1.81, p = 0.179), confirming that the addition of the moderating effect of social 
exclusion cues renders the former redundant. 
Finally, we used the moderated path analysis procedures recommended by 
Edwards and Lambert (2007) to test H4. In line with this hypothesis, we found an 
indirect effect of the Leader Neuroticism × Social Exclusion Cues interaction on 
antisocial employee behavior via abusive supervision (b = .14, p = .002, 95% CI 
[.05, .22]). Thus, the positive relationship between leader neuroticism and antisocial 
employee behavior through the mediating mechanism of abusive supervision was 
stronger when employees signaled stronger (vs. weaker) social exclusion cues. 
Furthermore, we probed this moderation of an indirect effect by investigating the 
conditional indirect effect of leader neuroticism on antisocial employee behavior. 
Leader Neuroticism was positively associated with antisocial employee behavior 
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when employees signaled more social exclusion cues (one SD above the mean; b = 
.18, p < .001), but was not significantly associated with antisocial employee 
behavior when employees refrained from signaling exclusion cues (one SD below 
the mean; b = .02; p = .58). 
 
 
Figure 2. Abusive supervision as a function of leader neuroticism (+/- 1SD) and 
employee neuroticism. 
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General Discussion 
We adopted a trait matching approach to examine antecedents of abusive 
leadership by focusing on the interactive process of leader and employee 
neuroticism. In line with TAT’s (Tett & Burnett, 2003) tenets our results revealed 
that leader neuroticism predicted abusive supervision, but only when employees 
scored higher (vs. lower) on neuroticism. The role of employee neuroticism in 
moderating the relationship between leader neuroticism and abusive supervision was 
explained by social exclusion cues communicated by higher (vs. lower) neurotic 
employees. Finally, our findings showed that leader neuroticism predicted antisocial 
work behavior via the mediating mechanism of abusive leadership, but only when 
employees signaled strong cues of social exclusion (i.e., higher scoring neurotic 
employees). Below, we discuss the implications and limitations of these findings. 
Theoretical Contributions 
Our research contributes to the abusive supervision literature in several 
ways. First, prior research has predominantly focused on examining consequences of 
abusive supervision, and more recent research started to look at the role that leader’s 
own supervisor and employees can play in the emergence of this leadership behavior 
(Liang et al., in press; Tepper et al., 2011). Our present research complements and 
goes beyond these studies by looking at both the role of employee and leader 
characteristics as antecedents of abusive supervision. This is a step required to 
capture better the dynamics of abusive supervision, particularly so because 
leadership is regarded as a meaningful relationship between both leader and 
employee (van Knippenberg & Hogg, 2003). We focused on the trait of neuroticism, 
which in a theoretical account by Tepper (2007) was proposed to be positively 
related to abusive behavior of leaders. In testing this idea, we relied on TAT (Tett & 
Burnett, 2003) to predict that it will be the level of neuroticism of the employee that 
acts as a source of leader trait activation. Because of its clear thematic connection 
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between the context variable employee neuroticism and leader neuroticism, our 
results suggest that employee neuroticism serves as a context-variable activating the 
workings and influence of leader neuroticism, revealing the emergence of abusive 
leadership. 
This interactive effect between leader and employee neuroticism provides 
first empirical evidence in favor of a trait matching approach to examine the role of 
personality in leadership (Judge & Long, 2012). Even more importantly, it also 
provides useful insights into the selection of the trait neuroticism to understand the 
phenomenon of abusive leadership better. Indeed, the role of neuroticism in abusive 
supervision can at first sight be considered as counterintuitive. In fact, neuroticism 
tends to produce problematic behaviors targeted at the self, not toward others (Costa 
& McCrae, 1992). The few studies that looked at leader personality as predictor of 
abusive supervision focused on traits like Machiavellianism (Kiazad, Restubog, 
Zagenczyk, Kiewitz, & Tang, 2010) and trait anger (Kant, Skogstad, Torsheim, & 
Einarsen, 2013), thus focusing on traits that have interpersonal implications and 
could be regarded ‘bully-type’ personalities (Paulhus & Williams, 2002). The ‘bully-
type’ personality has indeed been shown to predict a host of antisocial behaviors in 
daily life, such as interpersonal offensiveness and hostility (e.g., Lynam et al., 2011), 
manipulation and callousness (see Furnham, Richards, & Paulhus, 2013), and the 
exploitation of others (Decuyper, De Pauw, De Fruyt, De Bolle, & De Clercq, 2009). 
The fact that neuroticism does predict abusive supervision suggests that this 
trait also has interpersonal consequences. Employee neuroticism was found to 
activate leader neuroticism by signaling social exclusion cues to the leader. Neurotic 
individuals are vigilant towards social threats and as such turn out to be responsive 
to situations where they do not feel valued (Denissen & Penke, 2008). Such 
experience of social exclusion hurts higher neurotic individuals and puts them in 
distress (Downey et al., 2000; Leary & Springer, 2001). As our results show, this 
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motivated the display of abusive leadership. In fact, our analyses revealed that the 
signal of social exclusion by neurotic employees explained the interactive effect 
between leader and employee neuroticism in directly predicting abusive leadership 
and indirectly antisocial employee behavior. As such, our findings (a) provide 
evidence that neuroticism can reveal negative effects not only to the self but also to 
others, and (b) responds to claims that research should examine more carefully how 
traits exactly relate to leader behavior (Zaccaro, 2012). 
Furthermore, by testing both direct and indirect effects in the same study, we 
provided a more complete picture of how abusive supervision emerges and in turn 
affects antisocial employee behavior. This approach reveals that the employee at the 
same time can act as a crucial input for abusive supervision to emerge and be at the 
receiving end of this negative type of leadership. This finding makes clear that 
abusive leadership is a social consequence based on the input of both employee and 
leader and therefore needs higher-level supervision to prevent such negative 
leadership actions. This conclusion corresponds well with suggestions of Tepper et 
al. (2006) who argued, based on the victimization literature (Einarsen, 2000), that 
ultimately the responsibility for preventing abusive leadership lies primarily with the 
organization. 
Finally, as our research zoomed in on the social dynamics of leader and 
employee, and how they influence leadership behavior and ultimately work behavior 
of employees, our findings are also relevant to the literature regarding the role of 
personality on team performance (Monynihan & Peterson, 2001). It has, for 
instance, been studied how average levels of personality traits within a team 
influence team outcomes (e.g., Bradley, Klotz, Postlethwaite, & Brown, 2013). Yet, 
while these approaches are informative about which (combination of) traits predict 
group performance, one critique is that the processes underlying these particular trait 
interactions are lost when using those approaches (Monynihan & Peterson, 2001). 
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Our approach carries the potential to study more precisely the processes involved 
when looking at the interactive effect of leader and team member’s traits. 
Practical Implications 
One potential practical implication is that leaders higher in neuroticism do 
not have to be necessarily detrimental for organizations (at least not in terms of 
displaying abusive supervision), as long as they do not work together with other 
neurotics. However, neuroticism is a personality characteristic that is commonly 
found in non-clinical populations (Costa & McCrae, 1992). Therefore, neurotic 
leaders are likely to encounter neurotic employees. Given that organizations often 
consider the personality of employees in personnel selection (Morgeson et al., 2007), 
it would be advisable to be aware of the possible negative consequences of hiring 
neurotic leaders. 
Furthermore, our results show that leaders higher (vs. lower) in neuroticism 
respond with abusive supervision to neurotic employees because such employees 
signal cues of social exclusion. Organizations thus have to monitor situations in 
which such leaders feel excluded, as this is likely to make them respond with 
abusive supervision. Most importantly perhaps, leaders as well as employees should 
be made aware that both parties play their respective role in the emergence of 
abusive supervision and antisocial employee behavior. 
Strengths, Limitations, and Future Research 
A potential strength of the present research is our use of two different 
methods across employees from the U.S. (Study 1) and the Netherlands (Study 2). 
Making use of constructive replications (Lykken, 1968), we provided direct 
evidence to show that neurotic employees signal social exclusion cues in Study 1, 
whereas in Study 2, we collected field data from multiple sources (i.e., leaders and 
employees) to provide ecological validity for this claim, but also to test our overall 
model. The use of such a multi-source setting made it possible to control for 
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common method and self-presentation biases (Podsakoff, MacKenzie, Lee, & 
Podsakoff, 2003). 
A potential limitation for future research to address is that the cross-
sectional design of our research makes it impossible to draw causal conclusions from 
our results. However, it should be noted that personality traits are relatively stable 
across the life span, making reversed causation less likely. For example, there is a 
clear consensus in the literature that personality is an antecedent of antisocial 
workplace behaviors and not vice versa (Berry, Ones, & Sackett, 2007). 
Furthermore, although we used employees from the U.S. (Study 1) and the 
Netherlands (Study 2), both countries are nevertheless individualistic cultures that 
are low in power distance (Schimmack, Oishi, & Diener, 2005). Abusive supervision 
research has hardly taken on a cross-cultural perspective (Martinko et al., 2013; for 
an exception see Lian, Ferris, & Brown, 2012). As one’s cultural upbringing shapes 
responses to emotional experiences (such as exclusion), future research is advised to 
test our hypotheses also in collectivistic and high power distance cultures.  
While our research illustrated the roles of leader and employee neuroticism in 
predicting abusive supervision (as inspired by Tepper, 2007), we do not suggest that 
no other traits may be worth considering. Aggression prone personality types such as 
machiavellianism, narcissism, and psychopathy (Paulhus & Williams, 2002) are 
relevant to explore, particularly in light of our findings underscoring the role of 
social exclusion (see its relationship with aggression; Twenge et al., 2001). We 
advocate making use of our proposed trait matching technique to create a 
meaningful context to examine, for example, how supervisor machiavellianism 
interacts with employee machiavellianism; as such also going beyond existing 
research on supervisor machiavellianism and abusive supervision (Kiazad et al., 
2010). 
Finally, we focused on employee neuroticism as a context signaling cues of 
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social exclusion that activate the workings of leader neuroticism. Future research 
should examine other conditions in which leaders being criticized or rejected may 
lead to abusive supervision. This suggestion is backed up by Judge and Zapata’s 
(2015) finding that neuroticism is most detrimental to work performance in 
situations that require social skills and in situations in which one needs to interact 
with unpleasant or angry people. 
Conclusion 
Abusive supervision presents an important challenge to organizations, 
inviting scholars to understand antecedents of this leadership style to prevent its 
emergence and subsequent negative consequences for employees. We hope that our 
use of a trait matching approach combined with a broader view on both the 
antecedents and consequences of abusive leadership will stimulate future research to 
understand more deeply the dynamic nature of this leadership style. 
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Research overview and general discussion 
 
The aim of the present dissertation was to provide a better understanding of the 
antecedents of ethical and unethical decision making in organizations. In order to reach 
this aim, we adopted a self-regulation perspective to (un)ethical behavior. In four 
empirical chapters, we looked into various concepts relating to the self-regulation of 
(un)ethical behavior: the availability of self-regulatory resources and individual 
differences (more specifically: moral identity), behavioral history and moment-to-
moment ethical decision making, and finally, leader mistreatment and the interplay 
between leader and employee personality, respectively. This general discussion 
provides an overview of the main findings presented in the empirical chapters of this 
dissertation. Furthermore, we will discuss the theoretical implications of the present 
findings and some promising avenues for future research. Finally, we will conclude 
with some practical implications. 
Self-regulation of (un)ethical behavior in the workplace and individual differences 
In Chapter 2, we investigated how the availability of self-regulatory resources 
influences unethical leadership behaviors. More specifically, we expected that the 
depletion of self-regulatory resources may lead to higher levels of unethical leadership 
behavior. We also argued that moral identity is likely to be a relevant boundary 
condition for this effect. Moral identity is an important motivator of ethical behavior 
(Aquino & Reed, 2002; Blasi, 1980; Hardy & Carlo, 2005), and this variable may thus 
influence the amount of cognitive resources that people need in order to behave in an 
ethical manner. People with a high moral identity more frequently regulate their 
behavior (i.e., inhibit selfish impulses), resulting in more internalized and automatic 
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enactment of ethical behavior (Seeley & Gardner, 2003); and as such, they can be 
expected to consume fewer cognitive resources to maintain their self-control (cf. 
Aquino, Freeman, Reed, Lim, & Felps, 2009; Aquino & Reed, 2002; Reynolds & 
Ceranic, 2007). One can therefore expect that people with a high moral identity are less 
vulnerable than people low in moral identity to the effects of regulatory depletion on 
their display of unethical leadership behaviors. 
We found evidence for our hypothesis in an experimental and a multisource 
field study. In the experimental study, we manipulated participants’ level of regulatory 
depletion. The results showed that regulatory depletion increased unethical leadership 
behaviors for participants low in moral identity, whereas for participants high in moral 
identity, there was no such an increase. To be able to generalize our findings to an 
organizational setting, we also conducted a multisource field study. This multisource 
setting made it possible to assess leaders’ level of regulatory depletion and moral 
identity directly from the leaders themselves, whereas ratings about the leaders’ 
unethical behavior were provided by their colleagues as well as by the leaders 
themselves. Similarly to the experimental study, we found evidence for the moderating 
effect of moral identity in the relationship between regulatory depletion and unethical 
leader behavior. These findings suggest that leaders with a low moral identity need self-
regulatory resources to refrain from engaging in unethical leader behaviors, while for 
leaders who are high in moral identity behaving ethically is less reliant on these 
resources, and thus, not influenced by regulatory resource depletion.  
In Chapter 3, we focused on the effects of regulatory depletion and moral 
identity in predicting ethical behavior (vs. unethical behavior in Chapter 2). We argued 
that selfishness by showing unethical behavior is inherently different from selfishness 
by refraining from ethical behavior. We hypothesized that people need power to feel 
that they can refrain from being ethical, because people in a position of power are more 
likely to deviate from prevailing norms (Briñol, Petty, Valle, Rucker, & Becerra, 2007). 
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We therefore expected that power is likely to be a facilitator of the selfish state resulting 
from the combination of depletion and low moral identity.  
We conducted two studies to test our hypothesis. An experimental study in 
which we manipulated regulatory depletion and power, and a multisource field study 
where we assessed regulatory depletion, moral identity, and power directly from the 
respondents, whereas we asked coworkers of the focal respondents to indicate ethical 
behavior of the focal employee. Both studies showed the hypothesized interaction 
between moral identity and depletion for employees high in power, but not for 
employees low in power. It thus seems that employees with a high moral identity have 
their moral values more readily accessible, even when their regulatory resources are 
depleted and irrespective of their power level. Moreover, our results show that social 
power enables employees to refrain from ethical behavior. 
The findings of Chapter 2 and 3 thus show that people with a high moral 
identity are less prone to the effects of self-regulatory depletion on unethical and ethical 
behaviors in the workplace. It thus seems that people with a high moral identity are 
more effective in self-regulating their behavior than people with a low moral identity.  
Self-regulation of (un)ethical behavior in the workplace and behavioral history 
In Chapter 4, we investigated how people make moral decisions on a moment-
to-moment basis. Moral self-regulation investigates this issue by focusing on moment-
to-moment balancing acts between ethical and unethical behavior in the context of 
one’s behavioral history (Monin & Miller, 2001; Zhong & Liljenquist, 2006; Zhong, 
Liljenquist, & Cain, 2009). This research highlights the importance of self-regulation 
processes in examining ethical and unethical behavior, but presents us with diverging 
findings. On the one hand, research has shown that someone who feels moral (vs. 
immoral) is more likely to show ethical (vs. unethical) behavior (a process labelled as 
moral consistency). On the other hand, however, research has shown that someone who 
feels moral (vs. immoral) is more likely to show unethical (vs. ethical) behavior (a 
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process labelled as moral compensation). In Chapter 4, we try to consolidate these 
findings by arguing that both moral consistency and moral compensation reflect 
specific ways to deal with reputational concerns. More specifically, we argue that the 
crucial difference between moral consistency and moral compensation is that the first 
one implies a more proactive approach to reputation building and maintenance, whereas 
the latter forms a reactive, “damage control” response in social situations.  
We conducted two experimental studies to test this hypothesis. In both studies, 
we manipulated whether participants felt moral versus immoral by relying on an 
established priming procedure that asks participants to describe and recall a situation in 
which they acted in a moral (versus immoral) manner (see e.g., Aquino et al., 2009; 
Sachdeva, Iliev, & Medin, 2009). To induce reputational concerns, all participants were 
led to believe that they worked together with others in a team. Finally, as research has 
indicated that reactive (vs. proactive) responses are more likely in situations that 
constrain cognitive capacity (Parker, Williams, & Turner, 2006; Rusbult & Van Lange, 
2003), we relied on a common way to impair cognitive capacity. That is, we 
manipulated participants’ cognitive resources by administering a task which depletes 
(versus not depletes) participants’ cognitive resources. The first experiment showed that 
participants who were not depleted (i.e., allowing for a proactive, long-term focus on 
reputation building) showed moral consistency, whereas participants who were 
depleted (i.e., making them act more reactively upon reputational concerns) showed 
moral compensation.  
In the second experiment, we did not only replicate the results of the first 
experiment, but we also provided an explicit test for the relevance of reputational 
concerns in moral consistency and moral compensation by focusing on accountability 
as a boundary condition. We expected that if moral consistency and compensatory 
behavior are indeed shaped by reputational concerns, these processes should be 
particularly found when people are held accountable for their actions (i.e., the degree to 
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which one can be publicly held responsible for one’s actions). The results were in line 
with our hypotheses, participants who were not depleted (i.e., taking a proactive 
approach) showed moral consistency, whereas depleted participants (i.e., taking a 
reactive approach) showed moral compensation. Yet, these effects were only found 
among accountable participants. Participants who were not accountable showed no 
moral consistency, nor moral compensation. These results thus indicates that both 
moral consistency and moral compensation derive from reputational concerns. 
Self-regulation of (un)ethical behavior in the workplace and the interplay between 
personalities 
In Chapter 5, we investigated the role of leader mistreatment in predicting 
unethical behavior. We argued that leaders with a neurotic personality are especially 
likely to show elevated levels of leader mistreatment, and thus, increase unethical 
behaviors of their employees. In this chapter, we specifically considered the context in 
which leader mistreatment takes place. In line with trait activation theory (TAT; Tett & 
Burnett, 2003), we argued that the activation of leaders’ neuroticism is contingent upon 
the availability of trait-relevant cues in the social context, and employees’ personality is 
a most relevant aspect of a leaders’ social context. We further argue that neurotic 
employees are likely to signal social exclusion cues (e.g., Morse, Sauerberger, Todd, & 
Funder, 2015) and that especially leaders high in neuroticism are responsive to this kind 
of social threat (e.g., Denissen & Penke, 2008; Matthews, 2004). It is thus likely that 
leaders’ neurotic personality is activated by the exclusion cues of neurotic employees. 
We therefore hypothesized that employee neuroticism interacts with leader neuroticism 
in predicting abusive supervision and that this has downstream consequences for 
unethical workplace behavior. 
 To investigate our hypotheses we conducted two studies, an experimental 
study in which we showed that higher (vs. lower) neurotic employees signal more 
social exclusion cues to their leader, and a multisource field study in which we 
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recruited leader-employee dyads. Both leaders and employees indicated their level of 
neuroticism, but whereas the leader rated the unethical behavior of the employee, 
employees rated the level of exclusion cues which they signalled and the level of leader 
mistreatment. In this second study, we found support for our full model. That is, leader 
neuroticism and employee neuroticism interacted to predict leader mistreatment, and 
this effect was explained by the social exclusion cues of neurotic employees. 
Furthermore, as a result of this leader mistreatment, we found elevated levels of 
unethical employee behaviour. 
 
General Discussion 
Theoretical implications 
 This dissertation provides some new insights in the literature of ethical and 
unethical decision making in organizations. It enhances, for example, our understanding 
of the role of self-regulation in the display of ethical and unethical behavior. In fact, 
previous research mainly investigated the effects of self-regulatory depletion in 
laboratory settings. To our knowledge, our findings are among the first to show that 
regulatory depletion can induce people to show less ethical and more unethical 
behaviors in an organizational setting (Chapter 2 and 3). The present dissertation thus 
suggests that self-regulation facilitates the emergence of ethical and hinders the 
prevalence of unethical behaviors in organizations.  
 A second implication of this dissertation for the literature on self-regulation 
and (un)ethical behavior is that regulatory depletion does not necessarily imply 
selfishness. Prior work has often claimed that a lack of regulatory resources 
automatically leads to selfishness (Baumeister & Exline, 1999; Mead, Baumeister, 
Gino, Schweitzer, & Ariely, 2009; Shalvi, Eldar, & Bereby-Meyer, 2012). Research 
supporting this idea shows that depletion can result in less ethical behavior and more 
unethical behavior (DeWall, Baumeister, Gailliot, & Maner, 2008; DeWall, 
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Baumeister, Stillman, & Gailliot, 2007; Gino, Schweitzer, Mead, & Ariely, 2011; Mead 
et al, 2009). Yet, there is also research showing that being ethical is not by definition 
effortful, and some types of morality are in fact driven by automatic processes (Greene, 
Morelli, Lowenberg, Nystrom, & Cohen, 2008). Hence, a lack of regulatory resources 
does not necessarily lead to selfish behavior. Similarly, our research shows that 
depletion does not cause selfishness for people high in moral identity (Chapter 2 and 3). 
Moreover, Chapter 4 indicates that a lack of regulatory resources may also induce 
people to be more moral, if they are focused on damage control. 
 This dissertation also contributes to our knowledge of the role of individual 
differences in the self-regulation of (un)ethical behavior. We focused on moral identity, 
a variable particularly important for the emergence of ethical and unethical behaviors 
(Aquino & Reed, 2002). Our results show that moral identity facilitates the self-
regulation of (un)ethical behavior. More specifically, Chapter 2 and 3 show that among 
people high in moral identity, regulatory depletion does not necessarily hamper the self-
regulation of (un)ethical behavior. Our findings thus suggest that people high in moral 
identity have their moral values readily accessible irrespective of their level of 
depletion. People low in moral identity, on the other hand, are more likely to show 
unethical behavior. This thus indicates that successful self-regulation suppresses 
individual differences between people high and low in moral identity, whereas these 
differences emerge more strongly when people are depleted.  
 This dissertation also sheds light on the self-regulation processes that seem to 
be involved in (un)ethical behavior on a moment-to-moment basis. The findings of 
Chapter 4 indicate that moral compensation and moral consistency occur in a social 
context and that reputational considerations thus play an important role in these 
processes. Even though both literatures suggest that reputational concerns are relevant 
for the display of (un)ethical behavior (Miller & Effron, 2010; Reed, Aquino, & Levy, 
2007), the present dissertation is the first to integrate the moral compensation and 
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consistency literatures by focusing on differences in reputation management. More 
specifically, our findings suggest that moral compensation forms a reactive, “damage 
control” response in social situations, whereas moral consistency implies a more 
proactive approach to reputation building and maintenance. 
 A final contribution of this dissertation is to the self-regulation of (un)ethical 
behavior and the interplay between personalities. Leaders may have a profound role in 
the emergence of unethical behavior in the workplace by means of their own 
misbehavior (Bennett & Robinson, 2000; Robinson & Greenberg, 1998). Most research 
solely focuses on the influence of leader personality on behavior and neglects the fact 
that people are imbedded in relational networks. The present dissertation addresses this 
issue by showing that the personality of other people may also form an important 
context factor. More specifically, Chapter 5 shows that leaders high in neuroticism 
show more abusive leader behaviors, particularly when their employees score also high 
on neuroticism, and that, as a result of abusive supervision, the employees show higher 
levels of deviant behavior. Our results thus show that it is important to consider the 
interplay between the personality of the actor and the personality of ‘another’. 
Limitations and suggestions for future research 
In the present dissertation we employed various research methods to test the 
role of self-regulation on ethical and unethical behavior in organizational settings. The 
experimental research employed in the present dissertation allowed us to test our 
predictions in a controlled laboratory setting and gives us a clear indication of the 
causal relationships of our findings. Furthermore, the present dissertation combines this 
experimental research with multisource field research, which improves the robustness 
and the implications that can be derived from our findings (Ellemers, 2013). However, 
in an ideal situation, additional longitudinal research would have been employed to 
shed a light on the direction of the relationships investigated in this dissertation. In 
other words, we cannot be sure that our findings are unidirectional in nature and not 
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bidirectional. Future research could thus even further establish the validity and 
generalizability of our findings by employing a longitudinal research design. 
 This dissertation adopted a multisource method to investigate ethical and 
unethical behavior in organizations That means that we relied on own ratings and on 
colleague or leader ratings to test the role of self-regulation on (un)ethical behavior. 
While this enhances the validity of our findings because such a method avoids potential 
common method and self-presentation biases (P. M. Podsakoff, MacKenzie, Lee, & 
Podsakoff, 2003), it may also pose a threat to the validity of our findings, because we 
often relied on a single ‘other’ (i.e., colleague or leader) source to measure (un)ethical 
behavior. Ethical and unethical behaviors consists of many different behaviors and it is 
not unlikely that a single ‘other’ witnessed only part of these behaviors. It may thus be, 
that our reliance on a single source measure does not fully capture the unique variance 
present in (un)ethical behavior. Future research could adopt a 360 degrees approach in 
which various colleagues of the focal employee are used to indicate the prevalence of 
(un)ethical behavior. However, in Chapter 2 we combined self and other ratings of 
unethical behavior and found no differences between those two sources.  
Practical implications 
 A first important practical implication of the present dissertation is that it 
suggests that self-regulation failures may pose serious problems to organizations. 
Chapter 2 and 3 show that self-regulation depletion both hinders ethical behavior and 
promotes unethical behavior in organizations. At the same time, however, various 
causes of self-regulatory depletion are omnipresent in organizations, such as the 
necessity to make many choices and decisions (Vohs et al., 2008), overly long working 
hours that may lead to sleep deprivation (Barnes, Schaubroeck, Huth, & Ghumman, 
2011; Christian & Ellis, 2011), and high stress levels (Muraven & Baumeister, 2000). 
In other words, a number of factors that seem inherent to organizational life may 
constrain ethical and promote unethical behavior of organizational members. It is thus 
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important that organizations are aware of these factors that may lead to regulatory 
depletion and try to eliminate them as much as possible. 
The previous implication is especially relevant for leaders as they are a likely 
source of vicarious learning (Bandura, 1986). It is thus particularly important for 
leaders to act in an ethical manner. Indeed, if leaders focus on behaving ethically, then 
they will serve as an important source of ethical guidance for their employees (Brown, 
Treviño, & Harrison, 2005; Walumbwa et al., 2011). Conversely, when leaders act 
unethically, employees will usually follow suit (Mayer, Kuenzi, Greenbaum, Bardes, & 
Salvador, 2009). Yet, leader have busy and demanding work schedules and acting in 
ethical ways is not necessarily easy for them (e.g., Ganster, 2005; Hambrick, 
Finkelstein, & Mooney, 2005; Mintzberg, 1973). Organizations should thus be aware 
that overloading their leaders with decisions to take may come with the cost of an 
increased likelihood of leaders transgressing ethical norms. Nevertheless, leaders 
should be similarly aware that whenever they are facing tasks that can have important 
(i.e., ethical) implications, their cognitive state can affect their behavior; thus, it is 
necessary to carefully schedule these tasks. Tasks that may have ethical implications 
should preferably be made after a period of rest because rest can replenish leaders 
regulatory resources (Baumeister, Muraven, & Tice, 2000). 
 This dissertation also conveys a more optimistic message by indicating that not 
all employees are equally prone to the effects of self-regulatory depletion on (un)ethical 
behaviors. Chapter 2 and 3 showed that employees who are high in moral identity 
proved to be immune to the effects of self-regulatory depletion on (un)ethical behavior. 
This finding is possibly relevant for organizations because there is some research that 
indicates that it is possible to situationally increase the accessibility of moral identity 
(Aquino et al., 2009; Reed et al., 2007). Combined with the present results, this entails a 
promising implication for organizations. Making moral identity accessible through 
situational interventions such as stimulating a clear ethical climate and ensuring that the 
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organization’s top management behaves in ethical ways (Martin & Cullen, 2006; 
Mayer et al., 2009; Mayer, Kuenzi, & Greenbaum, 2010) makes it more likely that 
employees behave ethically. More importantly, this effect should also buffer the effects 
of regulatory depletion on unethical behavior. Moreover, these interventions seems to 
be especially important for leaders, because of the behavior of leaders can influence 
that of their employees (cf. Chapter 5). That is, interventions aimed at increasing 
morality at higher levels in the organization can have positive implications at lower 
hierarchical levels (Martin & Cullen, 2006; Mayer et al., 2009; Mayer et al., 2010). 
 Chapter 4, however, indicates that strategies aimed at stimulating ethical 
employee behavior are not necessarily effective. More specifically, the findings of 
Chapter 4 show that when employees are focused on a reactive approach to reputation 
management (which is likely to occur when they are experiencing regulatory 
depletion), feeling moral may not be effective in promoting ethical behavior. As we 
already explained before, various causes of regulatory depletion are omnipresent in 
organizational contexts and it is thus important that organizations are aware of this 
potential subversion.  
 A final suggestion for organizations comes from the findings in Chapter 5. 
From the results it can be inferred that neurotic leaders are not necessarily detrimental 
for organizations (at least not in terms of displaying abusive supervision), as long as 
they do not work together with other neurotics. However, neuroticism is a personality 
characteristic that is commonly found in non-clinical populations (Costa & McCrae, 
1992). Therefore, neurotic leaders are likely to encounter neurotic employees. Given 
that organizations often consider the personality of their (future) employees in 
personnel selection (Guion & Gottier, 1965; Morgeson et al., 2007; Tett, Jackson, & 
Rothstein, 1991), it would be advisable to be aware of the possible negative 
consequences of hiring neurotic leaders.  
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Conclusion 
The present dissertation contributes to the literature on ethical and unethical 
organizational behavior by adopting a self-regulation perspective. Our findings indicate 
that regulatory depletion hinders ethical behavior and promotes unethical behavior in an 
organizational context. This dissertation enhanced our understanding of the importance 
of individual differences (i.e., moral identity), one’s behavioral history, and leader 
mistreatment for the self-regulation of (un)ethical behavior. 
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Ethische besluitvorming in organisaties: een 
zelfregulatie benadering 
 
Inleiding 
In de afgelopen jaren zijn er in de wereldwijde media verschillende 
voorbeelden van onethisch gedrag van bedrijven verschenen, zoals de diverse 
accountancy schandalen (denk hierbij aan AIG, Tycom WorldCom, Enron en 
Ahold), het afluisterschandaal van de NSA, de met melamine besmette melk in 
China (300.000 slachtoffers), de overtreding van de bouwvoorschriften bij een 
fabriek in Bangladesh (1100 doden), GSK’s omkoping van dokters in China om zo 
meer medicijnen te verkopen, het Europese vleesschandaal en de diverse 
bankschandalen die mede geleid hebben tot de wereldwijde financiële crisis. Al deze 
voorbeelden maken duidelijk dat onethisch gedrag van organisaties zowel 
wijdverbreid als invasief is, en enorme gevolgen voor onze samenleving kent. Het 
moge dus duidelijk zijn dat het belangrijk is dat we begrijpen waarom onethisch 
gedrag in organisaties zo veelvoorkomend is. 
Als gevolg van de wijdverbreide corruptie die bij organisaties speelt begint 
het onderzoek naar ethisch en onethisch bedrijfsgedrag de aandacht te krijgen die het 
verdient. Voorheen nam het onderzoek naar de bedrijfsethiek een normatief 
perspectief aan die zijn grondslag vindt in de filosofie en theologie (Treviño & 
Weaver, 1994). Deze benadering richt zich op hoe mensen en organisaties zich 
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zouden moeten gedragen. Het normatieve perspectief is gebaseerd op de autonomie 
en verantwoordelijkheid van mensen en heeft de aanname dat ethisch en onethisch 
gedrag voortvloeien uit de vrije keuze van een individu (Treviño & Weaver, 1994). 
Interessant genoeg gaat deze benadering er ook vanuit dat mensen rationele morele 
wezens zijn. Met andere woorden, mensen zouden zich bewust zijn van de ethische 
aspecten van een situatie en ze zouden daardoor bewust kiezen om zich “goed” of 
“slecht” te gedragen. 
Het wordt echter steeds duidelijker dat onethisch gedrag in en van 
organisaties slechts voor een heel klein deel kan worden toegeschreven aan een paar 
rotte appels aan de top. Sterker nog, onethisch gedrag is wijdverbreid en op elk 
niveau in de hiërarchische structuur komt onethisch gedrag voor. Het lijkt dus eerder 
zo te zijn dat het merendeel van onethisch gedragingen toe te schrijven is aan een 
tijdelijke beoordelingsfout van goede mensen. En inderdaad, de voorbeelden hiervan 
zijn legio en ook onderzoek heeft laten zien dat goede mensen soms slechte dingen 
doen (Bersoff, 1999). Mede hierdoor is een meer empirisch (i.e., beschrijvend) 
perspectief in de bedrijfsethiek ontstaan die voortkomt uit de management- en 
sociale wetenschappen. De empirische benadering richt zich op hoe individuen en 
organisaties zich daadwerkelijk gedragen in plaats van op hoe zij zich zouden 
moeten gedragen (Treviño & Weaver, 1994). Met andere woorden, deze benadering 
probeert ethisch en onethisch gedrag te beschrijven, uit te leggen, en/of te 
voorspellen door te bestuderen hoe individuen in organisaties beslissingen nemen 
wanneer zij voor een ethisch dilemma staan. Deze dissertatie past een dergelijke 
benadering toe om zo ons begrip van de oorzaken van ethisch en onethisch gedrag in 
organisaties te verbeteren door het combineren van recente bevindingen in de 
zelfregulatie en ethiek. 
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Huidig doctoraatsonderzoek 
Ethische en onethische besluitvorming in organisaties: de invloed van 
zelfregulatie 
 Zelfregulatie stelt mensen in staat om hun impulsen en verlangens te 
onderdrukken en hiervan af te zien wanneer dat nodig is (Baumeister, Heatherton, & 
Tice, 1994; Mischel, 1974; Muraven & Baumeister, 2000; Tangney, Baumeister, & 
Boone, 2004). Het zelfregulerend vermogen van mensen is ontzettend adaptief en 
zorgt ervoor dat mensen zich kunnen gedragen volgens de normen en regels van de 
samenleving (Baumeister, Vohs, & Tice, 2007; Mischel, 1974). Dit zien we ook 
terug in onderzoek dat laat zien dat een goede zelfregulatie samenhangt met diverse 
positieve uitkomsten zoals succes op het werk, verbeterde concentratie, beter kunnen 
omgaan met stress en problemen en zelfs met lagere scheidingscijfers. Tegengesteld 
hieraan zien we dan weer dat een slechte zelfregulatie samenhangt met depressie en 
diverse gedragsproblemen zoals agressie, het niet kunnen omgaan met geld en 
diefstal (Hagger, Wood, Stiff, & Chatzisarantis, 2010; Muraven, Tice, & 
Baumeister, 1998; Tangney et al., 2004). Het moge dus duidelijk zijn dat het 
zelfregulerend vermogen een belangrijke rol speelt in allerlei aspecten van ons 
leven. 
 Onderzoek naar het falen van het zelfregulerend vermogen suggereert dat de 
cognitieve energie die voor effectieve zelfregulatie nodig is niet onbeperkt 
beschikbaar is (Baumeister, Bratslavsky, Muraven, & Tice, 1998; Muraven et al., 
1998). Meer specifiek, alle gedragingen die zelfregulatie verbruiken nemen deze 
energie op uit één en dezelfde beperkte bron, die dus uitgeput kan raken bij 
herhaaldelijk gebruik (Muraven & Baumeister, 2000). Wanneer het zelfregulerend 
vermogen uitgeput is dan kan dat negatieve consequenties hebben voor ons gedrag 
(Baumeister et al., 1998; Hagger et al., 2010). Deze toestand, waarin het 
zelfregulerende vermogen verminderd is door een eerder gedrag dat om zelfregulatie 
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vroeg, wordt meestal omschreven als cognitieve uitputting (Baumeister et al., 1998). 
Onderzoek naar cognitieve uitputting toont aan dat na een gedrag dat om 
zelfregulatie vraagt (bijvoorbeeld het niet toegeven aan ongezonde verlangens, zoals 
het eten van chocolade of snoep, het onderdrukken van emoties of iets tegen je zin in 
doen) het zelfregulerend vermogen vermindert. Wat dan vervolgens consequenties 
heeft voor onze prestaties op andere taken die om zelfregulatie vragen (voor een 
overzicht zie Hagger et al., 2010). 
 Het idee dat zelfregulatie gelimiteerd is kan ook van belang zijn voor ons 
begrip van ethisch en onethisch gedrag van individuen in organisaties. Het is 
namelijk aannemelijk dat we zelfregulatie nodig hebben voor het vertonen van 
ethisch gedrag en het vermijden van onethisch gedrag (DeWall, Baumeister, 
Gailliot, & Maner, 2008). In overeenstemming hiermee heeft onderzoek laten zien 
dat na een gedraging die om zelfregulatie vraagt mensen minder geneigd zijn om 
andere mensen te helpen (DeWall et al., 2008), eerder vals spelen (Gino, Schweitzer, 
Mead, & Ariely, 2011; Mead, Baumeister, Gino, Schweitzer, & Ariely, 2009) en 
zich eerder agressief gedragen (DeWall, Baumeister, Stillman, & Gailliot, 2007). 
Het is waarschijnlijk dat deze bevindingen ook consequenties hebben voor 
organisaties. Onethisch gedrag, zoals het lekken van geheime bedrijfsinformatie of 
de diefstal van bedrijfseigendommen, kan namelijk voor serieuze problemen zorgen. 
Ethisch gedrag, zoals het aankaarten van lastige problemen en het helpen van 
leidinggevenden, collega’s en klanten, zorgt dan weer voor een betere effectiviteit 
van de organisatie (N. P. Podsakoff, Whiting, Podsakoff, & Blume, 2009; P. M. 
Podsakoff, MacKenzie, Paine, & Bachrach, 2000). Echter, diverse factoren die 
leiden tot uitputting van het zelfregulerend vermogen zijn alomtegenwoordig in de 
dagelijkse werkomgeving, zoals de noodzaak om veel beslissingen te nemen (Vohs 
et al., 2008), het maken van veel overuren die kunnen leiden tot een slaapgebrek 
(Barnes, Schaubroeck, Huth, & Ghumman, 2011; Christian & Ellis, 2011) en stress 
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(Muraven & Baumeister, 2000). Anders gezegd, een aantal zaken die inherent zijn 
aan de organisatorische context kunnen ethisch gedrag verminderen en/of onethisch 
gedrag bevorderen. 
Onderzoeksdoelstellingen en overzicht van de bevindingen 
Het huidig doctoraat gaat dieper in op de oorzaken van ethisch en onethisch 
gedrag in organisaties en kijkt daarvoor naar de invloed van zelfregulatie. In vier 
empirische hoofdstukken bestudeerden we verschillende concepten die gerelateerd 
aan de zelfregulatie van (on)ethisch gedrag. In Hoofdstuk 2 en 3 onderzochten we 
de invloed van cognitieve uitputting en individuele verschillen op de zelfregulatie 
van (on)ethisch gedrag. In Hoofdstuk 4 keken we naar de zelfregulatie van 
(on)ethisch gedrag van moment tot moment. Dit wil zeggen, naar de invloed van 
eerdere (on)ethische beslissingen op huidige ethische beslissingen. Ten slotte 
bestudeerden we in Hoofdstuk 5 het effect van misdragingen van leidinggevenden 
op de zelfregulatie van (on)ethisch gedrag. In dit laatste hoofdstuk keken we niet 
zozeer naar de invloed van het al dan niet beschikbaar zijn van zelfregulerende 
vermogens, maar onderzochten we het samenspel van de persoonlijkheden van 
leidinggevenden en hun werknemers. Om onze voorspellingen te testten gebruikten 
we diverse onderzoeksmethoden: experimenten met studenten en veldstudies in 
bedrijven waar we gegevens verzamelden van verschillende bronnen. 
De zelfregulatie van (on)ethisch gedrag in de werkcontext en de rol van 
individuele verschillen 
In Hoofdstuk 2 onderzochten we hoe het al dan niet beschikbaar zijn van 
het zelfregulerend vermogen onethisch gedrag van leidinggevenden beïnvloedt. 
Meer specifiek verwachtten we dat cognitieve uitputting zou leiden tot meer 
onethisch gedrag van leidinggevenden. Daarnaast beargumenteerden we dat morele 
identiteit een relevante variabele is voor dit effect. We weten dat morele identiteit 
een belangrijke motivator van ethisch gedrag is (Aquino & Reed, 2002; Blasi, 1980; 
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Hardy & Carlo, 2005), en deze variabele kan dus een effect hebben op hoeveel 
zelfregulerende vermogens mensen nodig hebben om zich ethisch te gedragen. 
Mensen met een hoge morele identiteit zullen namelijk vaker hun gedrag reguleren 
(i.e., zelfzuchtige impulsen onderdrukken), wat ethisch gedrag meer geïnternaliseerd 
en automatisch maakt (Seeley & Gardner, 2003); en zodoende hebben zij minder 
zelfregulerende vermogens nodig om zich ethisch te gedragen (cf. Aquino, Freeman, 
Reed, Lim, & Felps, 2009; Aquino & Reed, 2002; Reynolds & Ceranic, 2007). Het 
is dus aannemelijk dat mensen met een hoge morele identiteit minder vatbaar zijn 
voor de effecten van cognitieve uitputting op (on)ethisch gedrag dan mensen met 
een lage morele identiteit. 
Onze verwachtingen werden bevestigd in twee studies: een experiment en 
een veldonderzoek waarin we meerdere bronnen raadpleegden. In de experimentele 
studie manipuleerden we het al dan niet beschikbaar zijn van zelfregulerende 
vermogens bij de deelnemers. Uit de resultaten bleek dat wanneer het 
zelfregulerende vermogen uitgeput was, er meer onethisch leiderschapsgedrag was 
onder deelnemers met een lage morele identiteit. Daarentegen was er voor 
deelnemers met een hoge morele identiteit geen toename in onethisch 
leiderschapsgedrag bij cognitieve uitputting. Om onze resultaten ook naar een 
organisatorische context te kunnen generaliseren, voerden we ook nog een 
veldonderzoek uit. Doordat we in dit onderzoek gebruik maakten van verschillende 
soorten bronnen konden we het zelfregulerend vermogen en de morele identiteit van 
de leidinggevenden aan henzelf vragen, terwijl we het onethisch gedrag van de 
leidinggevenden zowel aan henzelf als aan hun collega konden vragen. Net zoals bij 
het experimenteel onderzoek vonden we bewijs voor de modererende rol van morele 
identiteit op de relatie tussen cognitieve uitputting en onethisch leiderschapsgedrag. 
Deze bevindingen suggereren dat leidinggevenden met een lage morele identiteit 
zelfregulerende vermogens nodig hebben om af te zien van onethisch 
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leiderschapsgedrag, terwijl voor leiders met een hoge morele identiteit ethisch 
gedrag minder afhangt van de beschikbaarheid van zelfregulerende vermogens. 
In Hoofdstuk 3 keken we naar de rol van cognitieve uitputting en morele 
identiteit in het voorspellen van ethisch gedrag (versus onethisch gedrag in 
Hoofdstuk 2). We beargumenteerden dat zelfzuchtigheid door onethisch gedrag te 
vertonen iets heel anders is dan zelfzuchtigheid door het niet vertonen van ethisch 
gedrag. We voorspelden dat mensen macht nodig hebben om het idee te hebben dat 
ze het zich kunnen veroorloven om af te zien van ethisch gedrag (zoals helpen). 
Mensen in een machtspositie zijn namelijk meer geneigd om af te wijken van de 
geldende normen (Briñol, Petty, Valle, Rucker, & Becerra, 2007). Zoals eerder al 
beargumenteerd leidt de combinatie van een lage morele identiteit en cognitieve 
uitputting tot zelfzuchtigheid. In Hoofdstuk 3 verwachtten we dat macht deze 
zelfzuchtigheid bevordert. 
We voerden twee studies uit om onze voorspellingen te testen. Een 
experimentele studie waarin we cognitieve uitputting en macht manipuleerden; en 
een veldstudie met meerdere bronnen waarin we cognitieve uitputting, morele 
identiteit en macht direct bij de respondenten maten, terwijl we collega’s van de 
respondenten vroegen naar het ethisch gedrag van de respondenten. In beide studies 
vonden we de voorspelde interactie tussen morele identiteit en cognitieve uitputting 
bij mensen met macht, maar niet bij mensen met een lage machtpositie. Het lijkt er 
dus op dat mensen met een hoge morele identiteit hun morele waarden beter 
beschikbaar hebben, zelfs wanneer hun zelfregulerende vermogens uitgeput zijn, 
onafhankelijk van hun machtspositie. Daarnaast laten onze resultaten ook zien dat 
sociale macht mensen in staat stelt om af te zien van ethisch gedrag. 
Samenvattend kunnen we stellen dat de resultaten van Hoofdstuk 2 en 3 
laten zien dat mensen met een hoge morele identiteit minder vatbaar zijn voor de 
effecten van cognitieve uitputting op onethisch en ethisch gedrag in de werkcontext. 
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Het lijkt er op dat mensen met een hoge morele identiteit meer effectief zijn in het 
reguleren van hun gedrag dan mensen met een lage morele identiteit. 
De zelfregulatie van (on)ethisch gedrag in de werkcontext en de rol van 
gedragsgeschiedenis 
In Hoofdstuk 4 bestudeerden we hoe mensen morele beslissingen nemen 
van moment tot moment, een proces dat ook wel wordt omschreven als morele 
zelfregulatie. Morele zelfregulatie onderzoekt hoe mensen keuzes maken tussen 
ethisch en onethisch gedrag door te kijken naar hun gedragsgeschiedenis (Monin & 
Miller, 2001; Zhong & Liljenquist, 2006; Zhong, Liljenquist, & Cain, 2009). 
Hoewel dit onderzoek laat zien dat zelfregulatie processen belangrijk zijn bij het 
onderzoek naar ethisch en onethisch gedrag, geeft het ons ook uiteenlopende 
resultaten. Aan de ene kant is er onderzoek dat laat zien dat iemand die zich moreel 
(vs. immoreel) voelt eerder ethisch (vs. onethisch) gedrag laat zien (een proces dat 
we morele consistentie noemen). Aan de andere kant is er onderzoek dat laat zien 
dat iemand die zich moreel (vs. immoreel) voelt eerder onethisch (vs. ethisch) 
gedrag laat zien (een proces dat we morele compensatie noemen). In Hoofdstuk 3 
trachtten we om deze uiteenlopende resultaten samen te brengen. We deden dit door 
te beargumenteren dat morele consistentie en morele compensatie beide specifieke 
manieren zijn om met reputatiezorgen om te gaan. We verwachtten dat morele 
consistentie een meer proactieve manier van reputatiemanagement is, terwijl morele 
compensatie eerder een reactieve, “damage control” respons is in sociale situaties. 
We voerden twee experimentele studies uit om onze hypothese te testen. 
Hierbij manipuleerden we of deelnemers zich moreel versus immoreel voelden. 
Hiervoor gebruikten we een algemeen gangbare manipulatie waarbij aan deelnemers 
wordt gevraagd om een situatie te beschrijven waarin ze zich op een morele (versus 
immorele) manier gedroegen (zie bijvoorbeeld Aquino et al., 2009; Sachdeva, Iliev, 
& Medin, 2009). Om reputatiezorgen teweeg te brengen, zorgden we ervoor dat alle 
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deelnemers geloofden dat ze samen met anderen in een team werkten. Onderzoek 
heeft aangetoond dat een reactieve (versus proactieve) respons vaker optreedt in 
situaties waarin cognitieve vermogens beperkt worden (Parker, Williams, & Turner, 
2006; Rusbult & Van Lange, 2003). Dus, om een reactieve (of proactieve) respons van 
deelnemers te ontlokken, manipuleerden we de mate waarin deelnemers cognitieve 
vermogens beschikbaar hadden door een taak te gebruiken die al dan niet zorgt voor 
cognitieve uitputting. Het eerste experiment toonde aan dat deelnemers die niet 
cognitief uitgeput waren (i.e., wat dus een proactieve, lange-termijn oriëntatie op 
reputatiemanagement mogelijk maakt) morele consistentie lieten zien, terwijl 
deelnemers die cognitief uitgeput waren (i.e., wat dus voor een meer reactieve 
oriëntatie op reputatiemanagement zorgt) morele compensatie lieten zien. 
In het tweede experiment wilden we deze resultaten niet alleen repliceren, we 
wilden ook meer expliciet testen in hoeverre reputatiezorgen meespelen bij morele 
consistentie en compensatie. Daarom varieerden we in hoeverre deelnemers 
verantwoordelijk waren voor hun acties. We verwachtten dat als reputatiezorgen 
inderdaad verantwoordelijk zijn voor het optreden van morele consistentie en morele 
compensatie, deze ook voornamelijk gevonden zouden moeten worden wanneer 
mensen verantwoordelijk worden gehouden voor hun daden. De resultaten waren in lijn 
met onze verwachtingen, deelnemers die niet cognitief uitgeput waren (i.e., en dus een 
proactieve oriëntatie hadden) lieten morele consistentie zien, terwijl deelnemers die 
cognitief uitgeput waren (i.e., en dus een reactieve oriëntatie hadden) morele 
compensatie lieten zien. Deze resultaten vonden we alleen wanneer deelnemers 
verantwoordelijk voor hun daden waren. Deelnemers die geen verantwoording voor 
hun daden hoefden af te leggen lieten noch morele consistentie, noch morele 
compensatie zien. Uit deze resultaten blijkt dus dat zowel morele consistentie als 
morele compensatie optreden door reputatiezorgen. 
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De zelfregulatie van (on)ethisch gedrag in de werkcontext en het samenspel 
tussen persoonlijkheden 
In Hoofdstuk 5 onderzochten we de rol die een slechte behandeling van een 
leidinggevende heeft op het optreden van onethisch gedrag. We beargumenteerden 
dat leiders met een neurotische persoonlijkheid hun werknemers eerder slecht 
behandelen, waardoor deze werknemers eerder geneigd zijn om zich meer onethisch 
te gedragen. In dit hoofdstuk kijken we meer specifiek naar de context waarin 
slechte behandeling van een leidinggevende zich voordoet. In overeenstemming met 
de trekken activatie theorie (TAT; Tett & Burnett, 2003), beargumenteerden we dat 
de activatie van de neurotische persoonlijkheidstrek van leiders afhankelijk is van de 
aanwezigheid van trek-relevante wenken in de sociale context. Natuurlijk is de 
persoonlijkheid van werknemers een relevant aspect in de sociale context van 
leidinggevenden. We stelden dat werknemers met een neurotische persoonlijkheid 
meer sociale exclusie wenken laten zien (e.g., Morse, Sauerberger, Todd, & Funder, 
2015) en dat juist leidinggevenden met een neurotische persoonlijkheid gevoeliger 
zijn voor deze vorm van sociale dreiging (e.g., Denissen & Penke, 2008; Matthews, 
2004). Dus het is waarschijnlijk dat de neurotische persoonlijkheid van 
leidinggevenden wordt geactiveerd door de exclusie wenken van neurotische 
werknemers. We verwachtten dus dat de neurotische persoonlijkheid van 
werknemers interageert met de neurotische persoonlijkheid van leidinggevenden in 
het voorspellen van slechte behandeling van een leidinggevenden en dus van het 
onethisch gedrag van werknemers. Met andere woorden, de link tussen leider 
neuroticisme en de slechte behandeling van die leider wordt versterkt wanneer de 
werknemer ook een neurotische persoonlijkheid heeft. En dit heeft dan weer 
negatieve consequenties voor het onethisch gedrag van werknemers. 
Om onze hypothesen te toetsen voerden we twee studies uit: een 
experimentele studie waarin we aantoonden dat werknemers met een neurotische 
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persoonlijkheid meer sociale exclusie wenken laten zien aan hun leidinggevende; en 
een veldstudie waarin we setjes van leidinggevende en werknemer benaderden. 
Zowel leidinggevenden als werknemers gaven hun niveau van neuroticisme aan, 
maar de leidinggevende beoordeelde het onethisch gedrag van de werknemer, terwijl 
werknemers beoordeelden in welke mate hun leidinggevende hen slecht behandelde 
en in welke mate zij zelf sociale exclusie wenken lieten zien. In deze tweede studie 
vonden we ondersteuning voor ons volledige model. Dat wil zeggen, we vonden dat 
leidinggevenden die hoog scoorden op neuroticisme eerder hun werknemer slecht 
behandelden, vooral wanneer deze werknemer ook hoog scoorde op neuroticisme, 
een effect dat verklaard werd door de sociale exclusie wenken van werknemers met 
een neurotische persoonlijkheid. Deze slechte behandeling van leidinggevenden had 
op zijn beurt dan weer tot gevolg dat de werknemers zich eerder onethisch 
gedroegen. 
Conclusie 
 Deze dissertatie draagt bij aan de literatuur over ethisch en onethisch gedrag in 
een organisatie context door te kijken naar de invloed van zelfregulatie. Onze 
bevindingen tonen aan dat cognitieve uitputting ethisch gedrag belet en onethisch 
gedrag bevordert in een organisatorische context. Deze dissertatie verbetert onze kennis 
van het belang van individuele verschillen (morele identiteit), gedragsgeschiedenis en 
slechte behandeling van een leidinggevende voor de zelfregulatie van (on)ethisch 
gedrag. 
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Data Storage Fact Sheets 
 
In this appendix, data storage fact sheets for each study appearing in this dissertation 
are included.  
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% Data Storage Fact Sheet Chapter 2, Study 1 
 
% Name/identifier study: Leader self-regulation 
% Author: Anne Joosten 
% Date: 16/07/2015 
 
 
1. Contact details 
=========================================================== 
 
1a. Main researcher 
----------------------------------------------------------- 
- name: Anne Joosten 
- address: Henri Dunantlaan 2, 9000 Ghent, Belgium 
- e-mail: anne.joosten@ugent.be 
 
1b. Responsible Staff Member (ZAP)  
----------------------------------------------------------- 
- name: Alain Van Hiel 
- address: Henri Dunantlaan 2, 9000 Ghent, Belgium 
- e-mail: alain.vanhiel@ugent.be 
 
If a response is not received when using the above contact details, please send an 
email to data.pp@ugent.be or contact Data Management, Faculty of Psychology and 
Educational Sciences, Henri Dunantlaan 2, 9000 Ghent, Belgium. 
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2. Information about the datasets to which this sheet applies  
=========================================================== 
* Reference of the publication in which the datasets are reported: 
DOI 10.1007/s10551-013-1686-2 
* Which datasets in that publication does this sheet apply to?: 
Study 1 
 
 
3. Information about the files that have been stored 
=========================================================== 
 
 
3a. Raw data 
----------------------------------------------------------- 
 
* Have the raw data been stored by the main researcher? [x] YES / [ ] NO 
If NO, please justify: 
 
* On which platform are the raw data stored? 
  - [x] researcher PC 
  - [x] research group file server 
  - [ ] other (specify): ... 
 
* Who has direct access to the raw data (i.e., without intervention of another 
person)? 
  - [x] main researcher 
  - [x] responsible ZAP 
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  - [x] all members of the research group 
  - [ ] all members of UGent 
  - [ ] other (specify): ... 
    
 
3b. Other files 
----------------------------------------------------------- 
 
* Which other files have been stored? 
  - [x] file(s) describing the transition from raw data to reported results. Specify: 
described in detail in SPSS syntax file on my pc/fileserver 
  - [x] file(s) containing processed data. Specify: SPSS datafile ready for analyses is 
stored on my pc/fileserver 
  - [x] file(s) containing analyses. Specify: specified in SPSS syntax file on my 
pc/fileserver 
  - [x] files(s) containing information about informed consent. Specify: a blank copy 
is saved on my PC 
  - [ ] a file specifying legal and ethical provisions  
  - [ ] file(s) that describe the content of the stored files and how this content should 
be interpreted. Specify: ...  
  - [ ] other files. Specify: ... 
 
     
* On which platform are these other files stored?  
  - [x] individual PC 
  - [x] research group file server 
  - [ ] other: ...     
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* Who has direct access to these other files (i.e., without intervention of another 
person)?  
  - [x] main researcher 
  - [x] responsible ZAP 
  - [x] all members of the research group 
  - [ ] all members of UGent 
  - [ ] other (specify): ...     
 
 
4. Reproduction  
=========================================================== 
* Have the results been reproduced independently?: [ ] YES / [x] NO 
 
* If yes, by whom (add if multiple): 
   - name:  
   - address:  
   - affiliation:  
   - e-mail:  
 
    
v0.2 
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% Data Storage Fact Sheet Chapter 2, Study 2 
 
% Name/identifier study: Leader self-regulation 
% Author: Anne Joosten 
% Date: 16/07/2015 
 
 
1. Contact details 
=========================================================== 
 
1a. Main researcher 
----------------------------------------------------------- 
- name: Anne Joosten 
- address: Henri Dunantlaan 2, 9000 Ghent, Belgium 
- e-mail: anne.joosten@ugent.be 
 
1b. Responsible Staff Member (ZAP)  
----------------------------------------------------------- 
- name: Alain Van Hiel 
- address: Henri Dunantlaan 2, 9000 Ghent, Belgium 
- e-mail: alain.vanhiel@ugent.be 
 
1c. Copromotor (collected the raw data) 
----------------------------------------------------------- 
- name: Marius van Dijke (Rotterdam School of Management) 
- address: Burgemeester Oudlaan 50, 3062 PA Rotterdam, The Netherlands 
- e-mail: mvandijke@rsm.nl 
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If a response is not received when using the above contact details, please send an 
email to data.pp@ugent.be or contact Data Management, Faculty of Psychology and 
Educational Sciences, Henri Dunantlaan 2, 9000 Ghent, Belgium. 
 
 
2. Information about the datasets to which this sheet applies  
=========================================================== 
* Reference of the publication in which the datasets are reported: 
DOI 10.1007/s10551-013-1686-2 
* Which datasets in that publication does this sheet apply to?: 
Study 2 
 
 
3. Information about the files that have been stored 
=========================================================== 
 
 
3a. Raw data 
----------------------------------------------------------- 
 
* Have the raw data been stored by the main researcher? [x] YES / [ ] NO 
If NO, please justify:  
 
* On which platform are the raw data stored? 
  - [x] researcher PC 
  - [x] research group file server 
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  - [x] other (specify): the raw data were collected and owned by a third party 
(copromotor) 
 
* Who has direct access to the raw data (i.e., without intervention of another 
person)? 
  - [x] main researcher 
  - [x] responsible ZAP 
  - [x] all members of the research group 
  - [ ] all members of UGent 
  - [x] other (specify): the raw data were collected and owned by a third party 
(copromotor) 
    
 
3b. Other files 
----------------------------------------------------------- 
 
* Which other files have been stored? 
  - [x] file(s) describing the transition from raw data to reported results. Specify: 
described in detail in SPSS syntax file on my pc/fileserver 
  - [x] file(s) containing processed data. Specify: SPSS datafile ready for analyses is 
stored on my pc/fileserver 
  - [x] file(s) containing analyses. Specify: specified in SPSS syntax file on my 
pc/fileserver 
  - [ ] files(s) containing information about informed consent  
  - [ ] a file specifying legal and ethical provisions  
  - [ ] file(s) that describe the content of the stored files and how this content should 
be interpreted. Specify: ...  
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  - [ ] other files. Specify: ... 
 
     
* On which platform are these other files stored?  
  - [x] individual PC 
  - [x] research group file server 
  - [ ] other: ...     
 
* Who has direct access to these other files (i.e., without intervention of another 
person)?  
  - [x] main researcher 
  - [x] responsible ZAP 
  - [x] all members of the research group 
  - [ ] all members of UGent 
  - [ ] other (specify): ...     
 
 
4. Reproduction  
=========================================================== 
* Have the results been reproduced independently?: [ ] YES / [x] NO 
 
* If yes, by whom (add if multiple): 
   - name:  
   - address:  
   - affiliation:  
   - e-mail: 
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% Data Storage Fact Sheet Chapter 3, Study 1 
 
% Name/identifier study: Power, self-control, and moral identity 
% Author: Anne Joosten 
% Date: 12/05/2016 
 
 
1. Contact details 
=========================================================== 
 
1a. Main researcher 
----------------------------------------------------------- 
- name: Anne Joosten 
- address: Henri Dunantlaan 2, 9000 Ghent, Belgium 
- e-mail: anne.joosten@ugent.be 
 
1b. Responsible Staff Member (ZAP)  
----------------------------------------------------------- 
- name: Alain Van Hiel 
- address: Henri Dunantlaan 2, 9000 Ghent, Belgium 
- e-mail: alain.vanhiel@ugent.be 
 
If a response is not received when using the above contact details, please send an 
email to data.pp@ugent.be or contact Data Management, Faculty of Psychology and 
Educational Sciences, Henri Dunantlaan 2, 9000 Ghent, Belgium. 
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2. Information about the datasets to which this sheet applies  
=========================================================== 
* Reference of the publication in which the datasets are reported: 
DOI 10.1371/journal.pone.0126377 
* Which datasets in that publication does this sheet apply to?: 
Study 1 
 
 
3. Information about the files that have been stored 
=========================================================== 
 
 
3a. Raw data 
----------------------------------------------------------- 
 
* Have the raw data been stored by the main researcher? [x] YES / [ ] NO 
If NO, please justify: 
 
* On which platform are the raw data stored? 
  - [x] researcher PC 
  - [x] research group file server 
  - [ ] other (specify): ... 
 
* Who has direct access to the raw data (i.e., without intervention of another 
person)? 
  - [x] main researcher 
  - [x] responsible ZAP 
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  - [x] all members of the research group 
  - [ ] all members of UGent 
  - [ ] other (specify): ... 
    
 
3b. Other files 
----------------------------------------------------------- 
 
* Which other files have been stored? 
  - [x] file(s) describing the transition from raw data to reported results. Specify: 
described in detail in SPSS syntax file on my pc/fileserver 
  - [x] file(s) containing processed data. Specify: SPSS datafile ready for analyses is 
stored on my pc/fileserver 
  - [x] file(s) containing analyses. Specify: specified in SPSS syntax file on my 
pc/fileserver 
  - [x] files(s) containing information about informed consent. Specify: a blank copy 
is saved on my PC 
  - [ ] a file specifying legal and ethical provisions  
  - [ ] file(s) that describe the content of the stored files and how this content should 
be interpreted. Specify: ...  
  - [ ] other files. Specify: ... 
 
     
* On which platform are these other files stored?  
  - [x] individual PC 
  - [x] research group file server 
  - [ ] other: ...     
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* Who has direct access to these other files (i.e., without intervention of another 
person)?  
  - [x] main researcher 
  - [x] responsible ZAP 
  - [x] all members of the research group 
  - [ ] all members of UGent 
  - [ ] other (specify): ...     
 
 
4. Reproduction  
=========================================================== 
* Have the results been reproduced independently?: [ ] YES / [x] NO 
 
* If yes, by whom (add if multiple): 
   - name:  
   - address:  
   - affiliation:  
   - e-mail:  
 
    
v0.2 
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% Data Storage Fact Sheet Chapter 3, Study 2 
 
% Name/identifier study: Power, self-control, and moral identity 
% Author: Anne Joosten 
% Date: 12/05/2016 
 
 
1. Contact details 
=========================================================== 
 
1a. Main researcher 
----------------------------------------------------------- 
- name: Anne Joosten 
- address: Henri Dunantlaan 2, 9000 Ghent, Belgium 
- e-mail: anne.joosten@ugent.be 
 
1b. Responsible Staff Member (ZAP)  
----------------------------------------------------------- 
- name: Alain Van Hiel 
- address: Henri Dunantlaan 2, 9000 Ghent, Belgium 
- e-mail: alain.vanhiel@ugent.be 
 
If a response is not received when using the above contact details, please send an 
email to data.pp@ugent.be or contact Data Management, Faculty of Psychology and 
Educational Sciences, Henri Dunantlaan 2, 9000 Ghent, Belgium. 
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2. Information about the datasets to which this sheet applies  
=========================================================== 
* Reference of the publication in which the datasets are reported: 
DOI 10.1371/journal.pone.0126377 
* Which datasets in that publication does this sheet apply to?: 
Study 2 
 
 
3. Information about the files that have been stored 
=========================================================== 
 
 
3a. Raw data 
----------------------------------------------------------- 
 
* Have the raw data been stored by the main researcher? [x] YES / [ ] NO 
If NO, please justify:  
 
* On which platform are the raw data stored? 
  - [x] researcher PC 
  - [x] research group file server 
  - [x] other (specify): data were collected in collaboration with several other 
researchers 
 
* Who has direct access to the raw data (i.e., without intervention of another 
person)? 
  - [x] main researcher 
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  - [x] responsible ZAP 
  - [x] all members of the research group 
  - [ ] all members of UGent 
  - [x] other (specify): data were collected in collaboration with several other 
researchers 
    
 
3b. Other files 
----------------------------------------------------------- 
 
* Which other files have been stored? 
  - [x] file(s) describing the transition from raw data to reported results. Specify: 
described in detail in SPSS syntax file on my pc/fileserver 
  - [x] file(s) containing processed data. Specify: SPSS datafile ready for analyses is 
stored on my pc/fileserver 
  - [x] file(s) containing analyses. Specify: specified in SPSS syntax file on my 
pc/fileserver 
  - [ ] files(s) containing information about informed consent  
  - [ ] a file specifying legal and ethical provisions  
  - [ ] file(s) that describe the content of the stored files and how this content should 
be interpreted. Specify: ...  
  - [ ] other files. Specify: ... 
 
     
* On which platform are these other files stored?  
  - [x] individual PC 
  - [x] research group file server 
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  - [ ] other: ...     
 
* Who has direct access to these other files (i.e., without intervention of another 
person)?  
  - [x] main researcher 
  - [x] responsible ZAP 
  - [x] all members of the research group 
  - [ ] all members of UGent 
  - [ ] other (specify): ...     
 
 
4. Reproduction  
=========================================================== 
* Have the results been reproduced independently?: [ ] YES / [x] NO 
 
* If yes, by whom (add if multiple): 
   - name:  
   - address:  
   - affiliation:  
   - e-mail: 
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% Data Storage Fact Sheet Chapter 4, Study 1 
 
% Name/identifier study: Moral consistency and compensation 
% Author: Anne Joosten 
% Date: 12/05/2016 
 
 
1. Contact details 
=========================================================== 
 
1a. Main researcher 
----------------------------------------------------------- 
- name: Anne Joosten 
- address: Henri Dunantlaan 2, 9000 Ghent, Belgium 
- e-mail: anne.joosten@ugent.be 
 
1b. Responsible Staff Member (ZAP)  
----------------------------------------------------------- 
- name: Alain Van Hiel 
- address: Henri Dunantlaan 2, 9000 Ghent, Belgium 
- e-mail: alain.vanhiel@ugent.be 
 
If a response is not received when using the above contact details, please send an 
email to data.pp@ugent.be or contact Data Management, Faculty of Psychology and 
Educational Sciences, Henri Dunantlaan 2, 9000 Ghent, Belgium. 
 
 
Appendix: Data storage fact sheets                                                                                                                  245 
 
2. Information about the datasets to which this sheet applies  
=========================================================== 
* Reference of the publication in which the datasets are reported: 
DOI 10.1007/s10551-013-1794-z 
* Which datasets in that publication does this sheet apply to?: 
Study 1 
 
 
3. Information about the files that have been stored 
=========================================================== 
 
 
3a. Raw data 
----------------------------------------------------------- 
 
* Have the raw data been stored by the main researcher? [x] YES / [ ] NO 
If NO, please justify: 
 
* On which platform are the raw data stored? 
  - [x] researcher PC 
  - [x] research group file server 
  - [ ] other (specify): ... 
 
* Who has direct access to the raw data (i.e., without intervention of another 
person)? 
  - [x] main researcher 
  - [x] responsible ZAP 
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  - [x] all members of the research group 
  - [ ] all members of UGent 
  - [ ] other (specify): ... 
    
 
3b. Other files 
----------------------------------------------------------- 
 
* Which other files have been stored? 
  - [x] file(s) describing the transition from raw data to reported results. Specify: 
described in detail in SPSS syntax file on my pc/fileserver 
  - [x] file(s) containing processed data. Specify: SPSS datafile ready for analyses is 
stored on my pc/fileserver 
  - [x] file(s) containing analyses. Specify: specified in SPSS syntax file on my 
pc/fileserver 
  - [x] files(s) containing information about informed consent. Specify: a blank copy 
is saved on my PC 
  - [ ] a file specifying legal and ethical provisions  
  - [ ] file(s) that describe the content of the stored files and how this content should 
be interpreted. Specify: ...  
  - [ ] other files. Specify: ... 
 
     
* On which platform are these other files stored?  
  - [x] individual PC 
  - [x] research group file server 
  - [ ] other: ...     
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* Who has direct access to these other files (i.e., without intervention of another 
person)?  
  - [x] main researcher 
  - [x] responsible ZAP 
  - [x] all members of the research group 
  - [ ] all members of UGent 
  - [ ] other (specify): ...     
 
 
4. Reproduction  
=========================================================== 
* Have the results been reproduced independently?: [ ] YES / [x] NO 
 
* If yes, by whom (add if multiple): 
   - name:  
   - address:  
   - affiliation:  
   - e-mail:  
 
    
v0.2 
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% Data Storage Fact Sheet Chapter 4, Study 2 
 
% Name/identifier study: Moral consistency and compensation 
% Author: Anne Joosten 
% Date: 12/05/2016 
 
 
1. Contact details 
=========================================================== 
 
1a. Main researcher 
----------------------------------------------------------- 
- name: Anne Joosten 
- address: Henri Dunantlaan 2, 9000 Ghent, Belgium 
- e-mail: anne.joosten@ugent.be 
 
1b. Responsible Staff Member (ZAP)  
----------------------------------------------------------- 
- name: Alain Van Hiel 
- address: Henri Dunantlaan 2, 9000 Ghent, Belgium 
- e-mail: alain.vanhiel@ugent.be 
 
If a response is not received when using the above contact details, please send an 
email to data.pp@ugent.be or contact Data Management, Faculty of Psychology and 
Educational Sciences, Henri Dunantlaan 2, 9000 Ghent, Belgium. 
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2. Information about the datasets to which this sheet applies  
=========================================================== 
* Reference of the publication in which the datasets are reported: 
DOI 10.1007/s10551-013-1794-z 
* Which datasets in that publication does this sheet apply to?: 
Study 2 
 
 
3. Information about the files that have been stored 
=========================================================== 
 
 
3a. Raw data 
----------------------------------------------------------- 
 
* Have the raw data been stored by the main researcher? [x] YES / [ ] NO 
If NO, please justify: 
 
* On which platform are the raw data stored? 
  - [x] researcher PC 
  - [x] research group file server 
  - [ ] other (specify): ... 
 
* Who has direct access to the raw data (i.e., without intervention of another 
person)? 
  - [x] main researcher 
  - [x] responsible ZAP 
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  - [x] all members of the research group 
  - [ ] all members of UGent 
  - [ ] other (specify): ... 
    
 
3b. Other files 
----------------------------------------------------------- 
 
* Which other files have been stored? 
  - [x] file(s) describing the transition from raw data to reported results. Specify: 
described in detail in SPSS syntax file on my pc/fileserver 
  - [x] file(s) containing processed data. Specify: SPSS datafile ready for analyses is 
stored on my pc/fileserver 
  - [x] file(s) containing analyses. Specify: specified in SPSS syntax file on my 
pc/fileserver 
  - [x] files(s) containing information about informed consent. Specify: a blank copy 
is saved on my PC 
  - [ ] a file specifying legal and ethical provisions  
  - [ ] file(s) that describe the content of the stored files and how this content should 
be interpreted. Specify: ...  
  - [ ] other files. Specify: ... 
 
     
* On which platform are these other files stored?  
  - [x] individual PC 
  - [x] research group file server 
  - [ ] other: ...     
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* Who has direct access to these other files (i.e., without intervention of another 
person)?  
  - [x] main researcher 
  - [x] responsible ZAP 
  - [x] all members of the research group 
  - [ ] all members of UGent 
  - [ ] other (specify): ...     
 
 
4. Reproduction  
=========================================================== 
* Have the results been reproduced independently?: [ ] YES / [x] NO 
 
* If yes, by whom (add if multiple): 
   - name:  
   - address:  
   - affiliation:  
   - e-mail:  
 
    
v0.2 
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% Data Storage Fact Sheet Chapter 5, Study 1 
 
% Name/identifier study: Insecurity breeds negativity 
% Author: Anne Joosten 
% Date: 12/05/2016 
 
 
1. Contact details 
=========================================================== 
 
1a. Main researcher 
----------------------------------------------------------- 
- name: Anne Joosten 
- address: Henri Dunantlaan 2, 9000 Ghent, Belgium 
- e-mail: anne.joosten@ugent.be 
 
1b. Responsible Staff Member (ZAP)  
----------------------------------------------------------- 
- name: Alain Van Hiel 
- address: Henri Dunantlaan 2, 9000 Ghent, Belgium 
- e-mail: alain.vanhiel@ugent.be 
 
If a response is not received when using the above contact details, please send an 
email to data.pp@ugent.be or contact Data Management, Faculty of Psychology and 
Educational Sciences, Henri Dunantlaan 2, 9000 Ghent, Belgium. 
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2. Information about the datasets to which this sheet applies  
=========================================================== 
* Reference of the publication in which the datasets are reported: 
Joosten, A., van Dijke, M., De Cremer, D., Bostyn, D. H., & Van Hiel, A.. (re-
submitted (R2) for peer review). Insecurity breeds Negativity: Synergetic Effects of 
Employee and Leader Neuroticism on Abusive Supervision and Antisocial Work 
Behavior. Journal of Applied Psychology 
* Which datasets in that publication does this sheet apply to?: 
Study 1 
 
 
3. Information about the files that have been stored 
=========================================================== 
 
 
3a. Raw data 
----------------------------------------------------------- 
 
* Have the raw data been stored by the main researcher? [x] YES / [ ] NO 
If NO, please justify: 
 
* On which platform are the raw data stored? 
  - [x] researcher PC 
  - [x] research group file server 
  - [ ] other (specify): ... 
 
254                                                                                                                  Appendix: Data storage fact sheets  
 
* Who has direct access to the raw data (i.e., without intervention of another 
person)? 
  - [x] main researcher 
  - [x] responsible ZAP 
  - [x] all members of the research group 
  - [ ] all members of UGent 
  - [ ] other (specify): ... 
    
 
3b. Other files 
----------------------------------------------------------- 
 
* Which other files have been stored? 
  - [x] file(s) describing the transition from raw data to reported results. Specify: 
described in detail in SPSS syntax file on my pc/fileserver 
  - [x] file(s) containing processed data. Specify: SPSS datafile ready for analyses is 
stored on my pc/fileserver 
  - [x] file(s) containing analyses. Specify: specified in SPSS syntax file on my 
pc/fileserver 
  - [ ] files(s) containing information about informed consent. Specify: a blank copy 
is saved on my PC 
  - [ ] a file specifying legal and ethical provisions  
  - [ ] file(s) that describe the content of the stored files and how this content should 
be interpreted. Specify: ...  
  - [ ] other files. Specify: ... 
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* On which platform are these other files stored?  
  - [x] individual PC 
  - [x] research group file server 
  - [ ] other: ...     
 
* Who has direct access to these other files (i.e., without intervention of another 
person)?  
  - [x] main researcher 
  - [x] responsible ZAP 
  - [x] all members of the research group 
  - [ ] all members of UGent 
  - [ ] other (specify): ...     
 
 
4. Reproduction  
=========================================================== 
* Have the results been reproduced independently?: [ ] YES / [x] NO 
 
* If yes, by whom (add if multiple): 
   - name:  
   - address:  
   - affiliation:  
   - e-mail:  
 
    
v0.2 
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% Data Storage Fact Sheet Chapter 5, Study 2 
 
% Name/identifier study: Insecurity breeds negativity 
% Author: Anne Joosten 
% Date: 12/05/2016 
 
 
1. Contact details 
=========================================================== 
 
1a. Main researcher 
----------------------------------------------------------- 
- name: Anne Joosten 
- address: Henri Dunantlaan 2, 9000 Ghent, Belgium 
- e-mail: anne.joosten@ugent.be 
 
1b. Responsible Staff Member (ZAP)  
----------------------------------------------------------- 
- name: Alain Van Hiel 
- address: Henri Dunantlaan 2, 9000 Ghent, Belgium 
- e-mail: alain.vanhiel@ugent.be 
 
If a response is not received when using the above contact details, please send an 
email to data.pp@ugent.be or contact Data Management, Faculty of Psychology and 
Educational Sciences, Henri Dunantlaan 2, 9000 Ghent, Belgium. 
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2. Information about the datasets to which this sheet applies  
=========================================================== 
* Reference of the publication in which the datasets are reported: 
Joosten, A., van Dijke, M., De Cremer, D., Bostyn, D. H., & Van Hiel, A.. (re-
submitted (R2) for peer review). Insecurity breeds Negativity: Synergetic Effects of 
Employee and Leader Neuroticism on Abusive Supervision and Antisocial Work 
Behavior. Journal of Applied Psychology 
* Which datasets in that publication does this sheet apply to?: 
Study 2 
 
 
3. Information about the files that have been stored 
=========================================================== 
 
 
3a. Raw data 
----------------------------------------------------------- 
 
* Have the raw data been stored by the main researcher? [x] YES / [ ] NO 
If NO, please justify:  
 
* On which platform are the raw data stored? 
  - [x] researcher PC 
  - [x] research group file server 
  - [x] other (specify): data were collected in collaboration with several other 
researchers 
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* Who has direct access to the raw data (i.e., without intervention of another 
person)? 
  - [x] main researcher 
  - [x] responsible ZAP 
  - [x] all members of the research group 
  - [ ] all members of UGent 
  - [x] other (specify): data were collected in collaboration with several other 
researchers 
    
 
3b. Other files 
----------------------------------------------------------- 
 
* Which other files have been stored? 
  - [x] file(s) describing the transition from raw data to reported results. Specify: 
described in detail in SPSS syntax file on my pc/fileserver 
  - [x] file(s) containing processed data. Specify: SPSS datafile ready for analyses is 
stored on my pc/fileserver 
  - [x] file(s) containing analyses. Specify: analyses are performed by Dries H. 
Bostyn and are stored on his and my pc/fileserver 
  - [ ] files(s) containing information about informed consent  
  - [ ] a file specifying legal and ethical provisions  
  - [ ] file(s) that describe the content of the stored files and how this content should 
be interpreted. Specify: ...  
  - [ ] other files. Specify: ... 
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* On which platform are these other files stored?  
  - [x] individual PC 
  - [x] research group file server 
  - [x] other: PC Dries H. Bostyn 
 
* Who has direct access to these other files (i.e., without intervention of another 
person)?  
  - [x] main researcher 
  - [x] responsible ZAP 
  - [x] all members of the research group 
  - [ ] all members of UGent 
  - [ ] other (specify): ...     
 
 
4. Reproduction  
=========================================================== 
* Have the results been reproduced independently?: [ ] YES / [x] NO 
 
* If yes, by whom (add if multiple): 
   - name:  
   - address:  
   - affiliation:  
   - e-mail: 
 
